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Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on the Chinese cross-border M&As (mergers and 
acquisitions) market of public companies‟ performance. The study precisely identifies 
short-term performance surrounding a M&A announcement that a public Chinese 
company is acquiring an overseas firm or is being targeted. The key words of these 
three chapters are method of payment, public status, and acquirer industry. 
 
This study measures short-term performance by investigating CARs (cumulative 
average abnormal returns). The windows are approximately 2 days and 5 days before 
and after a M&A announcement. The time span is 15 years (2002–2016) for Chinese 
public companies‟ cross-border transactions and 23 years (1994-2016) for transactions 
targeting Chinese public companies. The first chapter demonstrates that cash 
transactions outperform stock transactions although more public Chinese companies 
chose stock to finance transactions. The second chapter demonstrates that an acquired 
public overseas target underperforms compared with targeting private companies. In 
addition, the transaction volume indicates that most bidder companies made the right 
decision. The third chapter demonstrates that overseas financial institutions are more 
likely (over 60% of transactions) to acquire Chinese public companies in all industries. 
These investors do bring abnormal returns to their target companies.  
ii 
 
Executive Summary 
This dissertation advises cross-border corporations and institutions on complex 
strategic and financial needs in Chinese stock markets and around the world. 
Whatever the challenge or opportunity, this dissertation provides a complete 
cross-border M&A offering to address transaction needs. Drawing upon data, 
methodology and regional market insight, this study may evaluate any business 
with a long-term view to providing comprehensive and integrated solutions to 
cross-border M&A needs. 
 
There are statistical summaries of all transactions. The scale and breadth of data 
with regression tests suggest a different approach and observation. This study has 
successfully examined all of the significant existing literature with regard to the 
primary issues and theories pertaining to the history of the Chinese market; a deep 
understanding and broad knowledge bring experience to future activities. This 
dissertation advises that only private market information is limited, and the interests 
considered are fully aligned with investors and shareholders. To benefit from 
cross-border M&A transactions validates the results of this dissertation. Therefore, 
this dissertation endeavours to provide specialized advice, swift strategic execution 
and robust resources to help companies seize opportunities and solve problems. The 
paper addresses strategic expansion and enhancing business value. 
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1. Chapter I: Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the past two decades, Chinese companies have become the major buyers in the 
global M&As market. Many transactions were large or remarkable. In this thesis, the 
author focuses on the cross-border transactions conducted by Chinese public 
companies. The analysis collected stock price data for 2 and 5 days before and after 
the M&A announcement date. Short-term performance was measured by CARs 
(cumulative average abnormal returns). Brown and Warner (1985) tested daily stock 
returns and how the particular characteristics of the data affect event study 
performance. The primary research of cross-border M&As was produced by scholars 
such as Bertrand and Betschinger (2011), Boateng and Wang (2008), Chen and Young 
(2009), Chen and Wang (2012), Coeurdacier et al. (2009), Dension et al. (2011), Datta 
and Puia (1995), Dos Santos et al. (2008), Dutta et al. (2013), Li (2010), Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005), Ryu and Lee (2009), Shimizu et al. (2004), Tang (2015), Tao 
(2017), Uddin and Boateng (2011) and Zhang and van Gorp (2017).  
 
The thesis is divided into three chapters; the first two chapters focus on the Chinese 
companies‟ cross-border M&As as the acquirers. The third chapter analyses the 
short-term performance of the target firm when Chinese public companies became the 
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cross-border M&A targets. The selected samples contain all M&A transactions
1
 
(whether completed or not) involving Chinese public companies as bidders from the 
years 2002 to 2016 and all M&A transactions ( complete or incomplete) involving 
Chinese public companies as targets from the years 1994 to 2016. In Chapter II, the 
primary control variable is method of payment in M&A transactions. The two primary 
groups are cash and stock payment. In Chapter III, the primary control variable is the 
public status of the M&A target. The two main types of targets are public and private. 
In Chapter IV, the primary control variable is the industry of the M&A acquirer. The 
two main groups of acquirers are financial companies and non-financial companies.  
 
1.1.1 Motivations 
This thesis contains the M&A transactions from both the bidder and target sides in 
which Chinese public companies were involved. Public companies were selected 
because information and data are easier to access. Gort (1969) posited that mergers 
and acquisitions are caused by evaluation differences among market competitors, 
activated by economic changes such as technological changes, industry restructure, 
improvements in the regulatory environment. The Chinese opening-up policy 
developed rapidly after 2001, encouraged by several supportive policies. SAFE (State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange) issued „Regulations of Domestic Institutions 
Overseas Direct Investment on Foreign Exchange‟ in 2009, and the Ministry of 
                                                   
1 Data Source: Thomason One Banker transactions (SDC) and GTA (CSMAR) database 
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Commerce issued „Offshore Investment Management Approach‟ in 2014. These 
regulations guided Chinese institutions to invest in overseas markets in a regulated 
manner. These supportive policies offered guidelines for both FDI (foreign direct 
investment) and for attracting investments from foreign markets. 
 
Numerous remarkable transactions were completed by Chinese buyers in the global 
M&A market. Many issues remain that may prevent a successful transaction, such as 
synergy problems, culture, law issues, and the tax structure. Chinese buyers remain in 
the beginning stage. This thesis does not examine operations or management issues 
although the author attempts to provide some academic support for the transaction 
stage. The result would be applicable for selecting an appropriate target and form of 
trade. In addition, these results are applicable to how an investor may accrue benefits 
for its shareholders when a company becomes a takeover target. 
 
Cross-border M&As in China increased in the 21
st
 century and became more active 
after the financial crisis of 2007, only 10 years ago. Many basic models and theories 
in the M&As market began development in the past century. When China became the 
second largest economy in the world, the structure of the market changed, and China 
began participating more often in global affairs. Data on research and testing in the 
U.S. and other developed markets are quite adequate; however, there is little access to 
research data in China. This thesis will partially fill the gap in this area. 
 
5 
 
1.1.2 Contributions 
This thesis may contribute to the M&A literature in several respects. First, the 
literature on method of payment is scant and has not been adequately updated in 
recent years. Business activities may have changed because of different investor 
structures, fiscal and monetary economic policies, cultures, market size, etc. Therefore, 
updates in this special market are necessary. The majority of Chinese buyers financed 
their transactions with stock payment although the results indicated that those 
transactions underperformed compared with cash transactions. This thesis chose 
Chinese public companies as a starting point from which to evaluate cross-border 
performance. 
 
Second, Chinese companies joined the M&As market only recently. Successful 
transactions are limited, and many transactions were uncompleted. However, Chinese 
companies are fast learners, and the teams are more professional than they were 10 
years ago. A better understanding of markets, culture, management, laws and taxes 
have spurred the completion of more transactions. During the past two years, several 
remarkable transactions occurred in Germany and Japan. This thesis provides better 
academic support for those activities. The results will also serve as a guide to 
investors and future researchers. 
 
Third, this thesis chose the unique date set of Chinese public companies‟ cross-border 
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M&As. These transactions represent half of the cross-border transactions in China, 
and the time period basically covered all transactions since the Chinese stock 
exchange was established. The majority of bidder companies in China acquired 
overseas private firms as the previous literature suggested. This is a good situation for 
Chinese investors. This thesis specifically attempts to explain the regional differences 
in North America, Pan-Europe, Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world and other factors 
that may affect performance in the short term. 
 
Fourth, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China monitors all 
overseas direct investment, including cross-border M&As. The author expects this 
study to have some influence on Chinese bidder companies, enabling them to choose 
better targets. In addition, the regional research in this thesis may help Chinese 
regulators create better guidelines for approving investable projects and reducing 
losses in risky markets. This thesis groups the markets as North America, Pan-Europe, 
Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world and includes 12 major industries. Future 
research on regional and industrial factors may be based on this thesis. 
 
Fifth, the literature on financial institutional investors is quite limited. In this thesis, 
the author realized that more than 60% of transactions are made by overseas financial 
investors. Because of the ownership structures of these bidders, only limited 
information is obtainable from bidder prospects. The author chose to begin with 
public Chinese targets, a unique angle for cross-border M&A research. Regional and 
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industrial research is included in this thesis. Therefore, the results may provide 
guidance to overseas investors when they consider acquiring a Chinese target. 
 
Sixth, the thesis introduces China‟s M&As market environment, regulations, and data 
statistics for historical transactions. China‟s opening-up policies sought to attract 
offshore corporations to invest in China although the investigation is difficult. A better 
understanding of China‟s market and policies involves helping transactions to 
completion and supporting the shareholders of Chinese companies to identify 
overseas buyers and financial investors. To become an overseas buyer‟s target is a sort 
of reward for a business and its operations. Of course, hostile takeovers are not 
welcome; however, financial or strategic investors should be encouraged by Chinese 
companies. To optimize ownership structure and to improve management or financial 
support are benefits for shareholders. This thesis attempts to provide academic 
support to this field. 
 
1.2 Background 
Mergers and acquisitions are corporate activities. Merger means one new corporation 
that is created by combining two or more independent firms. It also refers to a firm 
that has comparative advantage enabling it to engage one or more firms in an 
authorized alliance. Acquisition represents acquiring the ownership of one firm by 
another firm using stocks, or cash or a combination of all three to obtain control of the 
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acquired firm. Different from mergers, acquisitions often occur in situations in which 
a larger institution takes over a small counterpart (Copeland and Weston, 1988). 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions refer to a country's endeavours to acquire 
partial or full control of a foreign enterprise for some purpose by certain channels and 
methods of payment. Acquiring an existing foreign company allows the acquirer 
access to the related resources, which include the economics of scales, advanced 
technologies, and government policies as well as access to the new market in that 
country (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
 
According to the definition of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCAD), there are three major forms of cross-border M&As. Firstly, 
the horizontal M&As occur in two or more different nations in the same sector or 
industry with economical market relations. The core objective is to develop synergy 
by integrating the appropriate resources to enlarge market shares and develop growth 
in the international competitiveness of the company to achieve higher monopoly 
profits. Because the two sides of an industry in an acquisition have the same 
background, cross-border M&As represent approximately 70% of horizontal 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. These mergers are more likely to occur in the 
pharmaceutical, automotive, petroleum and financial services industries. Second, 
vertical M&As occur in two or more nations with different firms that has a relation 
such as customers and suppliers. The vertical M&As has two approach, forward 
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integration and backward integration. The core objective is to lessen production chain 
uncertainties and operation costs and to benefit from the economy of scales. Third, the 
conglomerate M&As occur between two or more nations in different industries or 
sectors. The core objective is to become a globally diversified company to reduce the 
risk in a single market and to obtain capital appreciation (Mirvis and Marks, 1992). 
 
The overall M&As market indicated elasticity in the past few years, the trade volume 
reach to of $3.9 trillion in 2016, it is the third best year in recent decades. The 
challenges in the market included the more withdrawn transactions since 2008, and 
there is approximately 18% year-over-year drop in USD volumes. The dropping was 
affected by the approximately 39% fall in mega transactions of over $10 billion, and 
transactions larger than $250 million declined by 6% year-over-year. Nevertheless, 
2016 was an exciting year for M&As: the transaction volumes and transaction count 
suffered among considerable global uncertainties, including intensified regulatory 
inspection and geopolitical vicissitudes, speculation about Brexit. Nevertheless, with 
these stresses above, the market still continued active and encouraging for 
deal-making in next coming years, especially when the uncertainties decline. 
 
Regardless of the potential challenges, optimistic fundamentals supported in recent 
years, enterprises pursued growth with cross-border M&As to entre different counties, 
services, products and techniques which benefits from the sustained lower cost of 
capital raising. Bidders in the worldwide leveraged strategical acquisitions to enlarge 
10 
 
both geographic scope and innovation capability, for example anticipated deals that 
contained within Qualcomm acquiring NXP Semiconductors, ChemChina acquiring 
Syngenta, and London Stock Exchange merger with Deutsche Boerse Group, and 
AT&T acquiring Time Warner. 
 
The cross-border M&As also remain a significant characteristics of the market, 
statistical indicating 36% of the entire deals, contrasted with 31% in historical records. 
A wave of outbound Chinese transaction contributes to general cross-border M&As 
development, as Chinese enterprises pursued opportunity overseas. Chinese 
cross-border M&A activities in EMEA and the U.S. have enlarged by 252% and 471% 
separately. Furthermore, market response to announcements of substantial deals, that 
bidders have showed positive response in their stock price movement. 
 
There is a broad consensus that China is a developing country that benefitted from the 
environment of globalization because of a remarkable GDP growth rate and a high 
employment rate. China has quickly developed into one of largest economic entities 
in the world and may exceed the U.S. in the next decade. Previous studies 
demonstrated that China‟s GDP was 64% of the U.S.‟s in 2014, and the IMF predicts 
China‟s reaching a GDP growth of approximately 7% whereas the U.S. growth would 
be approximately 2.9%. 
 
China is the second largest economic entity specializing in manufacturing and 
11 
 
industrial products and because of the reformed economic strategy, the more diverse 
services and products are exported because of increased worldwide demands. 
However, resources and technology are limited domestically. M&As have become the 
vital corporate activity to reallocate the use of capital and resources. In 2016, China 
announced the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), which focused on infrastructure, 
consumption, service industries, etc. The plan requires massive amounts of labour, 
capital, resources, and technology, and Chinese companies normally have plenty of 
cash flow and low borrowing costs. This has become the driver of investment 
booming and is why M&As have increased in recent decades (Jiang at el., 2011). 
 
Previous studies included various perspectives of M&As. This research focuses 
primarily on Chinese listed company cross-border M&As to construct the factors 
affecting stock price volatility in the Chinese stock market. This study includes 
various points of view from previous research regarding M&As based on different 
theories. According to the various perspectives, the factors in stock price volatility for 
Chinese listed companies include transaction size, leverage ratio, methods of payment, 
etc. This study also notes that there is a correlation among the type of target, the 
region of the target and the sector of the target, all of which affect the performance of 
M&As. And the final question focuses on what may occur when Chinese firms are 
acquired by foreign companies. 
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1.2.1 Merger Waves 
Andrade et al. (2001) investigated M&A transaction in the U.S. and concluded that 
M&A activities occur in several waves. A variation in the structure of sector raises the 
scale of M&As. Those authors proposed that deregulation is an influence that 
considerably influenced the volume and duration of M&As transaction in 1990s. They 
assumed that the merger waves are not all identical. To compare the scale of M&As in 
different industries in every decade from 1970s to 1990s, these authors observed 
which the primary industries do not intersect. 
 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) claimed that shocks cannot fully justify merger 
waves. They stated that waves are based on the behaviour of investors and 
misevaluated hypotheses, and M&A transactions are affected by equity market 
valuation. Those authors expected that investment managers are sensible and that 
overrated companies takeover companies which are underrated. It means that 
acquirers may distribute fewer stocks to buy a target firm. Bouwman et al. (2008) 
stated that there are driving activities in merger waves. These scholars noted that if the 
M&As are promised during the later periods of merger waves, the acquisition tends to 
create a poorer performance for the bidder firm. 
 
M&As were not common between 1993 and 1999 in the Chinese market. The initial 
mergers wave should be supposed to begin in this century when the volume of deals 
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seemed to double. And the motive may be explained by the globalization strategy 
when the Chinese government made efforts to encourage overseas investments 
activities. (Black et al., 2013) The most significantly, Chinese policies began to 
support SOEs to acquire overseas mining and energy assets. The volume of M&As 
nearly 100% growth in the year of 2002 and sustained that growth in 2003 and 2004. 
Nevertheless, the value of transactions in 2003 and 2004 did not appreciate 
significantly higher than the value in 2002. In 2007, the volume and volume of deals 
enlarged considerably. Nevertheless, the trend did not continue after the global 
financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. In 2010, this trend appeared to recur because 
M&As became quite active, primarily because of the growth of M&As in energy, real 
estate and the mining industry. Chinese central bank was tightening the monetary 
policies that led to the fiscal stresses in the real estate sector in 2010. Numerous firms 
were forced to provide additional investment, pushing these firms to convert takeover 
target. Moreover, the SOEs funded huge deals in the mining and energy sectors. It 
causes many M&As into those sectors (Gu et al., 2010). 
 
The following wave is currently in process, encompassing not only the transactions in 
industrial sectors but also in the technology and service industries. In the first 
well-known case, Lenovo declared the acquiring activity of the IBM (personal 
computers) and the Motorola mobile from Google, for 5 billion USD in 2014 
(Bloomberg Briefs, 2014). China‟s technology enterprise start to seek foreign merger 
opportunities; for instance, Tencent acquires Activision Blizzard, Inc., and also 
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participate in a Korean message service company, Kakao Corp. 
 
1.3 Market Overview 
According to Ding et al. (2010), the primary Chinese motivation for an investment is 
the return on the investment, demonstrating considerable growth in the volume of 
M&As. Investors seek a positive relation between bidders‟ return and M&As. Typical 
economic theory provides various motives for why M&As arise, for example, 
economies of scale, the lower cost of capital, and synergy (Andrade et al., 2001). 
Other motives are diversification; the hubris hypothesis, which suggests that 
overconfidence, leads to mispricing the target; market power; and tax reasons 
(DePamphilis, 2010). Moreover, M&As can be a strategic activity, such as the concept 
of „too big to fail‟; a firm grows so large that its failure may generate more issues, for 
example capital markets volatility. Consequently, governmental institutions must 
interfere to avoid the corporation‟s bankruptcy. 
 
This thesis contributes to some prospects. First, it could be important to refresh the 
current research regarding China, the world‟s largest emerging economy; it is 
important to dig deeply to understand the consequences of China‟ listed company 
activities, the M&As. This paper explores whether M&A decisions are leading to 
positive investment. Second, this paper examines whether different forms of 
transactions create effects on bidder returns, in particular, whether the types of firms 
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that Chinese firms tend to target generate greater bidder returns. This examination 
requires comparing public and private targets. Finally, this paper investigates, when 
Chinese listed firms became targets, whether the bidder firm was a financial firm and 
able to obtain abnormal returns from the transactions. 
 
Between 2007 and 2012, the growth rate in China in average was approximately 10% 
annually. The quality, quantity and valuation of assets were escalating in China. This 
rate compares favourably with the U.S. and core European developed markets that 
grew in a poorer level, up to 2% maximum. China‟s market has become the world‟s 
largest manufacturing and exporting market and holding $1.3 trillion in U.S. treasury 
notes (Global Research, 2012). 
 
China‟s market has great trade surpluses that are able to lead to huge volumes of free 
cash flows for enterprises. The free cash flow theory proposes that M&As damage 
rather than increase value for shareholders. Because of the theory of agent problem, a 
firm‟s managers tend to raise the influence by growing the firm instead of paying 
large dividend to its shareholder (Jensen, 1986). This expansion generates further 
benefits and opportunities to managers although the company does not take advantage 
from mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Previous studies suggested some concepts to clarify why M&As arise but also why 
M&As is not able to generate benefit to the acquiring firms. 
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There are 2 key motives in M&As are financial synergy and operating synergy. 
Synergies are the collaboration between 2 separate corporations to create greater value 
than if they worked separately or competed with one another. Operating synergy 
occurs when there is economy of scale. This is a cost advantage because of the growth 
in effectiveness by distributing fixed costs over a better level of productions. Though, 
economy of scales regularly has limitations. When the limits are reached, the cost 
begins to increase again, for example, losing control of the firm or coordination of 
internal or external issues when the firm becomes too enormous. Hence, if companies 
are involved in too many acquisition transactions, efficiency is affected and cost 
growth. Financial synergy arises if the costs of capital decline. The target firm 
generates better reputation, since M&As is expected to create a larger growth rate and 
reduce the level of risk. M&As might lead to fewer borrowing costs (DePamphilis, 
2010). 
 
An additional concept is empire-building, horizontal acquisitions that rise markets 
power, which allows firms to obtain the power of an oligopoly or monopoly 
monitoring pricing and level of productivity. Moreover, R&D are anticipated to 
develop because of more expertise and more power for research and development. If 
the acquirer and target belong to different industries, M&As are likely to generate 
negative effects on R&D. Or expertise and products or services may be too similar, 
which damages the net present value of the transaction because the assets would have 
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to be accounted for twice in the same area for both the acquiring and target firms 
(Cassiman and Colombo, 2006). 
 
1.3.1 Evidence of the U.S. and the U.K.  
As stated above, M&As create financial return, for example, enhanced efficiency, 
greater revenue, more clients and tax benefits. These are long-term predictable 
benefits that must increase the valuation of shares for both the bidders and the targets. 
The majority of empirical research investigates the abnormal return for bidders and 
targets announcement periods, and the majority focus on the factors that influence 
returns, for example the methods of payment, public status and size. The empirical 
outcomes of present research may be uncertain; however, all studies reach similar 
conclusions, that the target firm will be the evident winner in the transaction. The 
short-term abnormal return may range from 0% to 30%. Conversely, the bidder firm 
normally experiences a negative return. 
 
Firth (1980) stated that U.K. M&As did not generate monopolistic power, synergy or 
even improve the management target. Firth selected data between 1969 and 1975 in 
the U.K. to analyse whether M&As maximized the interests of shareholders. The U.K. 
bidders tended to destroy value by M&As, and these losses continued for many years. 
Nevertheless, because acquisitions may be beneficial to the management, it appears 
that the manager would be maximizing its own interests not the interests of 
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shareholder. Firth noted that the U.K. outcomes were quite different from outcomes in 
the U.S. The U.S. bidders only obtained no abnormal profit in the worst situations. 
Asquith et al. (1983) selected a similar time of period to Firth‟s, and they observed 
substantial growth in the assets of shareholders for the U.S. bidder firms. They 
observed that if there are several targets of the same merger transaction, the mergers 
are considered one transaction rather than several independent transactions. Therefore, 
they gained the data by scanning acquirer company rather than targets. 
 
Chang (1998) concentrated on how methods of payment affect acquirer return on 
private transactions. He selected mega transactions between 1981 and 1992 in which 
the value of the transaction was greater than $10 million and demonstrated that 
bidders would obtain a positive return for stock payment and none return for cash 
payment. However, cash payment is much more usual than stock payment in different 
markets. Fuller et al. (2002) selected the sample of acquirers involved in multiple 
M&As between 1990 and 2000 in the U.S. Those authors observed that bidders obtain 
a positive return with both methods of payment although stock payment tends to 
generate faintly better returns in private acquisition transactions. Conversely, 
acquirers experienced a bad return for stock payment and obtain a good but 
insignificant return for cash payment in public acquisition transactions. Moreover, 
Fuller et al. (2002) examined how the size of targets comparative to acquirers affected 
acquirer returns. These researchers detected that return is better for cash payment and 
worse for stock payment when the size of the targets is enlarged. 
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Moeller et al. (2004) agreed that abnormal return on the transactions of small firms is 
considerably higher than for large firms. They noted that big deals would lead to 
valuation damage whatever which methods of payment is adopted. Guo and Petmezas 
(2012) expanded the study by selecting the U.K. sample. They determined that firms 
that made smaller transactions tended to create more value than if they had engaged in 
larger transactions. This is because lower costs render a small target more obtainable 
than a larger target. They determined those acquirers who have suffered losses are 
more tends to generate better return because they have learnt from their previous 
errors. 
 
Bouwman et al. (2008) determined return changes if the state of the economy 
different. They attempted to study whether M&As involved in a market with good 
valuations, which is considerably different from a market with low valuation (to use 
the price-to-earnings ratio to measure the value of stocks). They observed the 
short-term return of acquirer during a boom period outperformed a recession period. 
Nevertheless, the long-term return of a bidder is higher for a transaction that occurs 
during a recession. They also observed that cash payment generated a greater 
long-term return than stock payment. Croci et al. (2010) observed bidders‟ return in 
markets with different level of valuations. They find a good abnormal return for the 
bidder firm, and their results were same with Bouwman et al. (2008). 
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1.3.2 Evidence of China 
Although many studies concentrated on Chinese government policy regarding M&As 
(Zhang and Zhang, 2010 and Sokol, 2013), only a few empirical studies focused on 
bidders‟ return on Chinese cross-border M&As. Previous research examined how the 
Anti-Monopoly Law in China (released 1 August 2008) affected China‟s mergers. 
Those studies observed that there was little disclosed information with which to 
process further research. Sokol (2013) also stated that transactions must be permitted 
by the interagency approval of various government departments as well as the 
Ministry of Commerce and that cross-border transactions must be approved by the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). These agencies do not consider 
the economic interests of individual privately-owned enterprises (POEs) when 
assessing the merger. Thus, the process appears to be closer to political guidelines that 
would benefit Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Zhou et al. (2012) also 
observed that M&As in SOEs have become a tool for the governmental institutions to 
realize their economic and political strategies in China. 
 
Jiang et al. (2011) detected distinctive characters of Chinese M&As activities are that 
majority of China‟s companies are SOEs. They are directly or indirectly owned or 
controlled by the government. And many POEs or non-SOEs were affiliated with 
SOEs or SOE subsidiaries. Moreover, Zhou et al. (2012) stated that SOEs tend to seek 
political connection than POEs, which could affect performance of transactions. This 
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feature changed the decisions of firm management. Hence, data from the U.S. and 
U.K. could not work in China. Zhou et al. (2012) hold opinion that the financial 
support is primarily offered by state-owned banks: SOEs will hold the advantage of 
having bank loans. Because M&As require huge amounts of financing, SOEs are 
privileged and certainly benefit from the arrangement. It is no surprise that SOEs 
outbid POEs over the long-term. 
 
Black et al. (2013) studied acquirer returns for cross-border and domestic M&As in 
China. These researchers observed domestic bidders obtained better abnormal returns 
and that stock payment created a surprising 6.24% abnormal return, which differed 
from the evidence in the U.S. and U.K. Cross-border M&As, conversely, performed 
poorly and obtained a negative return. Nevertheless, the results indicated that 
long-term acquirer return was worse for cash and the mixture of cash and stocks 
payment but positive for stocks payment in domestic M&As. These findings are not 
consistent with research on U.S. and U.K. transactions. 
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2. Chapter II: Chinese Company Cross-Border Takeovers 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates a Chinese listed company acquiring an overseas company. 
The control variables are the different methods of payment. In the Chinese M&A 
market, more companies elected to pay with stock than with cash. 
 
In a previous study, Moeller et al. (2007) tested different variables‟ effects using an 
information asymmetry model and diversity-of-opinion model to support the use of 
the cross-sectional variation in acquirer announcement returns. Those authors selected 
a sample of private and public firm transactions that included pure cash offer and pure 
stock offer between 1980 and 2002. They selected different variables and uncertainty 
proxies. Their research verified and tested the significance of a part of the 
cross-sectional variance during acquirer announcement and return. The authors tested 
the correlations between the theoretical prediction of information asymmetry and 
diversity-of-opinion and acquirers return. According to theory, bidder abnormal return 
is negatively related to information asymmetry and diversity-of-opinion proxies for 
stock offer but not for cash offer. The observation shows the case that is more 
outstandingly. It is not different in abnormal return between cash offer for public 
companies, equity offer for public companies, and stock offer for private companies 
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when monitoring for one of these factors, idiosyncratic volatility. Fuller et al. (2002) 
and Chang (1998) determined that acquisition of private company financed with stock 
has better abnormal return than private deal financed with cash. 
 
In Chapters II and III, this dissertation investigates the method of payment and target 
ownership structure as previous research did; however, the evidence is from China, 
and the time period and data size are basically Chinese M&A history. The motivation 
to choose the Chinese M&As market is obvious: Chinese companies are becoming 
more active in seeking acquisition opportunities, and there have been increasingly 
more remarkable cases in recent decades. 
 
Clearly, the Chinese economy has been more active in the 21
st
 century, and the global 
economy has become more volatile, for example, tech bubbles and the financial crisis. 
The Chinese economy has seen dramatic growth from the beginning of the 21
st
 
century, and Chinese companies began to seek cross-border takeover opportunities. 
 
Previous studies presented the correlations between the financial crisis and 
cross-border M&As because researchers were able to obtain long-term historical data. 
The 2008 financial crisis was already a classic case in Lybeck (2011), who 
highlighted the features of the 2008 financial crisis to compare it with previous crises. 
Lybeck explained why the crisis occurred and how it affected the global economy. 
Many studies investigated the outcomes of cross-border M&As, such as the 
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perspective of implications (Bruner, 2004, and Morck and Yeung, 1991), the 
evaluation of performance (Seldon and Colvin, 2003), and time frame research 
(Steiner, 1975 and Weston, 1953). The outcomes of M&A research are fairly broad; 
however, it remains necessary to explore the cross-border M&A deals during market 
volatilities. China‟s cross-border M&A activities also became more active since the 
financial crisis. 
 
Motivated by the above-mentioned facts and issues, this chapter examines short-term 
performance analysis. The dependent variables are the CARs [-2, 2] and CARs [-5, 5] 
of a Chinese public bidding company. The key explanatory variable is the method of 
payment; some of the sample were financed with cash, and the rest were financed 
without any cash. In the sample, of the number of transactions (465), only 37% of 
transactions were financed with cash; 63% of the transactions were financed with no 
cash. This study proposes to determine the difference in the performance of 
cross-border M&As of Chinese listed companies. This analysis follows numerous 
theories to provide a deeper understanding of this research area and to explore the 
concept from different perspectives. Resource-based theory is applied to an economic 
instrument to decide the obtainable strategy resource for firms. Tobin‟s Q theory could 
be defined as a monetary theory developed by Tobin in 1969 and applied for testing 
the market value performance. The helping-hand and grabbing-hand theories were 
presented by Vishny and Shleifer (1994) and argue that the government is acting 
important roles in the market.  
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This research adds to the M&A literatures in some respects. Firstly, previous literature 
on method of payment is scant, and few updates have occurred in recent years. In the 
past fifteen years, China has become the second largest economy. China remains a 
developing country, and the financial market remains an emerging market. All 
business activities are affected by different investor structures, economic policies 
including fiscal and monetary policies, cultures, market size, etc. Therefore, to update 
this special market is necessary.  
 
Second, the majority of Chinese buyers finance their transactions with stock payment 
although the results indicated that those transactions underperformed cash 
transactions. This thesis selected public Chinese companies as a starting point to 
evaluate their cross-border performance in different regions. The market groups are 
North America, Pan-Europe, Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world. The results may 
guide investors and future research. 
 
Third, Chinese companies have been in the M&A market for only a short time. The 
number of successful transactions is limited, and many transactions were uncompleted. 
However, Chinese companies are fast learners; the teams are more professional than 
they were 10 years ago, and a better understanding of the market, culture, 
management, laws and taxes helped to improve transaction completion. In the past 
two years, there were several remarkable transactions in Germany and Japan. This 
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thesis provides increased academic support for those activities. 
 
2.1.1 Market Background of China 
The cross-border M&A has become the significant activity in the international 
financial market. At present, China is the world‟s largest emerging economy in 
business, international trade, finance, etc. The listed companies have dominated the 
China financial market. Hence, the research on the return performances of China‟s 
listed firms in cross-border M&As has become a significant topic in the global 
financial markets.  
 
M&A transactions emerged in the U.S. in the 1990s, which saw a wave of M&As. 
M&As result in concentrated wealth, resource reallocation, reorganized corporate 
structure and upgraded industry structure. Thus, the results of M&As may be positive 
or negative. Sievers et al. (2014) provided evidence that the results are good in the 
year of general economic growth. For instance, in first half of year 2014, the volume 
of international M&As activities was approximately 7500, and the transaction value 
was up to $130.4 billion. Simultaneously, risks remained, and the political events 
between countries were problematic. The conflicts between political systems in the 
Middle East and Ukraine had negative effects on the market and caused volatility. 
 
Property rights were established in China in 1984. The China Shanghai Stock 
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Exchange was established in the 1990s. Thus, stock prices can be tracked for M&As. 
The first cross-border M&A occurred in 1992. In the late 1990s, the incentive of 
M&As was accelerating because China was going to join the WTO. This also 
generated multiple levels of scale and volume in M&As from the 2000s. The change 
of structure in SOEs created more opportunities and free cash flow. The private 
ownership firms were also developing rapidly after China joined the WTO. All of the 
fundamentals required to engage in M&As were ready in the early 2000s. Wei et al. 
(2005) stated that the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party (CCCP) of the Chinese government encouraged POEs to be more 
active and to develop. M&As benefit from a free-market economy. This event also 
promoted the development of mixed ownership of M&As. 
 
Although previous studies claimed that political effects may be detrimental to the 
value and performance of companies, the evidence in China renders that claim 
debatable. Although thirty years of reform and development in China were highly 
effective, the Chinese government retains the leading role in the economy and 
common business activities. Guo (2010) noted two political events in China: the 
CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) and the NPC (the 
National People's Congress), both convened annually in the first season of year in 
Beijing. The NPC represents the state organs. The purposes of the NPC include 
appointing executives of state organ, discussing and adjusting the law and 
determining main concerns of state. The non-controlling parties discuss bills and 
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further plan for various aspects of the country through the CPPCC. Guo (2010) stated 
that it is different in democratic countries; only little party rivalry in China. Each 5 
years, the government convenes the NCP to update economic and financial strategies, 
and the Central Economic Working Conference meets every year for more specific 
adjustments. 
 
Guo (2015) also claimed that in Chinese financial markets, SOEs may be subject to 
fewer political restrictions and have more opportunities to access funding because of 
their good credit, lower market entry barriers, more financial assistance, and the ease 
of obtaining licenses. Such a biased policy provides motivation to proceed with 
M&As. Moreover, Cull and Xu (2003) provided evidence about bank loans, SOEs are 
the evident precedence because of good credit and local government support.  
Financial support is the key factor in business development. The Chinese financial 
market relies heavily on the four largest state-owned banks (Bank of China, Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction 
Bank). This study clearly leads to the conclusion that SOEs are fundamentally eligible 
to engage in M&As.  
 
In 2007, the financial crisis dramatically slowed the global economy. The majority of 
developed economies experienced huge losses from the crisis. Conversely, China took 
advantage of the low valuations of assets to make many dramatic cross-border M&As. 
According to Coase (1937), the nature of a firm is to seek lower transaction costs. 
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Chinese companies require lower manufacturing technique costs and better quality 
control. For example, industrial manufacturing companies are able to find more 
advantageous locations and resources to invest in companies or establish new 
factories through cross-border M&As. This process also helps advanced technologies 
grow rapidly; this is how the Chinese economy reformed. The limitations of 
technology became the basis of the strategy of the sustained economic growth of 
China. The solutions of technology may be self-research and development; however, 
to absorb others is a quick and low-cost manner in which to achieve these goals. This 
is one reason why cross-border M&As became so popular in Chinese firms. Using 
M&As to obtain foreign advanced and core technology and copyrights leads to more 
competitive advantages. Conversely, with the incessant development of the Chinese 
economy and ideological differences between Eastern and Western countries, the 
above activities have become a threat to the Western world. This situation causes 
overseas transactions to be more difficult for Chinese companies, particularly in 
aviation, the military, the oil and gas industries, and even infrastructure. For example, 
the Chinese manufacturing company Midea offered 5 billion USD to acquire German 
robot maker Kuka in 2016. That offer was quite sensitive for the German government 
because robotic technology is the core asset of the German 4.0 strategy. Since then, all 
Chinese cross-border M&A with German corporations has slowed down. 
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2.1.1.1 M&As in China 
Faccio et al. (2006) determined that political connections exist in the market. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence demonstrates that such connections have become 
difficult to explain since institutional variance and economic growth. These authors 
also observed that political connections are common among European companies. 
The findings of previous studies generally concentrated on the correlation between 
SOEs or POEs and company performance; few studies focused on the correlations 
between SOEs or POEs and firm performance in M&As transactions. Political effect 
was also disregarded in some studies, particularly in China‟s M&As market.  
 
In China, there are 2 types of companies, SOEs and POEs. Wu et al. (2012) stated that 
there are 5 levels of government in China: township, county, prefecture, province and 
central government. Those authors defined Levels 1 to 4 as local governments. Hence, 
there are 2 types of SOEs, central SOEs and local SOEs. There have been many 
studies regarding whether SOEs can obtain more benefits than POEs, generating 
contentious opinions. Cull and Xu (2003) reported a positive correlation between 
banks financing and SOEs‟ earnings that became tougher with the reforming and 
opened-up policies after the 1980s. Wu et al. selected several econometric models to 
investigate the expected hypothesis, such as the OLS model with control variables and 
dummy variables. According to the research, there is a positive correlation between 
bank financing and SOEs‟ benefits. This study applies this assumption to explore the 
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performance of public SOEs and POEs in the M&As market.  
 
Wei et al. (2005) declared a negative correlation between SOEs and enterprise value 
caused by the conflicts among the various interests of shareholders that may reduce an 
enterprise‟s value. Those authors observed that local SOEs experienced great political 
stress from native governments and the central government, for example, regarding 
local GDP growth, employments and unemployment. Although the findings were 
developed based on Tobin‟s Q theory and agency theory, these theories are not 
particularly effective in the Chinese market because of the distinctiveness of Chinese 
institutions. In addition, the research lacked sufficient detail to demonstrate empirical 
evidence.  
 
M&As activities may be affected by market value, as Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) observed when M&As transactions were more numerous and when there were 
fewer. Their research focused on stock mergers. They posited that the managers of the 
bidder firm possessed private information, such as the potential price of the target 
firm. They claimed that M&As activities are positively associated with price 
movement. Their research provided the guidelines of the merger wave and also 
applies to cross-border markets; nevertheless, their conclusions do not apply to 
China‟s M&As market because the Chinese market is more influenced by political 
intervention. 
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Wu et al. (2012) observed that political connections may be affected by the ownership 
structure. The research clarified previous research on positive and negative 
correlations between company performance and political ties. The performance of 
POEs was positively correlated with political connection management. Nevertheless, 
the local SOEs demonstrated the poorer performance with politically connected 
managers since those managers must assume more public responsibilities to benefit 
more from political subsidies. The research was developed from the resource-based 
theory. It may be considered the economic instrument to decide the strategic resource 
distribution of companies. The basics of the theories are that the best competitive 
advantages depend on the management of appreciated resources. To clarify, SOEs 
utilize more major benefits than POEs.  
 
To compare with Wei et al. (2005), they find state-ownership may be disadvantageous 
to operate, Chen et al. (2009) concentrated on who owns stock not who owns 
company. Those authors determined that it is the positive relation among company 
performance and ownership tie, besides non-linear effects may be insignificant. Chen 
et al. selected instruments such as ROA (Return on Asset), CFOA (cash flow return on 
asset), productivities and Tobin‟s Q as the measurements of performance. The cash 
flow incomes and profitability in accounting incomes may be counted by ROA and 
CFOA separately, and one more measurement of profitability is ROE (return on sales). 
Those authors selected regressions models to investigate and demonstrate results. 
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Tian and Saul (2008) determined that the relation between the SOEs and company 
performance was not non-linear, but U-shaped because China‟s is the exclusively 
economic structure that renders the situation more complicated. Claessens et al. (2008) 
observed that political relations may be a significant channel for corporate profits. 
The results may also be practical for the M&As market. Particularly when there is 
corruption within a transaction, the financing structure of a transaction relies on its 
political connections. There are also debates over the results of Claessens et al. (2008). 
Wang (2007) stated that whether the firms belong to SOEs is not the primary factor 
that determines whether firms are able to benefit from political connections. Those 
authors also stated that on the date of the announcement of government shares being 
sold in stock markets, there were negative effects on returns. Conversely, invalid 
announcements lead to positive effects. This may explain the uniqueness of China‟s 
economic structure, which includes political connections bringing abnormal returns.  
 
To compare SOEs and POEs in China‟s M&As activities, Wei et al. (2011) compared 
the performance of SOEs and POEs in diverse time period. Their study evaluated 
performances in 3 periods using ROE, ROA and EPS analysis. The results indicated 
that POEs perform better in shorter time periods; conversely, SOEs perform better in 
longer time periods. There may be several reasons for this. First, because of the listed 
restrictions to acquire shell corporations, POEs must assume higher costs; conversely, 
in the stock market, SOEs have priority to receive assistance from local governments. 
The evidence also suggests significant correlations between ownership structure and 
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company performance. Shareholders have more controlling power to shelter 
companies from market risks, interest conflicts and other potential losses by the 
greater shareholding ratio.  
 
Sun et al. (2015) conducted research demonstrating that political connections 
positively affect the M&As market and that there are positive relations between 
government interventions and company performance and valuation. Their first 
research question was whether SOE bidders conduct more successful transactions 
than POEs. They collected 185 SOE bidders and 640 POE bidders between 1994 and 
2008. The theoretical research indicated that the SOEs well performed over POEs in 
long run performance. The following research issue was that do SOE bidders 
demonstrate more distinct performance than the POEs during a hot political period. 
Those authors studied Chinese M&As market in cold and hot political period. For 
example, there are 2 important political events are the annual CPPCC and the annual 
NPC, proceed in the first quarter annually (Doukas et al., 2010). The mechanism is 
that if government interventions determine varying performance among SOEs, then 
when political polices are announced, the results would significantly demonstrate that 
influence. Moreover, the empirical evidence indicated that the performance of SOEs 
is better than POEs when the transactions are conducted during hot political periods.  
 
There are several methods that can measure long-term and short-term abnormal 
returns. The abnormal returns have been well-defined as the returns created by the 
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portfolio or securities within the periods that are not the same as the estimated level of 
returns. The expected returns are predictable returns founded by the assets price 
modelling and the long-run historical modelling. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Sun et 
al. (2015) adopted BHARs (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) to investigate the 
long-term performance of M&As over 2 years. Additional measurement tool is the 
CARs (cumulative abnormal returns), which represents the summation of the 
day-to-day abnormal return in deal periods. To confirm that the result of BHARs and 
VARs could be tough, the authors processed OLS regressions model to monitor other 
dynamics which may affect announcements consequence.  
 
The assessment of CAR over 5 days (2 days before and after the announcements) 
indicated that SOEs are much more likely to become the targets of other investors in 
the M&As market. Moreover, the greater valuation of political connections may be 
attributed to tighter government interventions. Nevertheless, during cold political 
periods, SOEs‟ targets indicated non-significant effects on the M&As activities. The 
results of test indicated that the SOE has the best 2-year BHAR in hot political period. 
The bidder who takes over SOE obtains better CAR than the bidder who takes over 
POEs. Sun et al. (2015) selected OCFR (operating cash flow return) to explore the 
operating performances of SOEs. The researchers used the operating cash flows over 
sales to assess the per-unit sales profits. The employment could be another essential 
influence of SOE. Those authors used the employment rates to determine that when 
complete the transaction directed by the SOEs‟ bidders, the poorer debt ratio, greater 
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asset value per capital and greater capital expenditures ratio in the SOE compared 
with the POE. These outcomes indicated that the SOE has more competitions in 
Chinese markets.  
 
Sun et al. (2015) made distinctive contributions to academic research. Their study 
updates tested the relations between state-ownerships and company performances in 
Chinese markets. It could be beneficial to investigate Chinese M&As activities since 
it had become the 2
nd
 biggest economy worldwide. There were several creative 
findings in the study; for example, the authors combined state-ownerships and 
company performances and separated time periods by cold and hot political periods 
according to the CPPCC and announcements of fresh regulation connected to M&As 
activity. Nevertheless, the study has not made comparisons of China and overseas 
M&As markets. The performance of Chinese companies and overseas companies are 
investigated in this study.  
 
2.1.1.2 M&As in Overseas Markets 
Si (2014) stated that China experienced 3 overseas M&As waves. The first wave was 
between 1978 and 1991, with narrow outwards and inwards FDI (foreign direct 
investment). The second wave was between 1992 and 2005, with narrow outward FDI 
and huge amounts of inwards FDI. The recent wave was from 2006 to the current, 
with outwards FDI indicating rapid growth compared with inward FDI. The results 
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also demonstrated that there was tight but positive relation between FDI growing and 
the macro economy. The study also noted that the motivation of China‟s outward FDI 
shifted from political intervention during the primary period to assets and markets. 
The reason for the shift was that China had become the major foreign reserve 
worldwide. Consequently, outwards FDI became the significant tool compared with 
inwards FDI. Yao et al. (2010) observed that although China‟s outward FDI was 
experiencing quick development, the volume of shares remained small compared with 
other large economies worldwide.  
 
Dong and Guo (2013) agreed that the SOEs, including those that were state owned 
and state monitored, acting the dominant part in China outwards FDI activities. The 
governmanr retains the majority of management appointments of senior executive 
positions, even if the majority of SOEs have been listed on the public stock exchange. 
Wei et al. (2005) observed that for several years after the reforming, comparing with 
local private and overseas firms, the SOE obtained meaningfully poorer returns on 
capital. The SOEs in Chinese market generally demonstrate poorer performance in 
overseas M&As markets and also experience greater stress from targets based in 
developed markets, even if the operating capacity of the target companies is 
decreasing. Dong and Guo (2013) also presented the case that CNOOC (China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation) spent $19 billion attempting to control a U.S. oil 
company and was ultimately unsuccessful because of political obstruction from its 
government. Conversely, the POEs of FDI experienced less political obstruction; the 
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failure of their cases was commonly because of business issues rather than political 
effects. 
 
Globerman and Shapiro (2009) reported that U.S. policymakers expressed conceptual 
concerns regarding inwards FDI from Chinese market, such as policymakers of 
developed markets, particularly regarding state-ownership or monitor under the bidder 
companies. Precisely, larger companies below political monitor would carry 
ownerships in different manners to permit China‟s SOEs to engage in non-commercial 
purposes and to transfer the costs and other risks to the U.S. In fact, the primary 
concerns of U.S. companies and policymakers were the threat of Chinese competition. 
Therefore, the establishment of the CFIUS (committee on foreign investment in the 
U.S.) was to assess whether an activity was a threat to U.S. interests, particularly in 
the areas of securities and core resources.  
 
Kalinova et al. (2010), Koyama and Stephen (2006), and Zhang and Daniel (2014) 
developed their research using the FDI RR Index (FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness 
Index) to develop statistics on the statutory restrictions on inwards overseas direct 
investments. The bottom scores of FDI RR Index is zero, indicating that it could not 
have regulatory restrictive FDIs, and the top score is1, indicating that the country 
completely restricted FDIs. Of the average restrictiveness of inward FDIs 
demonstrated by various countries, the U.S. (0.089) and EU (0.041) were both less 
limited than China (0.407). 
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In addition, Chen et al. (2009) argued that the single entity approach may be applied 
to measure the purposes of M&As transactions. For example, if the government of 
China were being monitored, the relative commission would place all of Chinese SOE 
in identical sector as components of a particular entity. Nevertheless, Zhou et al. 
(2012) disagreed with this point of view, believing that the single entity method may 
have the possibility to become the antitrust or time bomb of Chinese SOE, that could 
be an important factor rendering the relation between China and Europe more 
complex. 
 
The unsuccessful transaction of Chinalco making a tender offer to Rio Tinto, which 
was the strategic activity, attracted global attention and generated tough criticism of 
China. Rio Tinto unilaterally rejected the primary agreement with China and was 
facing bankruptcy. Chinalco was the one of the largest Chinese companies for natural 
resources, particularly for overseas investments and acquisitions of large foreign 
multinational firms. The unsuccessful Chinalco transaction kept Chinese steel 
companies in a difficult position and experiencing massive losses, and they were 
required to continue more difficult negotiations. Chen and Wang (2012) provided 
evidence that China‟s SOEs experienced tough challenges regarding cross-border 
M&As markets.  
 
Globerman and Shapiro (2009) provided evidence that attempts to take over U.S. 
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firms conducted by emerging market entities such as China caused strong 
disagreements. For example, when the CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation) attempted to take over Unocal in 2005, numerous U.S. politicians spoke 
up against the transaction. Thus, the process took a long time, and finally the 
transaction failed when CNOOC cancelled it.  
 
By contrast with Globerman and Shapiro (2009), Zhang and Daniel (2014) observed 
that because of national security concerns and political opposition, the U.S. rejected 
M&As offers. Nevertheless, European countries have comparatively more tolerant 
attitudes towards China‟s SOEs. The European market has become the preferred 
market because of the numerous cases of Chinese companies being indirectly blocked 
from committees of the U.S. state governments, leading to many significant failures.  
 
Zhang and Daniel (2014) disclosed due to the rapid growth and growth of Chinese 
overseas investments in European M&As transactions, the public attention began to 
look at to the M&As transactions related to Chinese investors, particularly when the 
bidder was a SOE or had a related background. For example, in recent decades, there 
were 2 failures of Chinese companies‟ M&As transactions because the Netherlands 
and Poland had strong reactions to the transactions. Although China responded, 
detailing the participants and the target European companies and assets, many 
European politicians advocated modifying European attitudes towards China‟s SOEs, 
FDIs and trading in Europe. The politicians expressed worries regarding threats to 
41 
 
national security and established authorized blocks against China‟s M&A activities, 
such as defending high technology companies.  
 
As evidence of the above, Si (2014) demonstrated that China‟s Outward FDI was 
experiencing great growth, from 10 billion USD in 2006 to approximately 70 billion 
USD in 2011, and SOE was also major participants. Si also argued that the growth of 
Chinese economy benefited from the superior business operating of SOE in overseas 
M&As markets.  
 
Therefore, according to the literature cited above, this paper investigated the 
performance of China‟s listed companies that were associated with overseas M&As 
activities. The research hypothesis was that when overseas targets are private firms, 
the activity benefits the Chinese listed bidders on stock performance. The CARs 
model and Tobin‟s Q theory were applied to evaluate the performance of the bidders. 
Several studies investigated whether Chinese bidders‟ performance was affected by 
international political factors in overseas markets. The empirical evidence indicated 
that although the M&As transactions of Chinese companies grew tremendously, 
Chinese companies nevertheless experienced difficult obstacles from developed 
countries such as the U.S., Europe and Australia. To compare and summarize the 
literature, this paper selected the 2 directions of Chinese companies: bidders and 
target in cross-border M&A transactions. The data were from 1990 to 2016, and the 
performance of Chinese public companies was listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
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Stock Exchange. The overseas data of bidders and targets were collected from 
Thomson One. The empirical evidence was created using various models and factors. 
The research compares the findings with other previous studies.  
 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Hypothesis 
There have been increasing trends in the number and size of M&As in China since 
globalization policies and strategies. With the M&As transactions that have been 
disclosed, China cross-border transactions were appropriate for measuring whether 
M&As are meaningful decisions for Chinese enterprises. 
 
The assumption focuses on the return of acquirer companies. Supposing that  
China‟s economy runs efficient, the influence of M&As must be echoed in share 
prices of acquirer firms. Fama (1970) defined the efficiently running markets as if the 
share prices reflect entirely obtainable information. Hence, the influence of M&As 
may be demonstrated during the period of announcement adopting the fluctuation of 
acquirer‟s share prices. 
 
Nevertheless, Guo and Petmezas (2012) stated that numerous researches selected the 
U.S. and the U.K. as sample data and concluded that acquirers obtain negative to zero 
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return from engaging in merger activities. M&As activity is a strategy that 
management pursues to create value. An explanation of value damage which could 
work to free cash flows theory is that manager would like to enlarge the firm over 
beyond the ideal size (Jenson, 1986). For another explanation, Lu et al. (2008) 
claimed that the rate of profitability is growing in Chinese market, particularly in 
SOEs that were highly monopolized. Therefore, expansion may be a reason to engage 
in M&As in Chinese market. The China‟s business environment encourages concept 
of larger and tougher, therefore increasing the attractiveness of M&As (Jiang et al., 
2011). Ding et al. (2010) observed a positive relation between large-scale investments 
and investment efficiency. They also observed that the degree of overinvestment 
appears to not be a primary issue in China‟s economy.  
 
Therefore, this chapter concentrates on how methods of payment affect M&A returns. 
The three hypotheses are listed below: 
H1: The Chinese listed companies derive positive abnormal returns in the short term 
when they finance a cross-border M&A with cash. 
H2: The Chinese listed companies derive negative abnormal returns in the short term 
when they finance a cross-border M&A with cash. 
H3: A transaction financed with cash outperforms a transaction financed with stock. 
 
Methods of payment in cross-border M&A transactions include cash, stocks and 
leveraged buyouts. These hypotheses are the opposite of the results of Moeller et al. 
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(2004) but are consistent with Emery and Switzer (1999) and Dutta et al. (2013). The 
reason may be because the Chinese stock market is more volatile because over 
90%the majority of investors are individuals; few investors in China are institutional 
investors. 
 
Chinese companies have become the major buyers in the global M&As market. Many 
transactions were large or remarkable. I focus on the cross-border transactions 
conducted by Chinese public companies. Numerous remarkable transactions were 
completed by Chinese buyers in the global M&A market. Many issues remain that may 
prevent a successful transaction, such as synergy problems, culture, law issues, and the 
tax structure. Chinese buyers remain in the beginning stage. This thesis does not 
examine operations or management issues although the author attempts to provide 
some academic support for the transaction stage. The result would be applicable for 
selecting an appropriate target and form of trade. In addition, these results are 
applicable to how an investor may accrue benefits for its shareholders when a company 
becomes a takeover target. Cross-border M&As in China increased in the 21st century 
and became more active after the financial crisis of 2007, only 10 years ago. Many 
basic models and theories in the M&As market began development in the past century. 
When China became the second largest economy in the world, the structure of the 
market changed, and China began participating more often in global affairs. 
 
45 
 
2.2.2 Motivation of M&As 
The traditional theory is that the motives of M&As generate more value added to the 
companies. There are three major theories regarding the motivation of M&As within 
academic communities: synergy, the hubris hypothesis and agency motives. 
 
2.2.2.1 Synergy 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) described the synergy effect, and Gate and Very 
(2003) developed the definition based on their research. Gate ad Very claimed that 
resource sharing is the most direct benefit of synergy. Retail is as an example of 
cross-selling a product, and services may cause revenue growth; simultaneously, a 
lower cost economy strengthens the power of sales. In addition, such an economy 
combines less efficient management, thus lowering costs. For example, a brand is 
partially tangible but simultaneously an intangible asset and may also be transferable. 
A functional professional skill may be another transferable asset that creates more 
value for the transaction, such as a competitive market advantage or exclusive 
technology. 
 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) stated that the realization of synergy theorizes the 
M&A performance and attempts to obtain the properties of outperformance. Those 
authors constructed an integrative model that treats synergies achieved as a dependent 
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variables, blend potentials, amount of combination reached and the lacking of 
employee confrontation are independent variables. This study identifies similarities in 
production market and operations of production that are carrying the complementarity 
of product markets. The results indicated that complementary operations may improve 
the effects of synergy when organizational integration is fulfilled. 
 
2.2.2.2 Hubris hypothesis 
Roll (1986) opined that hubris hypothesis can be the underlying clarification on M&A 
activities. The hubris hypothesis can be described as the angle of more individual 
decision makers in tendering companies and may clearly explain the „why‟ of 
decision-making. The M&A is conducted with a higher valuation than the current real 
value, indicating that the asset is overvalued. Acquirers are affected by the hubris 
hypothesis and likely offer a higher value than the target‟s real value. The empirical 
evidence in M&A activities tests the hubris hypothesis with massive historical data on 
both the short and long term. The hubris hypothesis is also associated with other 
factors such as synergy theory, taxation effects and ineffective management theory. 
These are also key factors to evaluate whether a transaction was successful. 
 
2.2.2.3 Agency motives 
Some studies on agency motives theory stated that management tends to overpay for 
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candidates. Although such overpayment is for individual satisfaction, it is also at the 
cost of shareholders. Ultimately, a few particular studies related to takeovers and 
diversification decisions applied agency motives theory to explain the scenario in 
which a striking offer is declined by managements of candidate or bidders, whichever 
acquiring comparatively disadvantageous candidate or withdrawing from takeover of 
advantageous target (Canella and Lubatkin, 1998 and Achampong and Zemedkun, 
1995). Although adverse effects of fulfilling management‟s personal interests that 
affect acquisition decision-making were established as a theoretical explanation, there 
are inevitable resultant opportunities that cannot be measured. 
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan‟s (1993) test sample of data from over 330 successful 
tender offers between 1963 and 1988 explored the motives that drive M&As. It has 
been acknowledged that a few takeover transactions were essentially encouraged by 
the self-interest of bidder‟s administration. Few explanations had investigated to 
explain the deviation. These situations were diversifications of governance‟s separate 
portfolios (Amihud and Lev, 1981), the use of free cash flows to grow the scales of 
business (Jensen, 1986), and acquired asset that extend corporation's dependency on 
administration (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The principal awareness in the majority of 
explanations was that a takeover leads to loss of interest for the shareholder of 
acquirer by the managers of bidder. To take an example, the specialists in bidding are 
related to their own company; thus, the successful synergy of entities relies on their 
particular knowledge and experience. They would also claim that management may 
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change reliance to raise perquisites consuming otherwise beat opponents who had 
good performance in terms of processing particular operations. Such managerial 
movements lead to agency cost that declines total value of the merged enterprise 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). 
 
2.2.2.4 Diversification 
Moeller et al. (2004) claimed that the large degree of markets integrations tends to 
result in the reverse effect on the company in cross-border deals. Markets integrations 
could lead to the growth in degree of competitions or to less synergy for the acquirer. 
Furthermore, a greater degree of integration associated with a reduction in costs in 
cross-border transactions leads to an increased possibility of hubris and agency issue 
and may also result in a decline in the bidder‟s return. Martynova and Renneboog 
(2006) stated that diversification of corporations may lead to value losses. They 
observed that a decision to diversify strategy is primarily motivated by the private 
interests of management at the cost of shareholders. This concept is also associated 
with the diversification discount. If the motivation for acquisition is purely 
diversification, the bidder‟s stock price movement will likely underperform (Lang and 
Stulz, 1994).  
 
Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2012) investigated the advantages and 
disadvantages of diversifications. They reported empirical evidence indicating that 
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diversification decisions result in a loss in acquirer‟s value because of high agency 
costs (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996). Diversifications 
may be defined as the internal consideration, and those authors claimed that the 
decision affects the value of a company by combining competitors‟ advantages. 
(Graham et al., 2001; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). Considering the 
advantages of diversification, several studies reported that the internal capital market 
may lead to growth of the diversified company‟s value (Chang and Hong, 2002). 
 
2.2.2.5 Mergers Waves 
According to Gärtner and Halbheer (2009), M&As activities occur in waves, and 
Steiner (1975) applied multiple regressions to investigate transaction volumes and 
values created by M&As activities in different time periods. Beckenstein (1979) 
concluded that M&As activities may be affected by securities prices and interest rates. 
Furthermore, Beckenstein (1979) stated that if the economy is in a positive trend, 
M&As activities are not only pervasive but also perform better. Therefore, when the 
economic growth rate is accelerating, the assessment of asset value growth increases 
as much as the performance growth of the entire company. 
 
There is speculation that mergers of the same type are concentrated in specific time 
periods (Harford, 2005; Rhodes-Kropf, 2005), and there are six major M&As waves 
evident in an empirical investigation of historical data. These waves were quite 
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helpful in investigating bidders‟ returns. The merger waves always begin during 
economic booms and end in economic recession. Once the wave begins, there is a 
great volume of M&As in the wave (Lipton, 2006). 
 
The initial wave occurred by 1893 to 1904. This is a period of significant horizontal 
merger, primarily M&As occurring in telecom, mining, railways, steel and oil in the 
U.S. The M&As in the manufacturing and transportation industries became most 
active in 1907. An important antitrust law which was established in the Supreme 
Court in 1904 applied to horizontal merger. Then the initial wave ended because of 
World War I, that few viewed as a continuance over 1904 (Lipton, 2006). 
 
The second wave, between 1919 and 1929, was principally vertical merger. In these 
periods of time, consolidations tended to be vertical. Automobile manufacturers 
integrated the suppliers of car materials; steel, railroads, iron ore shipping and coal 
mines were principally restructured by consolidation. However, the crashes and the 
Great Depression terminated the wave in 1929 (Lipton, 2006). 
 
The third wave, between 1955 and 1969 or 1973, principally comprised diversified 
conglomerate mergers. The innovative concept of a conglomerate developed during 
this period. The major participants sought to establish more inroads into different 
sectors and fields. When the conglomerate stock lastly failed in 1969, those firms 
were not able to tale advantage to diversifications through the transactions.  
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The fourth wave, between 1974 and 1989, principally comprised congeneric merger, 
hostile takeover and corporate raiding. M&As is most prominent during the periods of 
time and contribute to innovation in finance technologies using financial leverages 
and deregulations (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). In the year of 1974, the finance 
service company Morgan Stanley effectively entered to takeover market of investment 
banks for the first time. Morgan Stanley was primarily involved in hostile takeovers 
and issued junk bonds to increase the LBO market in the U.S. and Europe. Till 1987, 
hostile takeovers with two-tiers, front-end-loaded, boot-strap, bust-up, junk-bond and 
hostile tender offer caused the equity market falls (Golbe and White, 1988). 
 
The fifth wave, between 1993 and 2000, was principally cross-border merger. Follow 
the progress of globalization, M&As come to be the most strategic thought to enhance 
competitiveness worldwide. Cross-border M&As were generally associated with huge 
international companies, even oligopolies. Therefore, the valuation of the deals during 
the period of time was extraordinarily huge. The M&As global size grew from 1992 
with $342 billion roughly tenfold to $3.3 trillion, and 9 of the 10 major transactions 
occurred in the final three years (1998-2000). Although governments became 
involved in monitoring the cross-border M&As during the past five years, the effects 
were insignificant. 
 
The different forms of M&As during the various waves produced "once-unthinkable 
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combinations such as the mergers of Vodafone and Mannesmann, Citibank and 
Travelers, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, Chrysler and Daimler Benz, AOL and 
Time Warner, Exxon and Mobil‟ (Lipton, 2006). A primary reason of these waves 
were significant was because the global market was disconnected. Global markets 
activated the cross-border M&As because they were an effective manner in which to 
develop the global market and avoid diverse cultural effects. The best example is 
Wal-Mart‟s successfully entering the U.K. market by acquiring ASDA in 1999. At that 
point, other companies began to be anxious about the upcoming of international 
competitions and joined the wave dramatically. This increase caused a worldwide 
plundering war (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). Finally, the wave was terminated by 
the millennium bubble and the Enron scandals (Lipton, 2006). 
 
The sixth wave, from 2003 to 2008, was principally shareholder activism, private 
equity and LBOs. Several entities or countries, such as France, Italy and Russia, were 
primary factors of this wave the government supported the creation of the influential 
domestic or international champion, increasing commodities price and lowering 
interests and the availabilities of hedge fund. The active investors and the remarkable 
development of private equity fund engendered more M&As. 
 
2.2.3 Cross-Border M&As Transactions 
Cross-border M&As are the business integration of a domestic company participating 
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in one or more overseas companies to construct a new company. The integrating 
companies hold the assets from both sides (Gaughan, 2011). Acquisitions are different 
from mergers, which comprise one company acquiring another by obtaining the 
ownership of the target company for the purpose of taking over the governance 
(Whitaker and Hoboken, 2012). The distinct difference between these two activities is 
valuable when investigating the M&As phenomenon. 
 
Seeking tangible and intangible assets may conceivably be the driving force for 
companies to execute cross-border M&As. There are several targets for the 
transactions: maximizing capital gains, obtaining managerial benefits and tax savings. 
 
The motivations for M&As may be divided into three different areas (Angwin, 2007): 
first, to realize economic growth; second, strategic consideration to lay a solid 
foundation for economic growth, for example, to obtain a greater market share, raw 
materials and technology; and third, the behavioural incentives that reflect the needs 
of target and bidder companies. 
 
Additionally, several aspects contribute to cross-border M&As. M&As activities may 
have technological advantages, which help to offset the cost of research and 
development. In addition, the openness of regulations may help cross-border M&As 
accelerate the liberalization and privatization of markets. Cross-border M&As are 
crucial to realizing geographic diversification and global collaboration. (Dos Santos et 
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al., 2008) Finally, cross-border M&As reduced the stress of the financial crisis in 
2007 and contributed to economic recovery (Grave, 2012).  
 
The valuation of the rewards of cross-border M&As is the specific investigation based 
on the value appreciation or depreciation before and after the transaction; in other 
words, the entire activity of M&As may have positive or negative effects on the 
bidder and the target. The market-based returns may be applied to estimate the 
performance of cross-border M&As (Bruner, 2004). The Lerner Index may also be 
applied to measure the creation of market value (Kim and Lyn, 1986).  
 
Conversely, cross-border M&As may be failures for certain companies for various 
reasons. The transactions may be executed at an inappropriate time. Angwin (2007) 
observed that the transaction may lose returns in an early stage or perform more 
poorly five years after the transaction. The results of M&As may be affected at 
different times. 
 
As the support of economic reforming and open market policy, the integration of 
domestic and overseas assets developed dramatically. The financial crisis had massive 
effects on cross-border M&As, which may be demonstrated by FDI (foreign direct 
investment). After the financial crisis, the global FDI reached its lowest point at 
$1,197,824 in 2009 and began recovering gradually after 2010 (Chor and Manova, 
2012). 
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The global market was deeply affected by the financial crisis whereas the cross-border 
M&As accounted for the majority of FDI (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). Transaction 
values peaked at the beginning of 2008; then the M&As transaction value in China 
declined gradually. The number of M&As transactions is correlated with financial 
crises (Mariana, 2011). During the peak years, Chinese companies accounted for 44% 
of the bidders and 42.3% of the targets in M&As transactions; these numbers dropped 
to 34% and 32% in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2010). Therefore, there is a robust relation 
between financial fluctuations and cross-border M&As (Mariana, 2011). 
 
Mergers may generally be categorized in following conditions: horizontal, vertical 
and conglomerate. Horizontal mergers occur when two corporations are combined 
into one company in the same industry (Baik, 1995). Vertical mergers involve the 
integration of two companies that have a buyer-seller relation and represent the 
diverse phases of production. Conglomerate mergers signify the combination of 
companies from different industries or different sectors and have neither a 
buyer-seller relation nor a competitive relation (Gaughan, 2011). Different types of 
M&As lead to different analytical results and company performance (Bouwman et al., 
2003). 
 
Merger waves are clearly different from previous waves with creative new methods of 
consolidating companies and defending the merged companies. There were six merger 
56 
 
waves between 1897 and 2003. These waves may be identified by the features of 
corresponding M&As, improving the credibility of analysis (Moeller and Brady, 
2007).  
 
There are three theories of M&As motives: the mergers as the lucid choice, the 
mergers as procedure consequence and the mergers as a macro-economic occurrence. 
The first theory may be the most significant motivation, comprising efficiency 
theories, monopoly theories, raider theories and valuation theories and suggesting that 
the interests of shareholders and managers are the first priority of the transaction. The 
second theory notes that M&As are a process outcome governed by individuals, 
organizational routines and political power. The third theory suggests that merger 
waves are stimulated by the economic disturbance (Friedrich, 1990). The assessment 
is based on different motivations, which provide more evidence to verify whether 
M&As add value to the performance of a company and whether the results of M&As 
are consistent with the motivations. 
 
M&As activities may lead to both positive and negative performance of the 
transaction. Companies may increase their income and market share and strengthen 
profitability and value creation by M&As. Nevertheless, M&As may also have 
negative effects, such as hurting the value for the shareholders of the bidder firms and 
experiencing losses in profitability. Assessment of performance would be important to 
research to determine how it affects the performance of bidders and targets. The 
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outcomes of M&As are generally measured using stock-based data and 
accounting-based data. Stock-based data measure the transaction‟s effect on stock 
price movements for the bidder company before and after the M&A announcement. 
Deans et al. (2003) suggested that a good performance of the stock value of the bidder 
company represents a successful M&As transaction and simultaneously increases the 
wealth of shareholders. Nevertheless, stock-based data have unavoidable limitations; 
thus, using accounting-based data is also supported by scholars. Investigating the 
accounting performance of bidder companies can determine whether M&As enhance 
or destroy value (Ooghe et al., 2006).  
 
After China has joined the membership of the WTO (world trade organization), the 
regulatory policies were more supportive and helped corporations work with overseas 
firms instead of against them, allowing the activities of cross-border M&As to grow 
quickly. Nevertheless, to successfully complete an M&A transaction may be a 
challenging task. 
 
M&As are a business activity in which one or more companies are bought or 
combined (Chong, 2007). As stated by Brealey et al. (2006), there are three major 
types of M&As: vertical mergers, horizontal mergers and conglomerate mergers.  
 
There are three important motivations for Chinese companies to participate in 
cross-border M&As. The primary motivation is to gain technologies and resources. 
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Shimizu et al. (2004) noted that the M&As transactions conducted by emerging 
markets such as China to developed markets may also be motivated by invisible assets 
such as patented technology. 
 
The second motivation is to encourage access into a new market and expand market 
share. Transnational M&As transactions provide the opportunity to access new 
markets directly with the existing sales volume; this is less time-consuming and costs 
less than to establish an international branch with foreign liabilities, considerations of 
organizational constraints and the differences in cultures and business practices (Datta 
and Puia, 1995; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). For example, Lenovo acquired IBM 
to expand overseas markets and sales, to avoid trade barriers and to increase its 
market share of personal computers. 
 
The third motivation is diversification. Cross-border M&As provide opportunity to 
lower costs and risks of accessing new markets. Boateng and Glaister (2003) also 
observed that risk may decease by asset diversification across different markets. 
Friedman and Gibson (1988) and Trautwein (1990) demonstrated that a company 
involved in M&As transactions is generally seeking synergistic effects. Cross-border 
M&As may increase the capacity of business, cut costs by large-scale production, 
increase the diversity of services and products, and expand market share in the long 
run (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Ghauri and Buckley, 2003). Nevertheless, 
cross-border M&As are complex events for companies, and the risks may appear in 
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any stage of the process. Previous research on cross-border M&As indicated that the 
risks fundamentally involve six aspects: finance, human resources, strategy, law, 
culture and customers. 
 
The uncertainty of the separation in capital structure, information asymmetry, and the 
difficulty of integrating different companies may enhance the financial risk for 
transactional M&As (Zhou and Zhang, 2010). 
 
Blake and Mouton (1985) demonstrated that the majority of employees are unwilling 
to experience the execution of cross-border M&As. Cartwright and Cooper (1993) 
reported that senior management also experienced nervousness during M&As. The 
anxiety and stress may result in a risk to human resources. 
 
The cross-border M&As are opportunistic-oriented instead of strategic-oriented for 
the companies; companies anticipate realized and direct profits (Mirvis and Marks, 
2001). Consequently, M&As may lead to strategic risks. 
 
Another risk is the law. The dissimilarities in the laws of different governments and 
countries may contribute to an anti-merger policy, which destroys the equilibrium 
between companies. 
 
Regarding the culture risk, Berry (1983) noted that there are three phases during 
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which people adopt different cultures: adaptation, conflict and contact. Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh (1993) clarified that if the adaptation is not positive, the dissatisfaction of 
employees may result in the underachievement of the operation. 
 
Moreover, Temporal (2002) noted that transactional M&As may lead to confusion in 
customers, such as a new co-brand, particularly when a well-known brand is acquired 
by a non-famous brand. This confusion may increase uncertainty among customer 
categories.  
 
2.2.4 Chinese Bidders’ Returns in Cross-Border M&As Transactions 
This part of the literatures review contains further study that contributes to M&As of 
Chinese bidders. The core objective is to fill the information gap regarding Chinese 
bidders‟ returns in cross-border M&As. Because the Chinese M&As market began 
much later than developed markets, data and resources directly referring to Chinese 
cross-border M&As are quite restricted. Hence, the referenced literature primarily 
derives from the research of Western scholars. This review also quotes common 
characteristic and methodology of different theory and empirical finding that are more 
significant to China‟s cross-border M&A transactions. The following literatures 
review includes the motivation of the M&As, the factor that affect bidder returns, 
forms of M&As, methodology and past merger waves. Finally, the review 
corresponds to the distinctive features of Chinese enterprise structures and the 
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findings of Chinese M&As. 
 
To study the bidder returns of M&As, the research question was to identify the 
difference in the value of the company after the transaction and what was expected by 
the investors. The majority of the answer is that the value grows after including 
operational, financial and collusive synergy (Chatterjee, 1986; Trautwein, 1990; Yook, 
2003).  
 
Operational synergy is an essential indicator of whether a M&As transaction was 
successful. It reflects that the general effectiveness of the company after the 
transaction should be better than the sum of the original two entities. Operational 
synergy primarily reflects structural changes in companies‟ operational actions to 
improve the quality and quantity of producing (Gupta and Gerchak, 2000). There are 
two significant theories support this perspective. When economies scale increases 
capacity of production, fixed costs decline, such as management costs, equipment 
costs and advertising costs. The other theory is that the vertical process creates 
benefits from lower transaction costs between suppliers and consumers and enhances 
the operations between departments to obtain better quality services and products.  
 
Management synergy principally reflects management systems, which is sharing the 
resources of both companies after the transaction, improving management quality. If 
the efficiency of management is quite different in the two companies, the inefficient 
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company may benefit from the more efficient one after the transaction. This type of 
synergy requires both companies to have similar management systems. If not, the 
transaction process renders it difficult to obtain benefits from management and even 
tends to be more costly (Bradley et al., 1988).  
 
Financial synergies are reducing internal cost of holding capital and reinvesting 
reserve earnings or cash to the portfolio, consequently increasing efficiency of the use 
of capital. The synergies may be reached by entirely forms of M&As transactions and 
may be major motivations of M&As. To take an example, mature or recession firms 
may hold plenty of capital however lack a proper opportunity to finance to their own 
industry. Hence, M&As may support their building a better investment portfolio. 
Fresh and active companies invest more when they have a lower debt ratio. 
 
Other studies regarding creating value by M&As also discuss market power, such as 
monopolies (Ghosh, 2004), tax benefit, diversifications and growth of equities 
(Mandelker, 1974). Nevertheless, numerous empirical results suggest that M&As 
might shrink the valuation of a company because of managerialism (Seth et al., 2000), 
hubris (Roll, 1986) or because the valuation of the synergy did not signify value of 
target (Andrade et al., 2001). In general, once the M&As announcement is released, 
the share price is swiftly reflected, and changes are led by short-term factors. The 
price returns to a steady level in the long term. 
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The majority of investors are only engaged in short-term returns in M&As 
transactions. Because the influence of synergy generally needs long-term reflection, 
the short-term factors are also worthy of study. The short-term factors could contain 
the nature of the targets, methods of payments, locations of the target, industries 
similarity, ownership structures, etc; and the benchmark to assess whether the factors 
are positive or negative are abnormal returns (Tao et al., 2017). The definition of 
abnormal returns is excessive returns that are much more than the expected returns in 
particular events (Brown and Warner, 1985).  
 
M&As represent considerable reallocation of resource within or across industry in 
capital market; hence, the way to distribute different resources straight affects 
performance and expected returns for shareholders (Andrade et al., 2001). M&As may 
be classified in flowing forms: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate M&As. 
 
Horizontal M&As contain the same or similar customer-related businesses between 
companies and suppliers or at least represent a similar economic environment. This 
type of M&A normally does not include a company that focuses on its own business 
and grows slowly. Conversely, when the company feels the demand to take advantage 
in a business sector, the M&A is the strategic choice. A M&A is more likely to enlarge 
market share and cut costs in its business sector. This form of M&A is positive for 
operational and managerial synergy (Jones, 1982). 
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Vertical M&As concern two companies that are related, such as suppliers and 
demanders. One company may receive better services or product as of its partner and 
may run more efficiently if it does not require cash flows and negotiation. This form 
of M&A is more possible to raise competitions by declining cost (Jones, 1982). 
 
Conglomerate M&As occur between two unrelated companies that are most likely 
seeking diversifications or finance synergies. This form of M&A is ideally positive for 
risks moderation. Nevertheless, there may be numerous issues, forcing the bidder firm 
to spend more managing an unfamiliar business and receiving fewer benefits 
(Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). 
 
Regarding the methodology of research, several tools and theories must be understood 
to investigate M&As. 
 
CAPM (Capital Asset Price Model) was developed by Markowitz (1959). It is quite a 
well-known and fundamental concept that is applied to assess the return on assets by 
considering risk (variance), and it is the most acceptable theory in the financial area. 
Most researchers use the model to investigate market efficiency on portfolio 
performance, and the risk to the portfolio can be quantified by beta (Fama and French, 
1993). Two methods are broadly used to measure the returns. The P/E ratio (price to 
earnings ratio) are used to assess the return of bidders; it is highly focused on earnings 
and ignores other relevant risk factors such as book to market, leverage ratio, and 
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sizes (Ball, 1978). 
 
The market to book ratio is the sign adopted to evaluate book and market value. It 
straight assess bidders‟ returns. Nearly all studies on M&As must consider the volume 
of transaction. Wansley (1983) claimed that big companies are facing more issues 
with methods of integration and payment. M&As transaction is principally 
reallocation of resource (Andrade et al., 2001); therefore, large transactions offer 
more opportunities to managers to derive more benefits, such as market power and 
reputation in the market. By contrast, more opportunities also mean more volatility in 
the bidder‟s returns (Marris, 1964). Moreover, the methods of payments for big 
transactions are more often stocks rather than using cash (UNCTAD, 2000). There is 
an empirical result indicates that a cash payment is more efficient in reaching the 
expected returns on the target than financing with stocks (Schmidt and Ruhli, 2002). 
Therefore, many studies classified various sized firms in different tiers and divided 
the firms into financing and non-financing (Uddin and Boateng, 2009). 
 
Most studies categorized the bidder's return on M&As activities into long-run and 
short-run returns. The market performance of bidder firms is assessed by the 
cumulative abnormal return before and after announcement date (short-run returns). 
Then the event window may be applied to observe the CARs (Schwert, 1996). Over 
the long run, transactions lasting more than 3 years are measured as operations 
performance. In addition to calculating the CARs for long-run returns, the returns on 
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earnings, profit margin and returns on equity are also used as sign for observations. 
The cross- sectional research statistically calculates relations among variables in 
which CARs are the dependent variable. 
 
The Chinese M&As investment environment is quite different from the environment 
in the U.S. and Europe. There is some special characteristics in Chinese market. First, 
the Chinese markets are likely more isolated than developed market in which it is 
easier to conduct transactions. Chinese market own two but connected stock 
exchanges, the Shanghai Exchange and the Shenzhen Exchange, and three 
commodities and future exchanges, the Dalian Commodities Exchange, the Shanghai 
future exchange, and the Zhengzhou commodities exchange; and one financial futures 
exchange, the China Financial Futures Exchange. These exchanges are quite dynamic 
and fulfil national demands in the financial market. Nevertheless, Chinese investors 
are not able to directly participate in foreign security through different market and 
must use other channels such as funds or other agencies, which are more expensive 
and more difficult. Thus, if cross-border M&As in China create benefits from onshore 
to offshore, the bidders in China must be supported by regulators and governors. 
Second, state-owned enterprises are the most competitive companies, and they 
represent the 242 largest companies in China. And these companies are more diverse 
from other firms. They could be less sensitive to market factors since they are held by 
the state. A study by Chen and Young (2009) observed that structures of ownership in 
Chinese market has major effects on performance because SOEs have the support of 
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the police, or at least they are backed up by the government and have better credit 
assessments than private companies.  
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Sample Selection and Data Description 
The selected samples contain all M&A transactions (complete or incomplete) 
involving Chinese public companies as bidders from 2002 to 2016. The primary data 
were collected from the Thomason One Banker transactions (SDC) and the GTA 
(CSMAR) database. Similar to Fuller et al. (2002), the samples selected fit following 
criteria: 
 
1. The acquirer must be Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges.  
2. To test hypotheses, all transactions must be announced, including all Chinese 
listed firms‟ cross-border transactions. 
3. The target firm may be public, private or other and must be a non-Chinese firm. 
4. The acquirer firm must have been publicly listed for at least 1 year before and 
after the acquisition announcement. 
 
The sample began in 2002 when Chinese public companies began to acquire foreign 
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companies. By the end of 2016, there had been 465 acquisition announcements of 
Chinese listed company cross-border takeovers. 
 
2.3.2 Methodologies 
This dissertation evaluates the financial performance of over one thousand public 
Chinese enterprises participated in cross-border M&As by adopting the events study 
method. The empirical study may be applied to measure effects on shareholders‟ 
assets by stock markets data after the transaction. The events study method is which 
firstly suggested by Fama et al. (1969), this was one of the most regular M&As 
performances assessment tool. This approach assesses effects of events throughout the 
periods of stock prices volatilities. It echoes investors‟ expectations of yet to come 
operation of events. Event study approach uses the markets model approach to assess 
separate firm's expected rates of returns throughout events periods, and then compares 
differences between expected rate of returns and actual return. Lastly, the method 
computes differences between accumulated excess returns and zero to decide whether 
events significantly affected the firm's share prices. The fundamental hypothesis is 
that capital markets are efficient, that suggests that capital market is able to precisely 
reflect economic activities (Fama, 1970). Another assumption is that securities prices 
may precisely echo present accessible public information and hold capability to 
correct quickly established on announced of the latest public information.  
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Jensen and Ruback (1983) previously applied event study research to M&As. They 
selected this approach to test short-run market performances of M&As. The typical 
events study testing models that was applied to exam performances of M&As had 
certain restrictions, for example, that there is no way to separate the effects of 
non-related conflicts as the event periods increase. Thus, academics have begun to 
adjust this method to increase its efficiency. Franks et al. (1991) used 8 factors to 
measure performance, which challenges the former model using simple long-term 
testing of market structure, significantly developing the dependability results of the 
long-term performance of M&As. 
 
For all transactions, the acquirers are classified into two groups, transactions financed 
with cash and with non-cash. In addition, the performance of bidders will be observed 
for several days beginning approximately 2-5 days before the date of acquisition 
announcements and ending approximately 2-5 days after the announcement. 
 
The steps are as follows: 
Step One: The event is defined as a cross-border M&A, and events periods for each 
cross-border M&A transaction are defined. T=0 is defined as firm first anounced the 
cross-border transaction announcements date. The event periods are T1, T2. T1 stands 
for 2-5 days earlier the announcements date, and T2 stands for 2-5 days later the 
announcements were free to public. 
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Step Two: Compute day-to-day actual rates of returns for transactions date of separate 
sample while events periods [-2, 2], [-5, 5]. 
The actual returns rates of the “i” firm for T days are defined as  
𝑅𝑖𝑇 =
𝑃𝑖𝑇 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑇−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑇−1
 
where “T” represents time. 
PiT ,Pi,T−1 represents closing prices of the “i” shares on trading day T-1 and T, 
separately. Using closing prices eliminates effects of dividends, rights issues and other 
incidents on closing shares prices for every company sample. 
 
Step ThreeTwo: Compute day-to-day normal rates of returns on transactions date of 
every sample during events periods [-2, 2], [-5, 5]. 
Using of the CAPM model (capital assets pricing model) to measure expected returns 
of shares is equivalent to additionally presenting the regressions model and 
uncertainties of estimating the systematic risks β; the fluctuations in equity market 
indexes may be adopted to represent expected rate of returns. 
The expected return rates of “i” firm for T days are defined as 
𝑅𝑖?̂? =
𝑃𝑖?̂? − 𝑃𝑖,𝑇−1̂
𝑃𝑖,𝑇−1̂
 
where PiT̂, Pi,T−1̂ represents the closing price of the stock market index. 
The market model may be applied to measure the expected rate of return for company 
“i”: 
𝑅𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑇 
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Due to the regressions model established on actual rate of return and market indexes 
rate of returns, parameter of αi and βi may be assessed. RMT represents the T days 
return rates of market (the differences between the T-1 and T return rates of market 
dividends is T-1 rate). The εiT is normally distributed error term. 
 
Step FourThree: Measure the abnormal returns for every sample by differences 
between normal return and actual returns. 
The abnormal returns of the “i” firm for T days are defined as 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 = 𝑅𝑖𝑇 − 𝑅𝑖?̂? 
 
Step FiveFour: Compute day-to-day average abnormal returns for entire samples 
throughout events periods. 
The average abnormal returns for all of samples for T days are 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Averaging abnormal returns among sample firms eliminates other factors that affect 
abnormal returns of M&As. Consequently, including more sample companies allows 
better identification of more effects on the abnormal returns of M&As. 
 
Step SixFive: Compute cumulative value of average abnormal returns of entire 
sample throughout events periods. 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇
𝑁
𝑖=0
 
This equation indicates general average effects of firm's transactions of sample events 
for whole equity return. 
 
Step SevenSix: Test to determine whether the CARs are affected by volatility of stock 
price. 
 
To decide whether above-measured AARs and CARs are affected by cross-border 
M&A transactions, following stage of the study is conducting significance tests. 
Significant testing results indicate that volatilities in equity price while events periods 
were affected by several factors. The cross-border M&As transactions produce 
significant effects on equity prices of public companies. According to the relevant 
market model, one hypothesis is that the cross-border M&As transactions have no 
effects on share prices when the AARs and CARs follow normal distribution with the 
mean equal to 0.  
Null hypothesisH0: AART = 0, CART = 0 
(t-statistics of tAART and tCART follow t-distribution degree of freedom of the N-1) 
AART test statistics: 
tAART =
AART
S(AART)/√N
 
CART test statistics: 
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tCART =
CART
S(CART)/√N
 
Established by upon hypothesis, AARs and CARs that are over zero and has 
significant testing results indicate that the information released by firm makes senses 
and has positive effects on trend of equity prices. AARs and CARs that are below zero 
indicate that M&As has negative effects on equity prices and create subtractive 
cumulative abnormal returns. No significant difference between zero and CARs 
indicates that the individual investor is not acting on the M&A or that the market is 
insensitive to the transaction announcements. 
 
The methodology of event study is broadly applied to measure the effects of M&As 
transactions. If any other influencing factors are certified as being uninvolved, the 
economic effects of the M&As will be confirmed. In addition, this method is 
calculated directly and is easier to realize. Because of the explanations presented, 
trend and rapidity of prices reaction to different economic phenomena may be revised 
in cross-border M&As.  
 
Nonetheless, there is a few restrictions to the event study method. First, it strongly 
depends on assumptions of market efficiency. This assumption is not effective in the 
majority of emerging markets, such as China‟s stock market. The time periods during 
which single investor respond to unpredicted event signs are general random and 
tough to assess. Hence, the effect that market tends to show inefficiency because of 
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prices may not immediately or completely reflect all public information. Second, this 
method only delivers assessments of the short-run effects on stocks and fail to reflect 
other influences, for example, level of disclosure to investor and concurrent event 
(Malatesta and Thompson, 1985). The concurrent event suggest that some event may 
occur concurrently with M&As, causing abnormal return that could not purely 
produced by cross-border M&As transactions. This method cannot reflect and assess 
probability of concurrent event. Sawyer and Gygax (2001) identified evidence that 
historical event may not fully explain some types of effects on cross-border M&A 
transactions as well.
2
 
 
2.3.3 Empirical Analysis 
This paper focuses on what type of target may be more beneficial to Chinese listed 
companies when the company decides to acquire an overseas company. The paper 
also presents advice regarding the relative methods of selecting a target to explain 
whether the M&A was successful. Numerous data regarding successful and 
unsuccessful transactions indicate the outcome of a chosen target and what was 
different between transactions. The purpose of this study was to identify the target in 
cross-border transactions initiated by Chinese acquirers to demonstrate the relevant 
factors for the target chosen by analysing massive amounts of data. 
                                                   
2 The result is robust by using different model, for example, Fama–French three-factor model and  Fama–French 
five-factor model 
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With regard to empirical analyses of whether M&As activities generate value for 
bidder companies‟ shareholder in Chinese transactions, some deviations remain. The 
first significant issue of these deviations is that there must be a fair benchmark with 
which to compare previous research. A persuasive and specific benchmark would help 
to resolve these differences. Specifically, the benchmark must be based on the 
definition of value creation and the method of measurement of shareholders‟ interests. 
By investigating many applicable empirical studies, Bruner (2002) discovered that 
there are three types of benchmarks: value creation, value destruction and value 
conservation. These findings depend on the specific factors that are the investors‟ 
required return. 
 
The following factors may be considered to be the variables of whether transactions 
succeed. 
 
2.3.3.1 Financial Leverage 
Maloney et al. (1993) illustrated that a company with a higher leverage ratio may 
deliver good performances in takeover transactions; smaller companies have higher 
levels of leverage ratios than larger companies. The authors also noted that an 
acquirer with a higher leverage ratio is more likely to bring a higher abnormal return. 
However, after massive empirical testing, some studies indicated that there may be no 
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connections between the leverage ratio and the outcomes of acquisitions. For example, 
Fausto and Holger (2004) stated that there is little empirical evidence regarding 
relations between the outcomes of acquisitions and bidders‟ leverage ratios. Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling (1991) concluded that a bidder‟s leverage ratio is negatively 
related to a shareholder‟s return of the target firm; the study considered bidders' 
existing leverage although there was no increasing debt to finance the transaction. 
 
2.3.3.2 Method of Payment 
In different M&As transactions, acquirers adopt different methods of payment by 
considering different advantages to complete the transaction. The methods include full 
cash payment, equity transfers, and assets stripping and assets replacement. In 
practice, the first 3 methods of payment are more common. This research concentrate 
on whether payment is made in cash because cash payments are more typical when 
Chinese companies engage in cross-border mergers. Larger M&As transaction 
activities are also quite common; Ronald and Mara (2005) claimed that financing 
strategy may affect the structure of ownership of the acquirer company, the financial 
leverage ratio, and further financial decision-making. They also noted that the 
acquirer selects the methods of payment, which may be affected by several factors. 
First, if the bidder has low liquidity, low unused borrowing capacity and fewer 
tangible assets but has a high leverage ratio compared with the industry average, the 
transaction may be intensely restrained in its use of liquid assets by cash. By 
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observing the effects of acquirers' financial situations, those authors determined that 
when bidders hold tangible assets or liquid assets, they tend to choose cash as the 
methods of payment, which is consistent with borrowing capacities growing with 
collaterals. Financially restricted bidders with a higher leverage ratio tends to use 
stock transfers as the methods of payment, which is consistent with the bidders who 
are concerned about considerably increasing the possibility of bankruptcies. Lastly, 
those authors determined that, as commonly anticipated, the bidder with greater total 
assets is more likely to adopt the cash payment, which is consistent with a great 
degree of diversification. Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
noted that acquirers finance with stocks when the stocks is overrated and acquirers 
paying with cash when the stocks are undervalued. 
 
2.3.3.3 Size 
Dixon et al. (2001) stated that firm size is also an important factor of capital gain 
before or after acquisition announcements. Those authors determined that large firms 
may benefit more from M&As activities and seek these opportunities and mergers 
with firms whose size is equal to or even larger than their own. They also determined 
that smaller companies may seek opportunities with larger companies to maximize. 
 
Campa and Kedia (2002) determined that average abnormal return of bidders, target 
companies, and the average of both acquirer and target weighted by quartiles of size 
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distribution determine the correlation between abnormal return and size of acquiring 
company. These scholars did not observe the significant correlation between scale of 
bidder companies and excess return of companies. If something, bidder companies 
with lower levels of markets capitalizations received higher abnormal return. 
 
Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2014) observed correlation between bidder‟s size and 
sovereign governance. Previous studies in this field generally considered company 
size to be the cause of agency issue and value loss. Nevertheless, larger company size 
produces few off-setting benefit within weaker sovereign governance. The benefit 
may derive from political connections and market power. A larger scale may also 
enjoy more protection from the system, for example, government corruption. Those 
authors determined that takeovers of larger firms generated considerably higher 
abnormal returns following M&As announcements and tended to improve the 
performance of operations. They also presented evidence that some of the gains of 
larger firms are the result of political connections. 
 
2.3.4 Event Study 
Different research methodologies are another issue causing deviations. Earlier studies 
regarding the profitability of M&A activity in the banking industry normally applied 
two major academic research methods, accounting facts or event study. Accounting 
facts are more likely to be used for measuring acquirer companies‟ accounting 
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profitability and cash flow and evaluating returns on equities or assets. Overall, 
banking sector uses the operating cost of all employees and an efficiency ratio to 
measure costs and profits. These data are combined with data regarding bidder 
companies‟ accounting performance in the pre-merger period to process calculations. 
Finally, these accounting facts are compared with bidder companies‟ competitors who 
are not participating in the M&As activity. During the same period, if the bidder 
company‟s fundamental facts overcome its competitors, the transaction will be 
defined as a positive performance for the bidder company. Event study may also be 
applied to analysing bidder companies‟ equity prices movement before and after 
announcements date to measure gains or losses created by the transaction. If the stock 
price of the bidder company or target company increases after the announcement date, 
the transaction may be considered to have created value for bidder companies‟ 
shareholders in the short-term. 
 
Event study is an alternative method to assist an author in research when there are 
obvious advantages to event study. First, selecting the benchmark is an issue. 
Compared with accounting facts, event study investigates abnormal return based on 
the stock market, which suggests that abnormal return uses the same standard. This 
rationale suggests that event study analyses are generally applied in the same market 
or index, for example, the returns of the S&P 500 or applying the capital assets 
pricing model. More specifically, events study is generally on account of same 
benchmark that would be able to remove specified industrial factors, particularly in 
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the banking industry (DeLong, 2001). Those factors may be noise that may affect 
abnormal return. Nevertheless, event study specifically avoids the limitations. 
Moreover, events study offers a sufficient samples size through periods of time, which 
fulfils the requirement for abnormal return. All of the advantages render events study 
studies more precise. 
 
However, accounting facts also have several disadvantages. The most significant 
limitation is that different companies or banks may accept different accounting 
practices or standards. Occasionally, accounting practices or standards may require 
revision when a particular company is studied. Another disadvantage is that the 
disclosure of accounting facts may not be available whenever needed. Conversely, 
stock prices are public information in the market, information is available nearly 
every day except holidays, and stock prices are simple to obtain and compute. 
Compared with accounting facts, there is no need to wait until the company discloses 
information. Moreover, according to Caves (1989), event study is more precise 
because it is a more direct manner in which to measure shareholder return. 
Consequently, using event study has more competitive advantages, peculiarly when 
measuring shareholder return. 
 
A positive abnormal return brings a premium to the expectation of investors that is the 
value created for the shareholders. Because event study is more appropriate for 
measuring the return for shareholders, the author examines the abnormal return 
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obtained from listed Chinese companies in merger transactions separate from 
pre-merger and post-merger periods.  
 
2.3.4.1 Abnormal returns in pre-merger 
To determine the pre-merger return, previous studies normally selected data 
surrounding the official transaction announcement date. The existing findings noted 
that the pre-merger return of an acquirer in the banking industry indicated a negative 
trend. An example from Houston et al. (2001) is that during the transaction 
announcements periods, bidder firms in banking industry regularly show a shrinking 
value in equity markets. According to Houston et al., most findings demonstrate that 
the market value of acquirer companies falls approximately 2% in the 5 working days 
surrounding the announcement date. The empirical evidence suggested that abnormal 
return is negative during the pre-merger period, leading to a decline in the value of the 
acquirer company. However, the empirical evidence supports a valid hypothesis. 
Generally, these former findings assumed that the performance of a stock price 
effectively reflects the expectation of M&A transactions, reflecting that the stock 
price is able to reflect the effect arising from the M&A activities. The findings did not 
explore the conclusive evidence that M&A activities create benefits for the 
shareholders of the acquirer company in banking sector. 
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2.3.4.2 Abnormal returns post-merger 
Lajoux and Weston (1998) noted that the short-term abnormal return post-merger 
generally demonstrates positive performances and are statistically significant as well. 
Desai and Stover (1985) determined that in completed transactions in the banking 
industry, the short-term abnormal return demonstrates a positive performance, 
whether using daily or monthly data. James and Weir (1987) stated that the short-term 
abnormal return is approximately 5%. The data demonstrate that M&As activities in 
the banking industry create profit for the shareholders of the bidder company in the 
short-term. 
 
Nevertheless, previous studies report different opinions on long-run and short-run 
abnormal return in banking sector during post-merger periods. Previous studies 
indicated that a long-term abnormal return indicates a negative performance. 
Hawawini and Swary (1990) and Neely (1987) noted that the abnormal return 
indicates a negative performance and is statistically significant in the long term. After 
analysing the samples of 28 major bidder companies in the banking industry, Lajoux 
and Weston (1998) reported that 80% of M&As transactions caused a decline in the 
stock prices of the bidder company. Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) observed 
data from research on the long-term abnormal return of bidders in the banking 
industry between 1985 and 1996; the data indicated negative results, from -4.46% to 
-2.61%. A bidder company in the banking industry commonly obtains a negative 
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abnormal returns in long-run.  
 
Moreover, compared with an abnormal return in the short-term, the volatility of 
abnormal returns is greater in the long term. For example, Houston and Ryngaert 
(1994) considered an abnormal return of -13.70% statistically significant in the long 
term whereas the return was only -1.68% in the findings of DeLong (2001).  
 
Compared with the short-term findings, the M&As transactions in the banking 
industry demonstrate a negative performance on abnormal return in the long term for 
shareholders of acquirer companies. Nevertheless, the positive abnormal return in the 
short term would be rejected by the negative abnormal return in the long term that 
suggests conflict with the profits maximization theory. 
 
Some previous studies differ, reporting that a positive return in the long-term is 
possible. Cornett et al. (2002) analysed the post-mergers of 20 large banks between 
1987 and 2002. There was positive performance for the return of the bidder company 
on equities in 3 rolling years post-merger although those data were based on 
accounting facts. Conversely, evidence indicates zero or a negative return in the 
banking industry in the short term. Nevertheless, due to diverse study methodologies, 
the outcomes were apparently statistically insignificant. 
 
In Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), and Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999), different 
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study outcomes regarding post-merger performances indicated that the explanations 
for disagreement may be differences in time periods, statistical methodology, the size 
of the sample, or the effective factors in banking industry M&As. Based on these 
reasons, the different time period selection may be the most important factor. In 
particular, if takeovers occurred between 1981 and 1989, that was during a merger 
wave, and there were many transactions. All things being equal, the average abnormal 
return of the bidder company should have been greater than in the 1970s. In Gell et al. 
(2008), the empirical evidence indicated that those bidders who proceeded earlier in 
the merger wave obtained more than 50% of abnormal return for shareholders because 
the performance of stock prices was higher than market expectations. Conversely, 
bidders who proceeded with M&As transactions later in the merger wave may have to 
experienced less or negative abnormal returns because of overpaying on transactions. 
 
The duration of the post-merger period may also require additional attention. Jarrell et 
al. (1988) emphasized that factor noise may have dramatic effects on stock prices; the 
post-merger return would indicate little deviation. De Pamphilis (2010) demonstrated 
that a longer the post-merger period may be another factor affecting the return on 
M&As transactions. 
 
Summarizing the empirical evidence and the previous literature, the bidder in the 
banking sector tends to gain a positive abnormal return in short-run. Nevertheless, if 
post-merger periods are longer, abnormal return of the bidder company is more likely 
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to be negative. 
 
2.4 Results 
Many studies explored China‟s growth, investments, corporate structure and the 
cross-border transaction returns of Chinese listed companies. The majority of relevant 
academic studies focused on U.S. and European transactions, for example, 
determining whether M&As created value for shareholders. The majority of findings 
concerned shareholders of target firms experiencing positive abnormal return affected 
by positive information or speculations. Nevertheless, results for acquirer returns were 
more diverse, rather depending on characteristics of transactions, such as methods of 
payments, size of transaction, the bidder‟s experiences with M&As and the duration 
of transaction. Travlos (1987) stated that taking stocks as method of payments results 
in a significant negative returns while a full cash payment generated no abnormal 
returns. This study fills the knowledge gap by exploring whether the theories apply to 
the Chinese market, the largest emerging economy and the second largest capital 
market. 
 
86 
 
2.4.1 Summary Statistics 
2.4.1.1 Entire Sample 
Table 2.1 indicates summary statistics for the entire sample of Chinese acquirers 
engaging in cross-border M&As. The table indicates the yearly transaction volume 
and value of the transactions. The second column compares the number of 
transactions financed with cash and those financed with non-cash payments. In the 
sample, only 37% of transactions were financed with cash, and 63% of the 
transactions were financed with no cash. The last column exhibits the breakdown of 
cumulative abnormal returns by year. 
 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
 
A distinctive component of this table is that there was a significant increase in the 
value of transactions and the number of transactions since 2006. Quite an active 
period began in 2012, and the transaction volume and the value of transactions 
remained high between 2013 and 2016. This trend echoed the Chinese opening-up 
policy, which included several supportive policies: SAFE issued offshore investment 
guidelines in 2009
3
, and the Ministry of Commerce issued an administrative approach 
                                                   
3 SAFE (State Administration of Foreign Exchange) issued “Regulations of Domestic Institutions Overseas Direct 
Investment on Foreign Exchange” on 13 July 2009. 
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in 2014
4
. These regulations guided Chinese institutions to invest in overseas markets 
in a regulated manner. The majority of Chinese investors chose to pay without cash. 
The cumulative abnormal returns performed better after 2011, and before that, the 
performance was negative and volatile. As for the financial crisis after 2007, the 
CARs performed badly with the global trend although the crisis was also an 
opportunity for many assets to be valued lower (Chor and Manova, 2012 and Grave et 
al., 2012). Chinese companies began to buy overseas assets during this period, 
beginning the high trading volume. In the early stage, the majority of transactions 
were not extremely successful although numerous mega-transactions occurred, such 
as in 2007, whereas they were rewarded in 2011, as the CARs showed in Table 2.1. 
The total value has declined, but the returns are significant. 
 
2.4.1.2 Transaction Distribution 
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the numbers and proportion of transactions that Chinese 
acquirers conducted in the twelve major industries. The results indicated that bidding 
companies were generally focused on industrials, materials and high technology. Panel 
B of Table 4.2 reports the numbers and proportion of transactions for foreign 
(excluding China) targets in the twelve major industries. The results indicated that 
Chinese buyers prefer companies dealing in industrials, materials and financials. Panel 
C of Table 4.2 reports the numbers and proportion of transactions for foreign targets, 
                                                   
4 The Ministry of Commerce issued “Offshore Investment Management Approach” Document No.3 in 2014. 
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divided into four geographic areas. The results indicated that the majority of target 
firms were located in Asia-Pacific. 
 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
 
The major industry sector of acquirers and targets is highly matched; many 
transactions occurred within the same industry. Of the Asia-Pacific targets, 36% (68 
transactions) were from Hong Kong. Perhaps because Hong Kong is always exposed 
to global investors and there is no capital monitoring, Hong Kong became the first 
priority platform for Chinese investors to access the global market (Zhao, 2003; Ruyi 
et al., 2012). European countries and the U.S. were also major destinations of Chinese 
buyers because of their more effective financial systems, legal protections and tax 
transparency, which lower the risk for international investors. (Zhang, 2017; Anderson 
and Sutherland, 2015) From a company perspective, E.U. and U.S. companies have 
better corporate governance, financial performance, complementarities and 
technology access in those developed markets (Kashif and Sardar, 2013; Tang, 2015). 
 
2.1.1.3 Univariate Test 
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the entire sample and the univariate 
comparison between transactions financed with cash and non-cash. In the sample, 37% 
of transactions were financed with cash; 63% were financed with no cash  
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[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for Chinese listed 
acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions financed with 
cash was 1.22% (t=2.45) and 1.01% (t=2.19), respectively; the mean and median CAR 
[-2, 2] for transactions financed with stock was -0.04% (t=-1.97) and -0.06% (t=-1.80), 
respectively. Transactions financed with cash outperformed transactions financed with 
stock by 1.26% (t=2.64) on average. Moreover, the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for 
transactions financed with cash was 1.29% (t=2.97) and 1.05% (t=2.43), respectively; 
the mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions financed with stock was -0.03% 
(t=-2.60) and -0.04% (t=-2.73), respectively. Transactions financed with cash 
outperformed transactions financed with stock by 1.32% (t=3.70) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.3 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions financed with 
cash and non-cash. The panel clearly identifies the difference between those two 
groups of companies in financial performance for the entire sample. First, the debt 
levels are similar. Second, companies financed with stocks have higher ROE and 
ROA, which indicates a better earning capacity. Third, the companies financed with 
cash have higher P/E valuation in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, the companies 
financed with stocks have much higher EBITDA and EBITDA/shares, which means 
better financial and operational performance. Finally, the companies financed with 
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stocks have much higher total assets and sales, which means the size and business of 
these companies is larger. Overall, the differences in ROE, ROA, EBITDA/share and 
total assets are significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 2.3 indicates transaction characteristics for transactions financed 
with cash and non-cash. The mean of market value for acquirer companies with 
transactions financed with cash is much smaller than for acquirer companies that 
financed transactions with stocks. The value of transactions financed with cash is 
significantly smaller than the value of transactions financed with stocks. The mean and 
median of relative size for transactions financed with cash and non-cash are 1.01 
(1.00) and 1.95 (1.64), respectively. The relative size of transactions financed with 
cash is significantly smaller than the relative size of transactions financed with stocks. 
According to the comparisons of market value and transaction value, therefore, it may 
be concluded that smaller companies tend to acquire similar sized overseas targets by 
paying with cash, and larger companies tend to acquire larger overseas target by 
paying with stocks. 
 
To summarize, Table 2.3 indicates that transactions financed with cash create 
significantly higher short-term returns; this result is consistent with the hypothesis of 
Chapter 2. Smaller companies have less capability to make cross-border M&A 
transactions, which explains why there are fewer transactions financed with cash. 
Larger companies have stronger financial performance and better fundamentals, 
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which encourage them to acquire foreign firms by paying with stock. These results are 
consistent with the existing literature. Emery and Switzer (1999) and Dutta et al. 
(2013), who also researched cross-border M&As, observed that cash offers were 
positively related to acquirer short-term performance. Moeller et al. (2004) observed 
that abnormal returns are associated with acquisitions announcement for small 
companies surpassed abnormal returns are associated with acquisitions announcement 
for large companies. Moeller et al. (2004) identified evidences that the management 
of large companies generally spend more on acquisitions. After monitoring for firm 
and transaction characteristics, those authors determined that the premium paid 
growths with company size. Acquiring a public firm financed with equity, a small 
firm would benefit considerably when it announced the acquisition. A large firm 
would suffer substantial shareholder losses when it announced the acquisitions of 
listed company regardless of how the acquisition was funded. 
 
2.1.2 Regional Univariate Test 
2.4.2.1 North America 
Table 2.4 demonstrates summary statistics for the entire sample and the univariate 
comparison between transactions financed with cash and non-cash in North America. 
In the sample, 37% of transactions were financed with cash; more transactions financed 
with no cash (63% of the sample).  
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[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2.4 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
financed with cash was -0.94% (t=-1.75) and -0.98% (t=-1.85), respectively; the mean 
and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions financed with stock was -1.01% (t=-1.85) and 
-1.08% (t=-1.87), respectively. Transactions financed with cash outperformed 
transactions financed with stock by 0.07% (t=1.97) on average. Moreover, the mean 
and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions financed with cash was -1.48% (t=-2.05) and 
-1.48% (t=-2.09), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
financed with stock was -1.62% (t=-2.62) and -1.90% (t=-2.59), respectively. 
Transactions financed with cash outperformed transactions financed with stock by 0.14% 
(t=2.22) on average. However, the results indicated that cash offers outperformed 
stock offers in North America; the abnormal returns were all negative. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.4 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions financed with 
cash and non-cash. The panel clearly shows the difference between these two groups 
of companies in financial performance. First, the debt levels are close. Second, the 
companies financed with stocks have higher ROE and ROA, which suggests better 
earning capacity. Third, the companies financed with cash have higher P/E valuation 
in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, the companies financed with stocks have much 
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higher EBITDA and EBITDA/shares, which suggests better financial and operational 
performance. Finally, the companies financed with stocks have much higher total 
assets and sales, which suggests that the size and business of these companies are 
larger. Overall, the difference in ROE, ROA, P/E, EBITDA/share total assets and 
sales are significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 2.3 indicates transaction characteristics for transactions financed 
with cash and non-cash. The mean of market value for acquirer companies with 
transactions financed with cash is higher larger than for the acquirer companies that 
financed transactions with stocks. The value of transactions financed with cash is 
significantly larger than the value of transactions financed with stocks. The mean and 
median of relative size for transactions financed with cash and non-cash are 0.62 
(0.63) and 0.70 (0.78), respectively. The relative size of transactions financed with 
cash is significantly larger than the relative size of transactions financed with stocks. 
This result is the opposite of the entire sample and different from other areas. 
 
To summarize, Table 2.3 indicates that transactions financed with cash create higher 
short-term negative returns than stock offers. This result is partially consistent with 
the hypothesis of Chapter 2. Chinese investors demonstrated a negative propensity 
towards domestic companies acquiring U.S. firms. 
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2.4.2.2 Pan-Europe 
Table 2.5 demonstrates summary statistics for the entire sample and the univariate 
comparison between transactions financed with cash and non-cash in Pan-Europe. In 
the sample, 38% of transactions were financed with cash whereas more transactions 
were financed with no cash (62% of the sample).  
 
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2.5 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
financed with cash was 3.51% (t=2.60) and 3.37% (t=2.16), respectively; the mean and 
median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions financed with stock was -0.28 % (t=-2.33) and 
-0.22% (t=-1.77), respectively. Transactions financed with cash outperformed 
transactions financed with stock by 3.79% (t=3.53) on average. Moreover, the mean 
and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions financed with cash was 3.82% (t=2.67) and 
3.37% (t=2.30), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
financed with stock was -0.19% (t=-2.51) and -0.17% (t=-1.84), respectively. 
Transactions financed with cash outperformed transactions financed with stock by 4.01% 
(t=3.56) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.5 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions financed with 
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cash and non-cash. The panel clearly presents the difference between those two 
groups of companies in financial performance. First, the debt levels were lower for 
the companies that financed transactions with cash. Second, the companies that 
financed with stocks had higher ROE but lower ROA, suggesting a weaker use of 
capital. Third, the companies that financed with cash had a much higher P/E valuation 
in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, the companies that financed with stocks had 
much higher EBITDA and close EBITDA/share, which suggests better financial and 
operational performance. Finally, the companies that financed with stocks had much 
higher total asset and sales, indicating that the size and business of these companies 
were larger. Overall, the differences in leverage, ROE, ROA, P/E and EBITDA/share 
were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 2.5 indicates characteristics of transactions financed with cash and 
non-cash. The mean of market value for acquirer companies with transactions financed 
with cash were much smaller than for the acquirer companies that financed 
transactions with stocks. The value of transactions financed with cash was significantly 
smaller than the value of transactions financed with stocks. The mean and median of 
relative size for transactions financed with cash and non-cash were 1.10 (1.10) and 
3.17 (2.59), respectively. The relative size of transactions financed with cash was 
significantly smaller than the relative size of transactions financed with stocks. 
According to the comparisons of market value and transaction value, therefore, it may 
be concluded that smaller companies tend to acquire similar size overseas target 
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companies by paying with cash, and larger companies tend to acquire larger overseas 
targets by paying with stocks. 
 
To summarize, Table 2.5 indicates that transactions financed with cash create 
significantly higher short-term returns. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of 
Chapter 2. In fact, these transactions were conducted with smaller companies that had 
less capability to make cross-border M&As transactions, which explains why there 
were fewer transactions financed with cash. Larger companies demonstrated a 
stronger financial performance and better fundamentals, which encouraged them to 
acquire foreign firms with stock. The results identified in-Pan-Europe are consistent 
with the findings of the entire sample. 
 
2.4.2.3 Asia-Pacific 
Table 2.6 demonstrates summary statistics for the entire sample and the univariate 
comparison between transactions financed with cash and non-cash in Pan-Europe. In 
the sample, 40% of transactions were financed with cash whereas more transactions (60% 
of the sample) were financed with no cash.  
 
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2.6 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
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Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
financed with cash was 0.45% (t=1.88) and 0.37% (t=1.86), respectively; the mean and 
median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions financed with stock were 0.29% (t=1.78) and 0.27% 
(t=1.63), respectively. Transactions financed with cash slightly outperformed 
transactions financed with stock by 0.16% (t=1.98) on average. Moreover, the mean 
and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions financed with cash was 0.62% (t=2.26) and 
0.52% (t=1.92), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
financed with stock was 0.40% (t=1.82) and 0.39% (t=1.78), respectively. Transactions 
financed with cash slightly outperformed transactions financed with stock by 0.22% 
(t=2.01) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.6 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions financed with 
cash and non-cash. The table clearly identifies the difference between those two types 
of the companies in financial performance. First, the debt levels were lower for the 
companies that financed transactions with cash. Second, the companies that financed 
with stocks had higher ROE but lower ROA, which is consistent with the 
Pan-European area. Third, the companies that financed with cash had a much higher 
P/E valuation in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, the companies that financed with 
stocks had much higher EBITDA and close EBITDA/share, indicating better financial 
and operational performance. Finally, the companies that financed with cash had 
much higher total assets but lower sales, suggesting a larger size but weaker market 
power. Overall, the differences among ROE, ROA, EBITDA/share, total asset and 
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sales were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 2.6 presents transaction characteristics for transactions financed with 
cash and non-cash. The mean of market value for acquirer companies with transactions 
financed with cash was slightly higher than for the acquirer companies that financed 
transactions with stocks. The value of transactions financed with cash was slightly 
higher than the value of transactions financed with stocks. The mean and median of 
relative size for transactions financed with cash and non-cash were 1.47 (1.30) and 
1.48 (1.75), respectively. The relative size of transactions financed with cash and 
transactions financed with stocks were close and lower. According to the comparisons 
of market value and transaction value, it may be concluded that Chinese listed 
companies tend to acquire similar sized foreign targets in Asia-Pacific. 
 
In summary, Table 2.6 shows that transactions financed with cash created slightly 
higher short-term returns; this result is basically consistent with the hypothesis of 
Chapter 2. Because the majority of transactions occurred in the Hong Kong market, 
investors did not expect a significant effect on this type of “cross-border” M&As 
activity. The results concerning Asia-Pacific were generally consistent with the 
findings of the entire sample. 
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2.1.1.4 Other Countries 
Table 2.7 presents summary statistics for the entire sample and the univariate 
comparison between transactions financed with cash and non-cash in Pan-Europe. In 
the sample, 23% of transactions were financed with cash; however, more transactions 
(77% of the sample) were financed with no cash.  
 
[Insert Table 2.7 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2.7 presents both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
financed with cash was 3.09% (t=2.51) and 3.04% (t=2.46), respectively; the mean and 
median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions financed with stock was 1.46 % (t=1.82) and 1.56% 
(t=1.79), respectively. Transactions financed with cash outperformed transactions 
financed with stock by 1.64% (t=2.27) on average. The mean and median CAR [-5, 5] 
for transactions financed with cash was 3.39% (t=2.76) and 3.19% (t=2.56), 
respectively; the mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions financed with stock 
was 2.17% (t=2.35) and 2.01% (t=2.29), respectively. Transactions financed with cash 
outperformed transactions financed with stock by 1.22% (t=2.18) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.7 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions financed with 
cash and non-cash. The panel clearly identifies the differences in financial 
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performance between these two groups of companies. First, the debt levels were 
slightly higher for the companies that financed transactions with cash. Second, the 
companies that financed with cash had lower ROE and ROA, suggesting a less 
efficient use of capital. Third, the companies that financed with stock had a much 
higher P/E valuation in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, the companies that financed 
with stocks had much higher EBITDA and close EBITDA/share, suggesting better 
financial and operational performance. Finally, the companies that financed with 
stocks had much higher sales but lower total assets. Considering the higher ROE and 
ROA, these companies had a higher quality of business. Overall, the differences in 
leverage, ROE, ROA, P/E and EBITDA/share were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 2.7 presents transaction characteristics for transactions financed with 
cash and non-cash. The mean of market value for acquirer companies with transactions 
financed with cash was much smaller than for the acquirer companies that financed 
transactions with stocks. The value of transactions financed with cash was significantly 
smaller than the value of transactions financed with stocks. The mean and median of 
the relative size of transactions financed with cash and non-cash were 1.23 (1.08) and 
2.10 (1.95), respectively. The relative size of transactions financed with cash was 
significantly smaller than the relative size of transactions financed with stocks. 
According to the comparisons of market value and transaction value, it may be 
concluded that smaller companies tended to acquire similar sized overseas targets by 
paying with cash and larger companies tended to acquire larger overseas targets by 
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paying with stocks in other countries‟ markets. 
 
To summarize, Table 2.7 indicates that transactions financed with cash created 
significantly higher short-term returns. This result is generally consistent with the 
hypothesis of Chapter 2. These smaller companies tended to acquirer similar sized 
targets paying with cash. Larger companies tended to acquire larger targets paying 
with stocks. The results are consistent with the findings of the entire sample, Europe 
and Asia-Pacific. It appears that in the U.S. market, it is more difficult to achieve 
abnormal returns for cross-border transactions, and the investor structure is also 
different. 
 
The difference between each of regions above could be broadly explained by several 
point. For North American market, the returns are even negative, due to the difficulty 
of investment in the U.S. In US market, different state follows separate state law. And 
the CFIUS (the committee on foreign investment in the United States) is very careful 
on overseas investments scrutiny in different situation, this could cause Chinese 
bidders to avoid sensitive target firms and to adopt JV/SPV deal structures in MANY 
situations. Due to the barriers and difficulties, the Chinese bidder normally did not 
received sufficient gains from market. Therefore, European market would become the 
second best choice, because of developed market and good quality of assets. And the 
most of European countries are loose to overseas investors, the completion of deals 
are also more comparing with North American market. In Asia-Pacific market, the 
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most of deals are traded between mainland of China and HK market, this normally 
only causes capital synergy, because mainland of China and HK are basically same 
market. The reflection of investors is more likely neutral. As for the other countries, 
the deals are very few, the result did not represent too much significance. 
 
2.1.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 2.8 illustrates the results of the short-term regression analysis. The dependent 
variables were the CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] of a Chinese public bidding company. 
The key explanatory variable was method of payment: which group in the sample 
financed transactions fully or primarily with cash and which were financed without 
any cash. 
 
[Insert Table 2.8 here] 
 
The CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] indicated that cash payments were significantly 
positive, approximately 0.29% and 0.36% each, over the entire sample. This suggests 
that there is the positive relation between markets response before and after an 
acquisition announcement and transactions financed with cash. There are, however, 
control variables as listed in Table 2.8, including target nations, acquirer financial 
performance and different target industries. The results also indicated that when 
targets were from developed countries or belong to the financial, energy, technology 
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and retail industries, the CAR was significantly positive. The results were also 
significantly negative when the acquirer had a high leverage ratio, high return on 
equity and high market value. This indicates that smaller firms perform better when 
conducting transactions in cash although more companies prefer to use stock to 
finance transactions. This also echoes Hypothesis 1 of this chapter. This result is 
consistent with Emery and Switzer (1999) and Dutta et al. (2013), who also 
researched cross-border M&As. Da Silva Rosa et al. (2004) also observed similar 
results on bidding for private firms, which is consistent with the findings in Chapter 2. 
Because of the restrictions and structure of financial markets in China, stock payment 
may create more problems because of the large number of individual investors and 
volatility of Chinese stock markets. Companies with the ability to engage in 
cross-border M&As generally are able to pay with sufficient cash. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter reviewed the existing literature and identified some 
empirical evidence regarding cross-border M&As of listed Chinese companies. 
Chinese public companies were rewarded higher returns when they financed 
transactions with cash. Previous studies indicated that M&As transactions generated 
more return for bidder firms when the transactions were financed with stock. This 
dissertation identified little evidence of the opposite result. The majority of research 
has been completed for over a decade. The Chinese cross-border M&A market 
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became more active only after 2007. Therefore, the essential point of this thesis may 
be updating the empirical research and evidence to investigate the current validity. In 
addition, this dissertation is more specific to the Chinese M&As market, which is the 
most active emerging market globally. This paper explored the empirical evidence to 
examine principles and theories. Because of the investor structure differences in 
China, over 90% of investors are individuals, which cause more volatility. 
 
The above results may demonstrate that cross-border transactions financed with cash 
bring higher premiums to their Chinese bidder companies because stock market 
investors strongly believe that bidder companies have good cash flow. The executive 
management and financial status demand a strong performance. The Chinese 
government also encourages local companies going abroad to expand techniques and 
resources. In the regional analysis, only the U.S. market created a negative return for 
the Chinese buyer whereas Europe and other countries rewarded China with positive 
and high returns. Most transactions occurred within the Asia-Pacific; however, the 
returns on transactions financed with cash or stock were not remarkable. 
 
There has been little research on methods of payment in M&As transactions; details of 
the transactions tend to be extremely confidential. It may also be difficult for data 
collection to reflect all related factors, which is why this author chose to focus on listed 
companies. Although more than 60% of transactions were financed with stock, this 
author attempted to demonstrate that cash may be a better option with which to 
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complete a transaction and attempted to identify Chinese evidence in this field. 
 
Nevertheless, as stated above, access of information and data collection remain 
difficult, and observations in this area are incomplete. In the Chinese cross-border 
M&As market, more than half of deals were traded by private companies, whose 
investor information is also confidential. Moreover, long-term validity requires 
measurement and observation.  
 
The hypotheses were all validated, and the empirical results indicated that the 
hypotheses are quite significant. The significant empirical results explain the practices, 
and effective findings also support this topic. This author selected the event study 
method to observe and gather abnormal returns in both the pre- and post-period of a 
M&As announcement. Moreover, time frames also significantly affected the results. 
The author selected the longer time period to better explain the results and improve 
accuracy. The author will continue to work in the institutional investment field and 
will thus be able to access more confidential information. Additional years of working 
experience will provide more comprehensive and underlying information to develop 
the theory and conduct an empirical analysis. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample 
This table summarizes the primary characteristics of merger transactions in the entire sample of Chinese acquirers. The sample comprised 465 completed or uncompleted 
M&As transactions in the cross-border market from 2002 to 2016 in which all acquirers were listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and all targets 
were worldwide companies (excluding China), either public or private. The first column lists the number or transactions announced year by year from 2002 to 2016. The 
second column lists the total value of the transactions by year from 2002 to 2016 in USD millions. The third column categorizes merger activities according to the method of 
payment; cash payment refers to transactions that were 100% financed with cash or primarily traded in cash. Non-cash payment refers to transactions that were completed 
with no cash financing. The fourth column reports the results of the OLS regressions of the acquirer‟s short-term performance for the entire sample year by year. The sample 
included all M&A cross-border transactions in which the acquirers were listed companies in the Chinese market from the Thomson One Banker (SDC) transactions database 
during 2002 to 2016. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistics. 
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Full   Total   Method of Payment   CARs 
Year All Sample   
Value of 
Transaction ($mil.) 
  
Cash 
Payment 
Non-cash 
payment 
  CAR [-2, 2] CAR [-5, 5] 
                Mean t-value Mean t-value 
2002 5   394.00    0 5   0.0610  (1.40) 0.0730* (1.81) 
2003 4   227.98    0 4   0.0154* (1.78) 0.0393** (2.36) 
2004 7   80.66    1 6   -0.0211  (-1.10) -0.0222  (-1.89) 
2005 5   54.35    0 5   -0.0079  (-1.22) -0.0109  (-1.25) 
2006 10   4,497.08    2 8   0.0182* (1.81) 0.0423*** (2.63) 
2007 23   10,288.30    5 18   -0.0546*** (-2.47) -0.1104** (-2.02) 
2008 34   4,639.58    7 27   -0.0637*** (-2.48) -0.0746** (-2.02) 
2009 29   3,044.09    7 22   0.0163*** (2.68) 0.0941*** (2.88) 
2010 37   5,461.94    12 25   -0.0161  (-1.40) -0.0172  (-1.47) 
2011 33   1,282.28    11 22   0.0240*** (2.51) 0.0262*** (2.51) 
2012 46   2,908.47    14 32   0.0252*** (2.29) 0.0261*** (2.98) 
2013 47   6,622.70    15 32   0.0455*** (2.74) 0.0635*** (2.78) 
2014 40   6,579.51    17 23   0.0169* (1.89) 0.0632** (2.28) 
2015 80   6,349.93    48 32   0.0111  (1.01) 0.0116  (1.64) 
2016 65   4,792.63    33 32   0.0121  (1.17) 0.0183  (1.62) 
SUM 465   57,223.48    172 293           
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics for the Acquirer and Target Sectors and Regions 
Panel A reports the number and proportion of acquirers in 12 industry sectors. Panel B reports the 
number and proportion of targets in 12 industry sectors. Panel C reports the number and proportion of 
targets in 4 regional distributions. The region of North America is a continent entirely within the 
Northern Hemisphere and nearly entirely within the Western Hemisphere. The region of Pan-Europe is 
a continent that comprises the westernmost portion of Eurasia. Europe is bordered by the Arctic Ocean 
to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea to the south and includes Russia. 
The region of Asia-Pacific is the portion of the world in or near the Western Pacific Ocean. It typically 
includes much of East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia. The region of other countries 
includes countries worldwide but not in North America, Pan-Europe or Asia-Pacific. For a list of the 
countries involved with the sample, please see Appendix 2.2. 
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Panel A         
Number of Deals Percentage% Acquirer Industry Sector 
21 4.52% Consumer Products and Services 
45 9.68% Energy and Power 
49 10.54% Financials 
22 4.73% Healthcare 
63 13.55% High Technology 
112 24.09% Industrials  
81 17.42% Materials  
8 1.72% Media and Entertainment 
7 1.51% Real Estate 
7 1.51% Retail 
37 7.96% Consumer Staples  
13 2.80% Telecommunications 
465 100.00%       
          
Panel B         
Number of Deals Percentage% Target Industry Sector 
28 6.02% Consumer Products and Services 
44 9.46% Energy and Power 
72 15.48% Financials 
26 5.59% Healthcare 
59 12.69% High Technology 
92 19.78% Industrials  
77 16.56% Materials  
7 1.51% Media and Entertainment 
3 0.65% Real Estate 
10 2.15% Retail 
31 6.67% Consumer Staples  
16 3.44% Telecommunications 
465 100.00%       
          
Panel C         
Number of Deals Percentage% Target Nation 
101 21.72% North America 
136 29.25% Pan Europe 
189 40.65% Asia-Pacific 
39 8.39% Others 
465 100.00%       
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics for the All Sample of Transactions Financed with Cash and Other Method of Payment 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of all countries targeting cross-border transactions; the transactions were financed with cash and non-cash. Panel 
A presents acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 
11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return 
on assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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All Countries All Deals Cash (C) 
 
Non-cash Payment (N) Difference (C) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N 
 
Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 0.42%*** 0.33%** 465 1.22%*** 1.01%** 172 
 
-0.04%* -0.06%* 293 1.26%*** (2.64) 1.07%** (2.24) 
 
(2.34) (2.16) 
 
(2.45) (2.19) 
  
(-1.97) (-1.80) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 0.46%*** 0.32%** 465 1.29%*** 1.05%*** 172 
 
-0.03%*** -0.04%*** 293 1.32%*** (3.70) 1.09%*** (2.62) 
 
(2.41) (2.31) 
 
(2.97) (2.43) 
  
(-2.60) (-2.73) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 48.54 47.89 465 45.44 45.76 172 
 
50.35 50.22 293 -4.91 (1.58) -4.47 (1.67) 
ROE 12.95 11.75 465 12.81 10.75 172 
 
13.04 12.40 293 -0.23* (1.93) -1.65* (1.81) 
ROA 7.92 7.00 465 7.85 6.65 172 
 
7.96 7.42 293 -0.12** (2.18) -0.77* (1.94) 
P/E 41.23 32.06 465 42.29 37.31 172 
 
40.61 28.52 293 1.68 (1.63) 8.78 (1.65) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 46.39 30.45 465 28.66 27.20 172 
 
56.81 57.64 293 -28.15 (1.53) -30.44 (1.15) 
EBITDA/share 0.87 0.67 465 0.81 0.56 172 
 
0.91 0.68 293 -0.10* (1.75) -0.12** (2.01) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 606.10 147.27 465 372.81 352.04 172 
 
743.05 733.45 293 -370.24** (1.99) -381.41* (1.75) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 145.04 151.86 465 144.44 136.56 172 
 
145.39 215.46 293 -0.96 (1.69) -78.90 (1.65) 
Relative Size 1.60 1.32 465 1.01 1.00 172 
 
1.95 1.64 293 -0.95** (2.19) -0.64*** (2.41) 
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Table 2.4. Summary Statistics for the North American Sample of Transactions Financed with Cash and Other Methods of Payment 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of North American targeting cross-border transactions; the transactions were financed with cash and non-cash. 
Panel A presents acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is 
the 11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return 
on assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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North America All Deals Cash (C) Non-cash Payment (N) Difference (C) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] -0.99%* -1.06%* 101 -0.94%* -0.98%* 37 -1.01%* -1.08%* 64 0.07%* (1.97) 0.10%* (1.91) 
 
(-1.77) (-1.95) 
 
(-1.75) (-1.85) 
 
(-1.85) (-1.87) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] -1.57%* -1.78%** 101 -1.48%* -1.48%* 37 -1.62%*** -1.90%** 64 0.14%** (2.22) 0.42%*** (2.37) 
 
(-1.84) (-2.18) 
 
(-2.05) (-2.09) 
 
(-2.62) (-2.59) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 41.25 44.95 101 37.60 45.67 37 43.35 43.99 64 -5.75 (1.73) 1.68* (1.75) 
ROE 11.63 10.84 101 10.43 10.64 37 12.32 11.60 64 -1.90* (1.85) -0.96* (1.79) 
ROA 7.89 6.75 101 8.18 6.74 37 7.73 6.91 64 0.45** (2.24) -0.17* (1.77) 
P/E 63.83 38.75 101 76.48 49.04 37 56.51 34.04 64 19.98* (1.97) 14.99* (1.95) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 14.94 14.04 101 18.50 12.95 37 12.88 14.39 64 5.62 (1.57) -1.44 (1.73) 
EBITDA/share 0.73 0.63 101 0.66 0.50 37 0.77 0.65 64 -0.11* (1.92) -0.15** (2.21) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 182.15 150.17 101 257.48 254.34 37 138.60 146.65 64 118.88*** (2.93) 107.69* (1.83) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 101.70 104.00 101 171.14 120.20 37 61.55 51.10 64 109.59 (1.64) 69.10 (1.85) 
Relative Size 0.67 0.69 101 0.62 0.63 37 0.70 0.78 64 -0.08** (2.19) -0.15*** (2.41) 
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Table 2.5. Summary Statistics for the Pan-European Sample of Transactions Financed with Cash and Other Methods of Payment 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Pan-European targeting cross-border transactions; the transactions were financed with cash and non-cash. Panel 
A presents acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 
11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return 
on assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Pan Europe All Deals Cash (C) Non-cash Payment (N) Difference (C) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 1.17%*** 0.80%** 136 3.51%*** 3.37%** 52 -0.28%** -0.22%* 84 3.79%*** (3.53) 3.59%** (1.99) 
 
(2.44) (2.22) 
 
(2.60) (2.16) 
 
(-2.33) (-1.77) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 1.34%*** 0.88%** 136 3.82%*** 3.37%** 52 -0.19%*** -0.17%* 84 4.01%*** (3.56) 3.54%** (2.03) 
 
(2.53) (2.32) 
 
(2.67) (2.30) 
 
(-2.51) (-1.84) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 49.07 49.93 136 44.50 41.29 52 51.90 54.58 84 -7.40* (1.75) -13.30* (1.84) 
ROE 14.23 12.56 136 14.32 12.33 52 14.17 13.80 84 0.15** (1.99) -1.48*** (2.50) 
ROA 8.46 7.70 136 9.01 7.76 52 8.12 7.00 84 0.89* (1.82) 0.76* (1.76) 
P/E 38.39 29.23 136 39.83 37.31 52 37.50 25.97 84 2.32* (1.83) 11.34* (1.76) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 93.59 72.37 136 26.18 22.91 52 135.31 123.56 84 -109.13 (1.69) -100.66 (1.32) 
EBITDA/share 0.97 0.62 136 1.02 0.61 52 0.94 0.62 84 0.08** (2.07) -0.01 (1.51) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 1,291.51 633.90 136 285.97 133.31 52 1,913.99 735.73 84 -1628.02 (1.66) -602.42* (-1.84) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 259.05 119.63 136 159.43 155.26 52 320.72 324.10 84 -161.29 (1.59) -168.84* (-1.87) 
Relative Size 2.38 1.87 136 1.10 1.10 52 3.17 2.59 84 -2.07** (2.11) -1.50*** (-2.41) 
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Table 2.6. Summary Statistics for the Asia-Pacific Sample of Transactions Financed with Cash and Other Methods of Payment 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Asia-Pacific targeting cross-border transactions; the transactions were financed with cash and non-cash. Panel 
A presents acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 
11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return 
on assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Asia-Pacific All Deals Cash (C) Non-cash Payment (N) Difference (C) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 0.35%** 0.26%* 189 0.45%* 0.37%* 75 0.29%* 0.27% 114 0.16%* (1.98) 0.11%** (2.00) 
 
(2.08) (1.79) 
 
(1.88) (1.86) 
 
(1.78) (1.63) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 0.49%** 0.42%** 189 0.62%** 0.52%* 75 0.40%* 0.39%* 114 0.22%** (2.01) 0.12%* (1.82) 
 
(2.24) (2.13) 
 
(2.26) (1.92) 
 
(1.82) (1.78) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 51.39 49.60 189 49.00 46.08 75 52.97 52.71 114 -3.97 (1.72) -6.62* (1.79) 
ROE 12.51 12.48 189 13.20 11.15 75 12.05 13.08 114 1.15** (2.15) -1.93 (1.57) 
ROA 7.35 6.54 189 7.18 5.87 75 7.46 6.81 114 -0.28** (2.13) -0.94*** (2.53) 
P/E 35.61 27.42 189 50.70 34.79 75 25.68 26.17 114 25.02 (1.51) 8.62 (1.72) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 38.42 33.93 189 45.25 2.83 75 33.92 3.15 114 11.33* (1.83) -0.32 (1.45) 
EBITDA/share 0.86 0.68 189 0.78 0.53 75 0.92 0.74 114 -0.14* (1.89) -0.20* (1.93) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 458.77 245.46 189 489.57 155.65 75 438.50 140.77 114 51.06* (1.76) 14.88 (1.56) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 112.41 74.45 189 124.53 113.75 75 104.44 94.45 114 20.09** (2.04) 19.29 (1.61) 
Relative Size 1.48 1.63 189 1.47 1.30 75 1.48 1.75 114 -0.01* (1.92) -0.45*** (-2.41) 
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Table 2.7. Summary Statistics for the Other Countries Sample of Transactions Financed with Cash and Other Methods of 
Payment 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Other Countries targeting cross-border transactions; the transactions were financed with cash and non-cash. 
Panel A presents acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is 
the 11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return 
on assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Other Countries All Deals Cash (C) Non-cash Payment (N) Difference (C) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 1.83%*** 1.66%** 39 3.09%*** 3.04%*** 9 1.46%* 1.56%* 30 1.64%** (2.27) 1.48%** (2.25) 
 
(2.55) (2.05) 
 
(2.51) (2.46) 
 
(1.82) (1.79) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 2.45%*** 1.88%** 39 3.39%*** 3.19%*** 9 2.17%*** 2.01%** 30 1.22%** (2.18) 1.18%** (2.12) 
 
(2.99) (2.10) 
 
(2.76) (2.56) 
 
(2.35) (2.29) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 51.72 51.35 39 54.39 58.19 9 50.91 51.35 30 3.47** (2.21) 6.84*** (2.65) 
ROE 14.10 12.77 39 10.82 9.97 9 15.08 13.19 30 -4.25* (1.77) -3.21* (1.92) 
ROA 8.86 8.53 39 4.01 3.80 9 10.31 9.68 30 -6.30* (1.91) -5.88* (1.93) 
P/E 19.89 16.05 39 12.23 16.05 9 22.19 16.51 30 -9.96 (1.52) -0.46* (1.85) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 1.94 1.75 39 3.15 2.62 9 1.57 1.54 30 1.58* (1.78) 1.07 (1.16) 
EBITDA/share 0.94 0.73 39 0.45 0.53 9 1.09 1.17 30 -0.64 (1.54) -0.65 (1.52) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 27.84 16.39 39 51.21 36.47 9 20.83 13.40 30 30.38 (1.72) 23.07** (-2.12) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 17.81 13.17 39 31.73 29.58 9 13.64 10.76 30 18.09 (1.71) 18.82** (-2.05) 
Relative Size 1.90 1.79 39 1.23 1.08 9 2.10 1.95 30 -0.87* (1.82) -0.88*** (-2.41) 
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Table 2.8 OLS Regressions of Acquirer Short-Term Performance 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of the acquirer short-term performance for the entire 
sample. In these models, this chapter regressed acquirer CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] against a number 
of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variable was method of payment (cash). The cash 
dummy variable equals 1 if the transaction was fully financed with cash; the dummy variable equals 0 
if the transaction was not fully financed with cash. For transaction characteristics, other control 
variables include diversification and nation. The diversification variable equals 1 if the acquirer and 
target were classified as being in the same industry; the dummy variable equals 0 if the acquirer and 
target are not classified as being in the same industry. The nation variable equals 1 if the target is from 
a developed market; the dummy variable equals 0 if the target is from an emerging market. For firm 
characteristics, other control variables include the proportion of top 10 shareholders and the proportion 
of largest shareholder. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at fiscal year-end before the 
announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at t fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E 
is measured as price to earnings ratio at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnSize is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnAsset 
is the natural logarithm of total assets measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnSales is 
the natural logarithm of total sales measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. For industry 
sector characteristics, other control variables included 12 different industries. Industry1 dummy equals 
1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Financials. Industry2 dummy equals 1 if the bidding 
firm was classified in the sector of Consumer Products and Services. Industry3 dummy equals 1 if the 
bidding firm was classified in the sector of Consumer Staples. Industry4 dummy equals 1 if the bidding 
firm was classified in the sector of Energy and Power. Industry5 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm 
was classified in the sector of Healthcare. Industry6 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified 
in the sector of High Technology. Industry7 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the 
sector of Industrials. Industry8 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of 
Materials. Industry9 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified as the sector of Media and 
Entertainment. Industry10 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Real 
Estate. Industry11 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Retail. Industry12 
dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Telecommunications. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ 
represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, 
based on one-tail t statistic. 
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    CAR [-2, 2]   CAR [-5, 5] 
          
Cash   0.2948***   0.3556*** 
    (2.39)   (2.60) 
Diversification   -0.0402    -0.0686  
    (-1.09)   (-1.14) 
Nation   0.2496**   0.2667** 
    (2.03)   (2.32) 
Top 10   0.1798    0.1877* 
    (1.73)   (1.77) 
Top 1   0.0766    0.0817  
    (1.04)   (1.15) 
Leverage   -0.1912**   -0.2110** 
    (-2.30)   (-2.33) 
ROE   -0.1806*   -0.2278*** 
    (-1.98)   (-2.66) 
PE   0.0625    0.0738  
    (1.06)   (1.13) 
LnSize   -0.1943**   -0.2032*** 
    (-2.27)   (-2.41) 
LnAsset   0.1884*   0.1966* 
    (1.83)   (1.97) 
LnSales   0.1898*   0.1993** 
    (1.93)   (2.02) 
Industry1   0.1981**   0.2532*** 
    (2.07)   (2.75) 
Industry2   0.1289    0.1503  
    (1.37)   (1.51) 
Industry3   0.1236    0.1334  
    (1.58)   (1.71) 
Industry4   0.1882**   0.1919*** 
    (2.15)   (2.53) 
Industry5   0.1384    0.1538  
    (1.59)   (1.61) 
Industry6   0.1915**   0.2020*** 
    (2.05)   (2.37) 
Industry7   0.1106    0.1232  
    (1.29)   (1.37) 
Industry8   0.1301    0.1307  
    (1.47)   (1.52) 
Industry9   0.1103    0.1179  
    (1.27)   (1.33) 
Industry10   0.1718    0.1756  
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    (1.62)   (1.71) 
Industry11   0.1928**   0.1996** 
    (2.25)   (2.29) 
Industry12   0.1373    0.1377  
    (1.39)   (1.41) 
Constant   0.1987    0.2303  
    (2.11)   (2.54) 
N   465   465 
R Square   0.162    0.220  
Adjusted R Square   0.133    0.183  
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1. Definition of Control Variables 
The table below defines control variables in the regressions of the chapter. The definition of each variable is presented in the table. Panels A, B and C present transaction 
characteristics, company characteristics and industry sectors, respectively. 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Transaction Characteristics 
Cash Dummy variable equals 1 if the deal is fully paid by cash; dummy variable equals 0 if the deal is not fully paid by cash. 
Diversification 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the acquirer and target are classified as the same industry; dummy variable equals 0 if the acquirer and target are not 
classified as the same industry. 
Nation Dummy variable equals 1 if the target is from developed market; dummy variable equals 0 if the target is from emerging market. 
Panel B: Company Characteristics 
Top 10 The proportion of top 10 shareholders. 
Top 1 The proportion of largest shareholder. 
Leverage Total debt over total capital. 
ROE Return on equity. 
PE Price to Earnings 
Lnsize The logarithm of the acquirer market value at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Lnasset The logarithm of the acquirer total asset at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Lnsales The logarithm of the acquirer sales revenue at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Panel C: Industry Sector 
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Industry 1 The acquirer is classified by Financials (FINANCE). 
Industry 2 The acquirer is classified by Consumer Products and Services (CPS). 
Industry 3 The acquirer is classified by Consumer Staples (STAPLES). 
Industry 4 The acquirer is classified by Energy and Power (ENERGY). 
Industry 5 The acquirer is classified by Healthcare (HEALTH). 
Industry 6 The acquirer is classified by High Technology (HT). 
Industry 7 The acquirer is classified by Industrials (IND). 
Industry 8 The acquirer is classified by Materials (MATERLS). 
Industry 9 The acquirer is classified by Media and Entertainment (MEDIA). 
Industry 10 The acquirer is classified by Real Estate (REALEST). 
Industry 11 The acquirer is classified by Retail (RETAIL). 
Industry 12 The acquirer is classified by Telecommunications (TELECOM). 
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Appendix 2.2. Definition of Regions of Entire Sample 
The region of North America is a continent entirely within the Northern Hemisphere and nearly completely within the Western Hemisphere. The Region of Pan-Europe is a 
continent that comprises the westernmost portion of Eurasia. Europe is bordered by the Arctic Ocean to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea 
to the south and includes Russia. The region of Asia-Pacific is the portion of the world in or near the Western Pacific Ocean. It typically includes much of East Asia, South 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia. The region of other countries is countries worldwide but not in North America, Pan-Europe and Asia-Pacific. The group of countries is 
the sample of transactions where the target firms are located. 
 
Target Nation Group of Countries 
North America British Virgin, Canada, Cayman Islands, Dominican Rep, United States 
Pan Europe 
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland-Rep, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Russian Fed, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom 
Asia-Pacific 
Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Macau, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
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Others 
Argentina, Brazil, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Dem Rep Congo, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan 
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3. Chapter III: The Target Selection of Chinese Company 
Cross-border Takeovers 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates listed Chinese companies acquiring overseas companies. 
The control variable is the public status of the target firms. In the Chinese M&As 
market, more companies chose to acquire foreign private companies than publicly 
listed companies. 
 
Fuller et al. (2002) presented samples of companies that made over five acquisitions 
during 1990s. They observed that abnormal return was greater when companies 
acquired private firm or subsidiary rather than when companies acquired public 
company. Chang (1998) tested the returns of privately owned acquiring firms when 
takeover proposals were announced. Acquiring firms were observed to obtain positive 
abnormal returns on stock offers. Conversely, bidders mostly received abnormally 
negative returns when acquiring public targets. Bidders did not receive abnormally 
positive returns in cash transactions. Chang believed that the observed positive wealth 
effects were associated with monitoring activities by shareholders of the targeted firms, 
resulting in reduced information asymmetries. 
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Officer (2007) studied the average acquisition discounts for independent private firms 
and unlisted target firms, such as subsidiaries, which had 15% to 30% acquisition 
multiples relative to similar publicly traded targets. Officer observed that the bidders‟ 
prices for unlisted targets were influenced by the liquidity of the acquirers and the 
availability of the target. Corporate parents were determined to be expressly 
liquidity-driven in the sales of their subsidiaries, particularly when the subsidiaries 
were being traded in a cash offer. Moreover, acquisition discounts were determined to 
be considerably larger when debt capital was comparatively more expensive to obtain. 
These discounts were observed to be greater than those observed in cases in which 
parent firms had underperforming stock returns for 1 year before the completion of the 
transaction. 
 
In this chapter and Chapter 2, the dissertation tested the method of payment and target 
ownership structure as was performed in previous research; however, this is a unique 
data set of Chinese evidence; the time period and data size were basically Chinese 
M&As history. The motivation to choose the Chinese M&As market lay in the 
obvious fact that Chinese companies are becoming more active in seeking acquisition 
opportunities, and there were some remarkable cases in the past decade. 
 
Motivated by the above-mentioned facts and issues, this chapter examines short-term 
performance study. The dependent variables are CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] of 
Chinese public bidding companies. The key explanatory variable was the public status 
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of target firms. Public status includes overseas public target firms, and the rest are 
non-public, including private, joint venture, and subsidiary as a whole. In the sample, 
of the number of transactions (465) between public targets and non-public target, only 
18% of target firms were publicly listed, and 82% of target firms were not public 
companies. This research proposes to recognise differences in performance of 
cross-border M&As of Chinese listed companies. This study follows numerous 
theories that provide a deeper understanding of this research area and explore 
concepts from a different angle. In fact, there have been more transactions with 
private overseas firms than public firms. Therefore, there is no need to give advice to 
Chinese bidders on general strategy although firm size may need to be considered. 
Moeller et al. (2004) selected samples of 12,023 transactions. The equally weighted 
average announcements return for the bidder company‟s shareholder from 1980 to 
2001 were 1.1%, which represents gains of $5.61 per $100 cost on acquisitions. 
Moeller et al. (2004) determined that small companies operated significantly 
outperform large companies when they made M&A announcement. Generally, 
abnormal returns associated with M&A announcement for small companies surpassed 
abnormal return associated with M&A announcement for large companies by 2.24%. 
Moeller et al. (2004) identified evidences that the management of large companies 
generally spent more on M&A. The premiums paid increased with firm size after 
monitoring for company and transaction characteristic. For M&A of public companies 
that was financed by equity, small company benefited significantly when it announced 
M&A decision. The large company suffered substantial shareholders losses when it 
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announced the merger of listed company regardless of how M&A is funded. The 
relative size and transaction size were factors tested in this thesis. 
 
This thesis contributes to M&As literature in numerous areas. Firstly, although 
literature on target public status is voluminous, the studies tend to be regional 
investigations, such as the U.S. and the U.K. Research on China‟s market remains 
scant. Therefore, this thesis presents a unique data set in Chinese public company, 
cross-border M&As. These M&As represent half of cross-border transactions in 
China, and the time period basically covers all transactions since China‟s stock 
exchange was established. 
 
Second, the majority of bidder companies in China acquired overseas private firms as 
the previous literature suggested. This is a good situation for Chinese investors. This 
thesis attempts to specifically explain the regional differences in North America, 
Pan-Europe, Asia-Pacific and rest of the world; and other factors may affect 
performance in the short term. This paper will help Chinese investors select better 
targets and will provide academic support for their activities. 
 
Third, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China monitors all 
direct overseas investment, including cross-border M&As. The author expects this 
dissertation to have some influence on Chinese bidder companies when they select a 
target. The regional research in this thesis may provide Chinese regulators with a 
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better guideline to approve investable projects and stop losses from risky markets. 
Future research on regional factors and industrial factors may result from this thesis. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Hypothesis 
Most findings have demonstrated the positive effects of cross-border M&A 
transactions. There are also some findings that have concluded that cross-border 
M&A transactions do not add value to shareholders‟ wealth. Bradley et al. (1988) 
stated that an effective tender offer may increase the combined value of both bidder 
and target firms by 7.4% on average. This dissertation raises the question of what 
types of target firms deliver better short-term performance in cross-border M&A 
activities. 
 
Chinese enterprises became more active in M&A activities in recent decades. This 
study must also consider that the Chinese market is an emerging market. Event study 
methodology was applied to test the sample and collect the cumulative abnormal 
return data. The empirical study tests the three hypotheses; however, there are some 
limitations to the study. First, the data for acquirers were available only for listed 
companies; approximately 50% of transactions were traded by unlisted companies. 
Moreover, the sample data focused on short-term performance because of the 
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volatility of the Chinese stock market; long-term performance (over 1 year) scarcely 
reflects the M&A activity effect. Within the unlisted companies, there are several 
different types of ownership, such as joint venture, SOEs, and subsidiaries. Thus, 
there are many improvements that may be extended to research in future studies. 
 
This chapter focuses on the target public status effects on M&A returns. The three 
hypotheses follow: 
H1: Chinese listed companies obtained positive abnormal return in short-run when 
they acquired overseas public firms. 
H2: Chinese listed companies obtained positive abnormal return in short-run when 
they acquired overseas private firms. 
H3: Companies acquiring private firms outperformed companies acquiring public 
firms. 
 
The non-public firms in cross-border M&A deals included private, joint venture and 
subsidiaries. These hypotheses are consistent with the results of Chang (1998) and Da 
Silva Rosa et al. (2004). Chinese stock markets is quite volatile, and the market 
overreacts easily to announcements. Bidder companies normally pay more for public 
targets. The reason of why acquiring private firm may outperform acquiring public 
firms, which could be conducted when the public target announce the transaction, the 
stock price would tend to increase, therefore the acquirer will pay more premium in 
the deal. The shareholders of the bidder firm will not expect this. 
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3.2.2 Motivation Theories of M&As 
3.2.2.1 Synergy Hypothesis 
Synergy theory refers to overall efficiency of united companies that are greater than 
entirety of separate businesses‟ effectiveness; commonly, „one plus one is greater than 
two‟ represents this effect. Financial synergy, originated by Markham (1973), states 
that M&As may carry advantages to financial performances of businesses, for 
example rational taxes benefit from native government of acquired company, worthy 
investment opportunity in which the enterprises are able to utilize redundant funds, 
and expected equity price growth. Managements synergies objective that degree of 
efficiency of company administration are primary motive of M&As (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The development of operating efficiencies may also engender more 
benefits. 
 
3.2.2.2 Market Power Theory 
Market power theory explained that primary incentive of M&A was to pursue control 
of the markets by acquiring of entities that have resource and customer in the markets 
(Stigler, 1991). The straight advantages are growth in market attentiveness and might 
even leads to sector monopolies. 
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3.2.2.3 Transaction cost theory 
The key reasons for M&As are that business transaction costs may be internalized to 
save cost of external trades (Coase, 1937). Hennart and Park (1993) applied this 
theory to analyse investments and M&As on the selection of international enterprises. 
The results indicated that if international enterprises enlarge into non-related sectors, 
transaction decision may reduce risks and transaction costs. 
 
This theory may also relate to cross-border deals. Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) and 
other scholars determined that though there is a primary high costs of cross-border 
M&As, the transactions support the development of business performance in the long 
term. Bresman and Birkinshaw (1999) and other researchers observed that 
cross-border M&As may lead to strategic advantages for the acquirers that improve 
fundamental competency and fill strategic gap. The main goal for a M&A transaction 
is regularly to gain the resources of target firm and transfer benefits to their acquirers. 
 
3.2.3 Financial Performance Theories 
3.2.3.1 Business Factors 
Organizational scales, fundamental competitiveness and a variability of physical and 
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human resource are quite significant in development of companies. A company has 
prior experience with international operations and has positive effects on cross-border 
M&As. Such experiences are generally considered to help increase the financial 
performance of M&As (Markides and Oyon, 1989). Buono and Bowditch (1989) 
thought that the steady management approach may help synergy of post-merger 
combination; however, management approach dissimilarity is the major purpose for 
operating outcomes after M&A unsuccessful to reach anticipated objectives. 
 
3.2.3.2 Macroeconomics Factors 
Macroeconomic factors refer to markets in which the capital activities and other 
macroeconomic conditions are involved. The exchange rate, tax rate and related 
policies or laws, in particular, may garner more attention in cross-border M&As 
(Manzon et al., 1994). The influence of the exchange rates is chiefly echoed in prices 
of target firms in the assessment exchange rate. Cross-border M&A transactions tend 
to be massive, and the exchange rate changes frequently; thus, the correct judgment of 
the transaction exchange rate for companies is quite significant for financial decisions. 
 
3.2.4 China’s M&As 
To better explain the topic, the literature review presents several variable perspectives 
from different studies regarding M&As. This section generally concentrates on the 
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comprehensive theories of financing, strategic managements, organizational 
behaviour and post-merger integrations in area of M&As to construct effects that 
affect firm‟s theoretical models of value making and briefly explain progress of 
M&As in the Chinese capital markets. The literature review includes many 
viewpoints from previous studies regarding M&As that are based on different theories, 
and the majority of the theories purposely focus on complementing this study, 
presenting factors that influence the value creation of M&As. The factors that affect 
value creation for M&As in listed Chinese firms are method of payment, leverage 
ratio, resource integration and the degree of staff resistance. Moreover, cash offers, 
the proportion of acquisitions, and the degree of post-merger resource integration are 
all relevant to value creation. Although staff resistance does not encourage M&As‟ 
value creation, industry relevance has obvious indirect and positive influences on the 
M&As‟ value creations (Arzac, 2004). This literature review also demonstrates that 
there was collaboration between factors of M&As value making and organizational 
fitting, and related transaction influence degree of employees‟ resistance in target 
firms. Finally, this literature review concentrates on Chinese cross-border M&As with 
public and private targets and explains how to create value for the transactions. 
 
M&As activities that encourage the development of a global economy continue to 
grow. Industry restructuring and consolidations rely primarily on M&A activities. 
Enterprises are able to obtain more market shares and thus may generate more value 
in their market (Arzac, 2004). With the quick development of China‟s economy, 
137 
 
Chinese firms have become main players in the M&As market. According to the 
development of governance and management in Chinese firms, they have 
progressively become accustomed to selecting M&As strategy to grow their 
businesses. M&As is the method of business expansion that increases market shares 
and combines resources. This is a significant approach helping Chinese firms to 
globalize. Nevertheless, there are challenges and risks for Chinese firms.  
 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) connected the results of the merger integration 
process to the reality of results, which indicated that value creation in M&As are 
derived from the capability of strategic transferring and discussing the difficulties in 
the process focusing on specific reasons and contributing factors. Those authors 
suggested that the value creations of M&As derive from the capability of strategic 
transferring. The competitive advantages are the formation of interactions between the 
different degrees of the organization through the transaction for both parties. 
Generally, previous research on M&As examined many different perspectives, 
multi-fields, and multi-levels with specific considerations; this study is able to absorb 
and develop based on these previous findings. 
 
There are also many Chinese specialists and entrepreneurs with experience from 
practical cases; they have learned lessons that made them completely aware of the 
significance of cross-border transactions. Many specialists and scholars have written 
journals about this particular area (e.g., Chen, Y. and Young, M., 2010; Boateng, Q. 
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and Wang, T. Yan, 2008; Chen, Y.Y. and Young, M. N., 2009; Ryu, K. H. and Lee, J. 
E., 2009). These authors conducted studies in this field and contributed findings.  
Examining cases of M&As helps scholars to understand transactions; therefore, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requested that public companies 
disclose their activities. Thus, there are numerous domestic empirical studies that 
contribute. The success of transactions strengthens the core competency of both 
bidder and target firms and explains the success of M&As from perspectives such as 
business and management. 
 
3.2.4.1 China’s Merger Waves 
To observe a period of time, company mergers activities have arisen in characteristic 
forms. In some periods, there were showed very strong and frequent activity where as 
in others time of period were showed slighter activities, there were some more 
positive whiles others found more negative. To observe these M&A activities, it will 
be able to identify in the historical data and each of waves have their own major 
features. 
 
There were 3 mergers waves in China. The first wave of domestic M&As was in 1984. 
The very first transaction was an air blower company in Baoding in the Heibei 
province of China. In the 1980s, corporations were restructuring and assets 
reorganized, and there were numerous losing businesses and less competitive firms 
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that were acquired by other larger companies with better quality assets. In the year 
1984, Chinese government began to encourage company restructure and help minus 
competitive businesses. 
 
The following waves of M&As began in 1992, the year that China established the 
capital market economic system. The major objective of the market economic system 
was to reform economic structure and encourage the emergence of the joint-stock 
reform of SOEs. Companies began to engage in mergers and reorganization in the 
capital market. This was also the year that a public company made the very first 
merger transaction. 
 
The third wave of M&As began in 1997, which was later Asian financial crisis; 
Chinese firms began to grow quickly after the crisis. The year of 1998 has been called 
the year of M&As in China, and at that time, M&As transactions occurred in large 
Chinese firms such as the Vanke Property, Tsingtao Beer, China Everbrite Group, 
Hainan Airlines, and Danone Group. In April 2005, another stage of share reforming 
began in which all stocks of public enterprises slowly circulated in public markets. 
Numerous M&A transactions occurred between public companies. 
 
After the financial crisis in 2008, China began to become a major player in M&As. 
However, transactions appeared to decline abruptly in 2008 and 2009; the volume of 
transactions recovered considerably worldwide in 2010 and 2011. Then another wave 
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of M&As began; emerging markets became the major markets in the world. In 
addition, the energy and minerals sectors were the focus of M&As transactions 
worldwide. Since 2008, the total China M&A volume have been never under 200 
billion USD. Between 2014 and 2017, the amount has reached above 500 billion USD.  
The peak is the year of 2015 and 2016, which is 748 and 721 billion USD separately. 
And since 2010, the cross-border deals have started to become major contribution, 
which is above 50 billion USD, and reach to the peak in 2016 which is 217 billion 
USD. 
 
The Chinese M&As market developed dramatically, particularly after 2010. For 
example, Geely acquired Volvo, and SOEs went abroad as well to promote their 
recycling resources and to purchase various mineral resources such as iron and steel. 
Chinese M&As had increasingly grown during this time and played an important part 
in M&As markets. With policy and development of open financial capital market in 
China, the VC or PE-backed M&A increased quite quickly as well. 
 
3.2.4.2 Value Creation of M&As in China 
Many academic studies investigated the four factors of M&As to determine what 
affects the value creation of transactions. Previous studies were primarily established 
on strategic finance and management status. Researchers in area of strategic 
management determined that whether strategic decision is applicable or not, M&As 
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definitely affect value creation (Lubatkin, 1987). Researchers in the financial area 
determined that the features of M&As transactions and the characters of both bidder 
and target may affect value creation in the transaction. Thus, previous researches 
could incompletely explicate M&As value making (Datta et al., 1992), and 
researchers observed that M&As value making primarily arises from M&A synergies 
of both entities and the realizing of synergy from post-merger integration of both 
entities (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). A few researchers attempted to combine 
from organizational behaviour and sought factor that may explain these areas. These 
researchers in area of organizational behaviour principally researched organizational 
cultures fits for both bidder and target in M&As (Datta, 1991; Chatterjee et al., 1992) 
and effects of bidder‟s managements experiences in M&As value making (Haleblian 
and Finkelstein, 1999). Researchers of merger integrations chiefly examined M&A 
integration degrees (Pablo, 1994). The resources should be integrated post-merger to 
provide descriptions of procedure of value creation in M&As (Capron and Pistre, 
2002). 
 
Datta et al. (1992) used performance data from M&As value making to generate 
empirical researches, testing five main factors that affect asset and interests of 
shareholders throughout the M&A process. They determined that transactions that 
make payment with stock had a significant negative correlation with value creation. 
Although the regulatory regimes improved in 1969, the implementation of tender 
offers was positively correlated with asset of target firm's shareholder; however, those 
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authors determined that these five main factors explain only a portion of value 
creation in M&As. Organizational behavioural factors and institutional factors may 
also require consideration in the model. Based on the samples of the empirical 
research of Datta et al. (1992) and further investigation of whether diversification 
benefits the company in M&As, the relations among the companies, the methods of 
payment, and the experiences of managers affect value creation after the merger 
transaction. However, these four factors cannot effectively explain value creation, and 
there may be other important factors.  
 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) observed that previous studies were not able to 
completely explain M&As because M&A transactions are continuous and 
comprehensive process. To explain only from view of strategic finance or 
management or only from organizational behaviour is not sufficient to explain the 
value creation of M&As. Incorporating finance, strategic management, organizational 
behaviour and human resource management creates an innovative theoretical model 
that helps to evaluate M&A value creation. This model reflects complementarity and 
relevance of both bidder and target firms. The level of interactions and coordination in 
organizational integration process and relation between degree of staffs‟ resistance to 
M&A and accomplishment of synergy are also quite significant. Those authors chose 
61 M&As cases as their sample for empirical analysis. The results indicated that the 
complementarity of the two companies in the transaction, a higher level of 
post-merger integration, and less resistance from union members may improve the 
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synergy of M&As. Simultaneously, when levels of organizational integration in 
M&As are higher, it is more helpful to realize synergy in complementary M&As. 
Papadakis (2005) considered the factors that affect the success of M&As to improve 
post-merger performance. The external environment, such as highly competitive 
markets and technology development, is quite important, as are characteristics of the 
transaction such as paying a premium because of overconfident managers. Also 
important are the characteristic of bidder firm, for example its experiences with 
transactions, relative sizes of both firms in the transaction, and the specifications of 
decision-making procedure. Finally, integration of human resource is significant, for 
example, frequency of communication and employee turnover rate during the 
transaction. All of these factors are essential. To establish theoretical model to 
discover factors between 1997 and 1999 in Greece, the researcher observed that 
communications are the most decisive factor in completing successful transaction. 
 
Additionally, to espousing four factors above, a few researchers identified further 
results. Some studies identified the synergistic effect as the driving factor of M&As‟ 
value creation. Horizontal mergers create an economy of scale and scope, vertical 
mergers lead to lower costs, and mixed mergers benefit both horizontal and vertical 
mergers because of synergy (Weston, 2004). Zollo and Meter (2008) observed that 
market powers are a key driver in M&As‟ value making; horizontal and vertical or 
mixed M&As may improve attractiveness of companies and toughen barrier to entry, 
controlling market prices and therefore obtaining unexpected benefit. Strategic 
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motivations are also motive of M&As‟ value making; horizontal, vertical or mixed 
mergers may present rare resource (Chung and Alcacer, 2002) or fast market 
developing (Shimizu, 2004) to gain strategic advantages. Masulis et al. (2007) 
observed that agents are also motive of value damage in M&As‟ value creation by 
pursuing self-interest acquisitions of corporate management. The expansion of a 
company by a M&A may improve the dependence of the company, which may 
damage value creation. Overconfidence is also a driver of value damage in M&As‟ 
value creation. For example, the M&A decision was made even if the gain in 
valuation was negative (Roll, 1986). This may affect value loss to M&As‟ value 
making. Healy (1992) tested 50 samples between 1979 and 1984 using empirical 
researches and observed that in the majority of synergy from M&As‟ activity, agents 
and arrogance coexisted. Agents had a positive effect on M&As‟ value creation, and 
arrogance had negative effects; however, these motives of M&As were nevertheless 
unable to fully explain the source of value creation or value damage. In China, 
previous research determined that motivations of M&As were associated with some 
distinctive Chinese characteristics, such as "eliminate loss motivation" or "bankruptcy 
alternative motives".  
 
Motivations of M&As do not explain value creation or damage. Value may not be 
explained by a few factors related to M&As‟ activities in transaction failures. Hence, 
many researchers shifted their focus to different aspects, such as strategy, finance, 
organization, management and integration of M&As to explain transaction value 
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creation or damage. According to the findings of Lamont and Polk (2001), research on 
strategic reasons proposed that the design and planning of value creation in M&As 
were essential. Better competitiveness in the market and the flexibility of regulations 
and policy may also create better value creation (Andrade, 2001). Bouwman et al. 
(2009) noted that research in finance indicated that the bidder company had more 
incentive to create value when it held more equity in the target company. Stock 
payment is a better choice when the target company is overvalued; conversely, cash 
payment is a better decision when target firm was undervalued (Hansen, 1987). 
Nevertheless, no matters what methods of payments are used, higher premiums cause 
more damage to value creation (Rhodes-Kropf, 2005). Research on organization 
indicated that the overconfidence of managerial leadership in M&As more easily 
damaged value creation (Roll, 1986). However, Lang et al. (1989) observed that poor 
leadership of corporate management was more likely to damage value creation. After 
researching post-merger integration, Nardozza (1997) reported that strategy, 
organization, human resources and corporate culture were the primary issues of 
M&As‟ activities. Bert and Timothy (2003) observed that deeper and faster 
integration created greater value creation in M&As‟ activities; however, Homburg and 
Bucerius (2006) reported that the level and speed of the integration in M&As had 
indeterminate effects on value making.  
 
In early 1990s, China began to create the capital markets. The first completed M&As 
activity in listed companies was completed in 1993; therefore, the duration of 
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historical data is quite limited in China. Previous studies primarily analysed the 
theoretical motivations of M&As, and Chinese researchers conducted numerous 
empirical studies on whether public firms are able to create value in M&As and how 
to identify and prove an appropriate theory. Conversely, because of the lack of 
systematic research on the factors that affect value creation, only a few studies also 
focused on finance and strategic management perspectives between 1999 and 2001. 
Those studies selected 84 Chinese public firms as the sample to identify transaction 
premiums, industry-related levels, industry-related sizes, the proportion of 
transactions, and the proportion of shareholdings as the major factors affecting the 
performance of M&As. These factors may explain the changes in operating 
performance after transactions. Because of difficulty of data collections, empirical 
research on both organizational behaviour and integrations of M&As is extremely 
limited. Only a few studies used secondary data to explore the effects of target firms 
post-M&A. Examining assets, management, details, structural integration, and 
industry-related degrees, the findings were that there is no effect on industry-related 
degree. Moreover, stronger financial strength had negative effects on value creation 
and on the cultural differences among management teams (Yao and Shi, 2010).  
 
Previous research provided some valuable evidence although these studies lacked 
evidence of M&As‟ value creation or damage. Three primary factors may explain and 
fill the gap. First, research failed to disclose the relation between transaction value 
making and internal procedure. The primary target of researches has been how M&A 
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motivations cause M&A procedure of value making or damage. Depend on 
motivations of M&As‟ value making, there is no difference, which is inconsistent 
with actual transaction. Another finding was that there was no relation between the 
motivations of M&As and value creation, which is not consistent with reality. Second, 
the majority of former studies used large group of sample data, which did not allow 
investigation of the process and mechanism in an in-depth study of value creation. 
Third, conflicts and differences remain in former studies for reasons such as different 
regions and sectors. 
 
The above literature review indicates that if only one or two aspects of M&As are 
investigated, a study cannot fully explain post-merger value creation because the 
M&As transactions are quite complex. Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) observed that 
conclusions are meaningful when investigating integrated strategic management, 
finance, organizational behaviour and theoretical models of human resources 
management theories. Those authors believed that these factors should be considered 
in further studies on value creation in M&As. Moreover, studies of these factors that 
affect value creation in Chinese markets must also consider financial and strategic 
management. 
 
3.2.4.3 Risks of M&As in China 
M&As present some issues or risks because of the undeveloped Chinese financial 
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market and system. First, government only recently began interventions to regulate 
M&As activities because the regulators began to realize the imperfection of the young 
Chinese M&As market. Second, property rights of SOEs (state-owned enterprises) are 
imprecise Theoretically, SOEs belong to the Chinese common people; in fact, they 
belong to the related local or central government department. Managers are merely 
operators, not the actual owners of assets. Therefore, when SOEs are involved in a 
transaction, the M&As process becomes more complicated. Third, local protectionism 
isolates the M&As market. Some local governments may tend to protect local 
interests, disregarding the rules of the market or industrial trends and establishing 
restrictive policies that create barriers to the market and affect the development of 
industry for good or bad. Finally, because investment banking was less developed, 
when companies were engaged in M&As transactions, professional intermediaries 
were definitely necessary. Investment bank is obvious intermediaries; nevertheless, if 
bidder or target in a Chinese market owns a sector of the state economy, the 
investment banks must work with the local government, which may be more costly 
and time-consuming. 
 
Previous studies investigated the development of M&As in the Chinese market. 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) and Papadakis (2005) observed that because 
acquisitions are dynamic and continuous procedure and interactions are affected by 
different factors of value creations, the research on M&As‟ value creation must be 
applied in an integrated model. The four areas that explain value creation in M&As 
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are strategic management, financial areas, organizational behaviours and merger 
integration. In addition, some scholars hold that these factors are the core motives of 
whether M&As succeed. The research also indicated the primary factors that directly 
affect value creation in Chinese M&As: staff boycotts, resource integration, methods 
of payment and proportion of acquisition. Staff boycotts are not beneficial to M&A 
value making. Cash acquisition, a great proportion of M&As, and a high level of 
resource integrations after a M&A are beneficial to value making in M&As 
transactions. Another empirical study determined that industry-related and resource 
integration have no direct effect on M&A value making. Lastly, this research also 
indicated that interactions among diverse factors of M&As value making may affect 
extent of organizational fitting and whether M&A interactions are good. Interactions 
may affect employee resistance in target company in transaction. However, there is 
also some risk in these factors that create value; for example, former studies did not 
explore the internal process relation in value creation in M&As, studies nearly always 
used large samples that may not explain all situations, and some conflict remains 
regarding the findings. Moreover, the research results indicated four issues in Chinese 
M&As. First governments did not regulate companies in M&As; second, the property 
rights of SOEs are confusing; third, local protectionism artificially divides the merger 
market; and fourth, investment banking is underdeveloped. 
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) developed the approach to assess target firms and 
total gains from Bradley et al. (1988). The data in their research comprised successful 
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M&As transactions between 1963 and 1988. These scholars provided estimations of 
gain of target firms and bidder firms for 330 tender offers in the research. Their tables 
indicated that mean gains of target firms and bidders were $130 million and -$10 
million, separately. In 49.4% of tender offer transactions, bidder firms realized 
positive gain; however, in 95.8% of transactions, the gain of target firms were positive. 
In 76.4% of tender offer transactions, total gains were positive. The data indicated that 
approximately 75% of buyouts were motivated by chasing synergies effects; 
remainder were primarily driven by agency motive or the hubris hypothesises. Of 
takeover transactions, 63.9% realized positive total gain; bidders had positive gain. As 
seen from subsample of negative total gain, losses from M&As might be massive; 
mean total losses were $146.5 million. The outcomes clearly supported their research 
hypotheses that synergies are primary motive for M&As in subsample of positive total 
gains whereas agency motives are principal motives of negative total gains subsample. 
To explain more detailed, plus signal on β that estimates positive total gains for the 
sample and minus signal on β that estimates negative total gain for the sample is not 
consistent with hubris hypothesises. Thus, there are no correlations between target 
firms and total gain. 
 
Roll (1986) indicated that the hubris theory predicts that during M&A, total value of t 
target and bidder companies declines a little, value of bidder firms also decreases, and 
value of target companies would rise. The empirical results in Roll (1986) indicated 
that combined value of bidder and target companies may nevertheless increase in a 
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few researches and decrease in others. The values have not been statistically 
significant. Statistical changes in markets value of bidder company has been blended 
across researches and the majority of changes were quite small. These changes were 
deemed considerably negative in a few results, and other researchers determined them 
to be positive. The price of target firms steadily increased, nevertheless, only if 
primary bid or a later bid was effective. 
 
From the perspective of a U.S. bidder, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) identified 
empirical evidence that cross-border M&A are different from domestic M&As on 
basis of equities and performances of operations. They used samples of 4430 takeover 
transactions since 1985 to 1995. By monitoring for different factor, they determined 
that U.S. companies that purchase overseas target firms compared with those that bid 
on domestic target firms have considerably fewer fluctuations in operating 
performances and considerably lower announcements equity return (approximately 
1%). Equity return is negatively related to development in both global and industrial 
diversifications. Those authors determined that bidder return is positively associated 
with M&A activities in target company‟s country with legal systems that provides 
more right to shareholders. Excluding in the U.K., bidder return is negatively related 
to target country‟s level of economic restriction. 
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3.2.4.4 The Result of Chinese Firms to Takeover Foreign Firms 
Calomiris et al. (2010) observed that Chinese SOEs‟ activities lead the China‟s M&As 
market with significant positive abnormal returns surrounding announcements of the 
transaction, and SOEs are more likely to acquire unlisted and private companies. This 
is not consistent with the U.S M&As market that overall may not obtain abnormal 
returns (Fuller et al., 2002) although other evidence indicates that to acquire private 
companies creates positive financial growth for shareholder (Faccio et al., 2006). In 
addition, SOEs acquiring other enterprises are more likely to pay in cash. Due to the 
prior empirical studies mentioned, cash payments in the short-yerm is better than 
other methods. Hence, the short-term bidders‟ returns grow with significant abnormal 
returns and better-than-expected factor in six months (Calomiris et al., 2010). 
 
Over the long term, there is more evidence that the operational performance of bidder 
firms did not change significantly in the 3 years after the Chinese enterprises 
completed the transaction (Calomiris et al., 2010; Feng and Wu, 2001; Wang et al., 
2001). Nevertheless, shareholders‟ asset greatly increased over the 3 -year post 
transaction periods, particularly for SOEs.  
 
The cross-border M&As accounted for only 10% of overall M&As transactions; the 
most of targets were private companies in China from 1997 to 2007. During that 
decade, except for the unlisted companies or internal M&As in which shares were 
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purchased from subsidiaries, there were 136 suitable samples are identified for testing, 
and all involved in M&As transactions. The investigation of cross-border M&As 
groups was not consistent with any theories or empirical outcomes from earlier 2008. 
Li (2010) observed that cross-border groups mainly deal with SOEs and 
underwhelmed the markets by the standard value creations measured by stock prices 
moving surrounding announcements date. That author also observed that cross-border 
M&As in Chinese market do not reflect the interests of shareholder and it is likely 
that the transactions are politically driven although there is not a sufficiently large 
sample to determine a significant implication. The history and data remain limited to 
observing bidder returns on Chinese cross-border M&As transactions. However, 
searches and studies remain scant in China. Therefore, this dissertation emphasizes 
the perspective of theoretical findings and examines regulations to transfer 
knowledge. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample Selection and Data Description 
The selected samples all contained M&A transactions (complete or incomplete) 
involving Chinese public companies as bidders from 2002 to 2016. The primary data 
were collected from Thomason One Banker transactions (SDC) and the GTA 
(CSMAR) database. Similar to Fuller et al. (2002), the samples selected fit the 
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following criteria: 
 
1. The acquirers must be Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges.  
2. To test the hypotheses requires all announced transactions, which includes all 
Chinese listed firms‟ cross-border transactions. 
3. The target firm may be public, private or other and must be a non-Chinese firm. 
4. The acquirer firm must have been publicly listed for at least 1 year before and 
after the acquisition announcement. 
 
The sample began in 2002 when Chinese public companies began to acquire foreign 
companies until the end of 2016 and included 465 acquisition announcements of listed 
Chinese company cross-border takeovers. 
 
3.3.2 Methodologies 
For all transactions, the acquirers were classified into two groups, the acquiring public 
and the unlisted target. The performance of bidders was observed for several days, 
beginning approximately 2-5 days before the date of the acquisition announcement 
and ending approximately 2-5 days after the announcement. 
 
When all data samples were collected, testing followed Brown and Warner (1985). 
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The modified market model was applied to appraise daily abnormal return (ARs), 
which are the acquirer‟s daily return minus the value-weighted stock return of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges: 
ARi,t = Ri,t − (αt̅ + βi̅RM,t) 
Compute cumulative value of average abnormal returns of entire sample throughout 
events periods. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇
𝑁
𝑖=0
 
This equation indicates general average effects of firm's transactions of sample events 
for whole equity return. 
Abnormal returns were summarized for 5 and 11 days before and after each 
acquisition announcement (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) as 
CARi,t = ∑ (Ri.t − RM,t)
t+2,5 
t−2,5 
 
where Ri,t is the returns (i) of an individual firm at day t and RM,t is Shanghai and 
Shenzhen value-weighted stock returns at day t.  
 
The specific steps of calculations are the same as 2.3.2.
5
 
 
                                                   
5 The result is robust by using different model, for example, Fama–French three-factor model and  Fama–French 
five-factor model 
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3.3.3 Empirical Analysis 
The financial industry is one of the most important sectors in the market. M&A 
activities are not only one of investment banking‟s core businesses but also important 
strategic decisions or simply financial investment solutions. Therefore, M&As are 
essential to the capital market. Many journalists have conducted a great deal of 
research on value creation from M&As. In the past few decades, numerous empirical 
studies demonstrated that M&A activities may deliver the opportunities and potential 
for value creation for both acquirer and target. Examining different financial 
indicators may unearth many different methods to validate value creation. Previous 
research from Jensen and Ruback (1983) examined whether M&As create value, and 
numerous scholars have broadly and deeply argued the issue. Nevertheless, there is no 
consensus among scholars, and different articles present different views on value 
creation from M&A activities. Jensen and Ruback (1983) studied 13 takeover 
transactions to determine whether shareholders of target firms can obtain a 20% value 
increase in merger and 30% in tender offer. The acquirer firm may obtain 4% of 
abnormal returns in tender offer and 0% in merger in effective transactions. The 
majority of researches focused more on short-run financial movement and market 
performances than long-run performance and valuation. More than a few studies were 
event studies and empirical analyses to determine the value creation of M&A 
activities. 
 
157 
 
In this study, the author explores data from cross-border transactions. The study 
provides more details of Chinese listed bidders acquiring overseas companies. The 
consequences of Chinese listed companies acquiring overseas companies are 
significant. The study focuses on overseas markets, particularly the developed 
markets that are more freely competitive financial markets. Compared with developed 
financial markets, the Chinese market is highly regulated and restricted. Chinese firms 
may have to integrate international standards by acquiring overseas companies to 
achieve internationalization. It is not only the factors stated previously may influence 
the value creations of M&As but regulations and internationalization may help 
Chinese firms achieve the value generated from acquiring overseas firms as well. 
These research questions may be answered in two stages. The first stage is to identify 
the motivations of Chinese listed companies acquiring cross-border targets. The 
second stage is to identify the difference between overseas targets and domestic 
targets, for example, firm size, method of payment, leverage ratio, and the target‟s 
public status. 
 
3.3.3.1 Financial leverage 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2007) constructed the dynamic models of M&As in which 
financial policy of bidders‟ companies and the terms and timing of merger activity 
were jointly determined. In that study, financial leverage was quite an important 
commitment factor and determined the results of acquisition competition. Those 
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authors stated that the possibility of developing externally by monitoring transactions 
constructs an asymmetrical equilibrium in financing policy, and lastly bidder with 
lower leverage ratio is likely to survive M&As competition. With regard to 
asymmetric equilibrium, the leverage ratio is well-balanced insolvency cost with 
benefit of taxes shield. This is considerably larger than the capital structures of the 
competition‟s success. The application of the models was consistent with the 
accessible empirical evidences and created numerous innovative forecasts. Principally, 
the models forecast that the acquirers with a lower leverage ratio tend to be successful 
in M&As competitions except when the targets companies have an extremely higher 
leverage ratio. Due to the rationality of their models, the model forecast the bidder 
winning the competition to increase the leverage ratio after the transaction was 
completed. Their model also linked the dispersion of the industry leverage ratio with 
various industry features, such as the instability of cash flow, national industries and 
bankruptcy costs. 
 
3.3.3.2 Method of Payment 
Travlos (1987), examining only stock transactions, concluded that the acquiring firm 
determines whether the shareholder experiences large losses during the announcement 
period of the takeover offer. However, the results for the bidding firm that is paying 
cash demonstrated that the shareholders experience a normal rate of return during the 
announcement period. 
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Yook (2003) took the position that there may be two major effects of payment in cash. 
The first effect is on capital investments, and the second is the financing influence. 
Assuming that to choose cash as payments option in great value creation transactions, 
synergies influence raises valuation of both equities and debts. Simultaneously, the 
synergy effect may reduce the financing risk of a company. However, the leverage 
ratio increases because cash payment transactions are positive on financial risk. 
Replacing the leverage effect with the synergy effect increases the rating. If these two 
effects offset themselves, the rating is not affected. Inversely, the drawdown on rating 
results from the leverage effect leading the synergy effect. 
 
Cao (2013) stated that cash payment transactions result in satisfactory long-run 
performances. The performance of M&As became steadier in recent decades, and the 
number of transactions has also been gradually growing, which are consistent with the 
empirical evidences of value creation theory to cross-border M&As. Acquirers‟ 
selecting cash payment is an obvious advantage; the company is thus able to offer 
plenty of cash and good operation. Holding liquid assets such as cash achieves the 
purpose of offshore expansion and strategic business diversification. M&As activity is 
the quicker way to expand a business, achieving targeted growth and shrinking the 
time required for research and development. 
 
Eckbo et al. (1990) used the sample of 182 acquiring companies between 1964 and 
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1982 to analyse the abnormal return of shareholder. Those authors reported abnormal 
return of 5.7% when transaction were financed with a combination of cash and equity 
and 2.7% when transaction were financed by stocks only. When transaction was 
conducted in cash, abnormal returns were not significant.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) created the simple models that was consistent with the 
obtainable empirical evidence and created several innovative theories. First, takeovers 
are disproportionate conducted in cash when the valuation of the industry is low and 
conducted in equity payments when the valuation is high. Second, the volumes of 
stock transaction increases as the dispersions of valuation between company‟s growth. 
Third, the targets firm in a cash payments acquisition has a lower prior return whereas 
the bidding firm in an equity payment acquisition has a higher preferred return. Fourth, 
the bidding firm in an equity payment acquisition indicates overvaluation, for 
example, insider selling or manipulating earnings. Fifth, a long-term return to a 
bidding firm tends to be negative in equity payment transactions but is positive in 
cash payment transactions. Sixth, although long-run return is negative, equity 
payment acquisitions provide interest for long-term shareholders of bidding firms. 
 
Martin (1996) stated that a downgraded acquiring firm has a higher return than an 
acquiring company with an unchanged grade and that an upgraded company tends to 
have an exceptionally higher return than both grade unaffected and demoted firms in 
the stocks payments method. In fact, upgraded and stocks payment bidder companies 
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has the highest positive abnormal return whereas demoted bidder companies using the 
stocks payments method has the highest negative return across all samples. 
 
3.3.3.3 Size 
Moeller et al. (2004) described the size effects as gaps in abnormal return between 
larger firm and smaller firm. Those authors also indicated that the abnormal profits 
that are connected to an acquisition announcement for small firms exceed abnormal 
returns related to transaction announcement for larger firms by 2.24 %. The evidences 
also indicated that larges firm suffer interest damages for stockholder when the 
announcements of the transaction of a listed firm is released, however the acquisition 
is financed. That is why the size of a firm is an important aspect that may influence 
the returns on the transaction to bidder company. In their research, those authors 
measured the signs of equity and growth opportunity and theorized that the 
overvalued and hypothesis of free cash flows explained effect of firm‟s size. They 
also measured whether larger firms tended to accept offer with negative synergies and 
overpaid. Finally, the research of sample regarding long-run return derived from 
transaction by large and small firms.  
 
Anderson et al. (1994) identified evidences of targets size effect established on 
average return. They adopted the 0/1 market models with a 13 month events window. 
They calculated that the average smaller firm excess returns were 24% and the 
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average larges firm excess returns was 16% in the transaction announcements month. 
The difference in excess return changed with the transaction announcements, and the 
average excess return of smaller firms was greater than of larger firms in whole 
sample during the transaction announcements period. Those authors also observed no 
evidences of any relations between results and size when evaluating the robust of 
result. However, they did identify evidences of the relations between size and 
following offers although the condition separately occurred in the 13 month events 
window and in the smaller firms group. 
 
3.3.4 Event Study 
This study focuses on the value creation of M&As since the stock exchange began in 
China. The performance evaluations of M&As are a debatable topic in this field of 
empirical research. Since the 1970s, studies in this field have been constant and have 
presented particularly remarkable findings from empirical research. The M&As 
transactions continue to occur, creating many more events to track. Using 
performance evaluation analysis, previous studies attempted to identify the shifting of 
the enterprise value from M&As transaction. The research methodology was 
primarily event studies, which are established on equity prices movement and 
accounting analysis and on financial performances (Robert, 2003). The method of 
event study focuses on the equity prices movement of M&As bidders or target 
companies as the research objects. The method observes stock price movements to 
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explore the volatilities of shareholder earnings pre- and post-M&A announcements 
and evaluates the performance of abnormal returns by computing cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAR), earnings per share (EPS) and other signals. The method of 
event study is dominant in this field of study and has been validated. 
 
3.3.4.1 Empirical Evidence 
Langetieg (1978) computed the CAR of 149 M&As deals between 1929 and 1969 
during M&A announcements window periods. He identified the target company 
shareholders‟ CAR to be 10.63% and the shareholders‟ CAR of the bidder company at 
-1.61%. The mutual CAR was 0%. Thus, M&As only generate value for shareholder 
of target company.  
 
Jensen and Richard (1983) announced results on foundation of 16 researches and 
determined that the profitability of the bidder in completed M&As was none. They 
determined that completed transactions could carry abnormal returns for shareholders 
of the target company of approximately 20%, and successful transactions created 
earnings up to 30% for the shareholders of the target company.  
 
Frank and Harris (1989) presented the findings for more than 1800 U.K. companies 
involved in M&As between 1975 and 1985. They determined that during the M&As 
announcement period, which is from 4 months before the M&A announcement to 1 
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month after the M&A announcement, the shareholder of target firm obtained 
abnormal return of approximately 25% to 30%. 
 
Schwert (1996) selected 1814 samples of data on M&A events between 1975 and 
1991 and also determined that shareholder of target firm obtained 35% abnormal 
return on average for the period of the M&A announcement and transaction. 
 
Berge and Ofek (1995) researched event studies for 107 data samples regarding 
refocusing announcements between 1954 and 1993. They determined that refocusing 
the announcements moved firm approximately 7.3% on CARs. In the meantime, the 
cumulative average abnormal returns were positively and considerably correlated with 
loss of value affected by applying diversifications approach on samples, and the 
authors also indirectly observed the ineffectiveness of diversified M&As. 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission established an expert committee in 1983 
comprising 18 people who explored effects of value creation on both the bidder and 
the target companies in M&As transactions from 1986 to the present. An expert 
committee disclosed that there were no adequate evidences to demonstrate that M&A 
activity creates value for the public (Wang, 2004). Therefore, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission enacted assessment that neither predominantly supports nor 
constrains the rule of M&A activity. 
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Weidenbaum and Vogt (1987) reported several findings based on historical data. One 
finding was that the shareholders of bidder firms generally received a negative return. 
Merger transactions always include benefits and losses. The shareholders of target 
firms tend to create benefits whereas the shareholders of acquiring firms tend to suffer 
losses in the transaction (Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1987). Caves (1989) reported several 
findings that measured the response of equity market and earnings after M&As 
announcement over several years. One finding was that prior research stated whether 
M&As would create value for M&As transactions that relied on value of target firms 
before announcement. Financial market assumed that the bidder was able to squeeze 
out more value from the assets of the target firm. Nevertheless, later studies come to 
the opposite conclusion, that M&As do not guarantee a value premium and abnormal 
return and may also decrease the real yields of the bidder‟s business sector and 
increase the level of productivity discreteness to decrease the value of acquirer stock. 
Datta et al. (1992) reported several findings, stating that the yield of the bidder was 
less than 0.5%. It may be demonstrated by adequate evidence that the bidders‟ 
shareholders cannot commonly obtain an abnormal return. 
 
Bruner (2002) published comprehensive summaries that analysed data from 1971 to 
2001, observing that in the process of a M&A transactions, shareholder of target firms 
in a developed market gain more abnormal return than the shareholders of bidder 
firms in an emerging market. In addition, the stock price of the target firm increases 
sharply, 10% to 30% of excess returns. Second, the equity yields of bidders were quite 
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inconclusive, demonstrating a negative tendency. Moreover, over time, the long-run 
financial performances of bidder indicated descending tendency. The inclusive 
shareholder‟s earnings of the target firms and the bidder was uncertain as well. Grubb 
and Lamb (2000) advised that approximately 20% of M&As transactions were in fact 
successful; the majority of M&As transactions decreased the value of shareholder 
assets. The failure rate for M&As is also quite large and tough to monitor.  
 
The researches not only demonstrated views of value creation for shareholders in 
M&As but also suggested M&As‟ damage to shareholders‟ benefits. When authors 
investigated the shareholders of bidder and target firms, they discovered as many 
differences as there were assumptions. Although there may not be consensus on 
cross-border transactions and shareholders‟ value, the overall summary is that M&As 
could be more valuable to the shareholders of target firms while uncertain for 
shareholder of bidder firms. And the combined total value of the transaction may tend 
towards zero. 
 
3.3.4.2 China’s Evidence 
Chinese academics also selected event study to investigate M&As transactions‟ 
performance, and the primary findings are below.  
 
Li and Chen (2002) selected event study as the method to conduct an empirical 
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analysis of 349 M&As transactions between 1999 and 2000 in China‟s stock market. 
They determined that first, the shareholders of bidder companies obtained a positive 
cumulative abnormal return during the M&A announcements window [-10, 30] 
whereas target firm is unsuccessful to obtain good cumulative abnormal return during 
that period. Second, M&As may not have major effects on value for shareholders of 
the bidder company but do have significant effects on the value of target company. 
The value of shareholders‟ asset for target company decrease, and the equities transfer 
for the target company grow. Then there may be a declining trend. Third, the equities 
structure has specific effects on the value of bidders. Nevertheless, there are no effects 
on the value of the target company. There are 2 types of transactions that cause 
growth in value for bidder firms‟ shareholders, the proportions of state-owned equity 
and proportions of legal persons whose shares gain the most. However, the value for 
shareholders of the bidder company that most benefitted from the tradable A share did 
not change considerably. Fourth, the top managers strongly affected the value of the 
target company. The shareholding ratio of manager is negatively related to the value 
of shareholder for target company. When this ratio is higher, shareholders of target 
firm benefit less. Large proportions of shareholding do not reduce the agency problem 
in M&As transactions. 
 
Zhang (2003) conducted empirical research on 1216 data samples regarding M&As 
transactions of public companies in China between 1993 and 2002. The research on 
average share price and average cumulative abnormal return in the public companies 
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was from a period established as -60, 30 of M&As announcement disclosures. The 
findings demonstrated that when the M&As occurred, there were 2 indicators of the 
target firm, an asset-restructuring event and a share-acquisition event indicating 
increasing trends. The stock price of the share-acquisition event increased more than 
for the asset-restructuring event. There is an indicator of the bidder firm, that a 
consolidation-merger event caused decreasing trends. The research consequences of 
the event study method stated that all of the samples of CARs were considerably 
positive in range of -17, 30. In target company, CARs of share acquisition firm were 
quite positive in the range of -36, 30. The CARs of an asset-restructuring firm were 
quite positive in the period of 0, 10. The CARs of a consolidation-merge firm were 
negative. Research on average share price generated findings similar to the CARs. 
They both indicated that M&As transactions created excess return for shareholder of 
target firms and affected loss for shareholder of bidder firms. 
 
Zhang (2003) selected the event study method to compute the 2 main indicators, 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. Zhang was able to measure 
abnormal returns on stock price movement in the window of -10, 30 in the M&As 
announcement period. He conducted the statistical tests to define the significant 
degree of the announcement‟s effects. The study used CARs to determine whether the 
shareholders of a public company were able to gain an abnormal return in pre- and 
post-announcement periods of M&As transactions. The empirical findings were that 
during the transaction window in M&As, the ARs and CARs of the bidder firm were 
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not significantly larger than zero on trading days, and the shareholders did not gain 
significant premiums. Of the trading days, 31% indicated positive ARs, and 69% 
indicated negative ARs; there were no differences between ARs and zero. The CARs 
initially presented an increasing trend and then later declined. Furthermore, CARs 
decreased more in value than they improved. And the CARs of final window achieved 
-10.56%, and the value for shareholder declined. 
 
Chen and Zhang (1999) researched public firms in 1997 after M&As and resolved 
that during M&As announcements window [-10, 20], the cumulative abnormal return 
of target company increased. 
 
Guang and Rong (2000) researched M&As transactions on both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges between 1993 and 1995. The shareholder of target 
companies obtained a positive cumulative abnormal return in M&As transactions; 
nevertheless, it was difficult for the shareholders of the bidder firm to obtain an 
abnormal return in the M&As transactions.  
 
Liang (2002) tested the M&As transactions of 92 public firms on Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges, selecting transactions between 1998 and 2002. The 
selected data involved the transfer of controlling stakes, and the research implied that 
the markets were different for M&As activities among Chinese companies. The 
assessment of the markets was not consistent with previous findings of foreign studies 
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on M&As activities.  
 
Yu G. and Yang R. (2000) applied comprehensive performance evaluation methods to 
research 103 M&As transactions in which controlling stakes were transferred. The 
research demonstrated that overall, the performance of the bidder company caused 
few developments after the transaction. The performance improvement of non -special 
treatments was more noticeable than special treatments after the M&As. The free 
allocation company that benefitted from the support of governmental policy displayed 
more noticeable improvements than the stakes transferred with compensation. 
 
As for the method of event study, Chinese academics were more likely to select 
accounting methods to measure M&As transactions performance because the events 
study relies on markets model methods that compute the volatility of share price to 
measure the change in company operating performance. The foundation is effective 
stock market trends, indicating that equity price echo all information to change value 
of listed firms. The majority of public firms have a definite percentage of non-tradable 
stocks and non-circulating shareholders that may not clearly obtain or lose value on 
stock price increases and decreases. Therefore, the volatility of the stock prices of 
public firms renders it difficult to observe the earnings changes of non-tradable 
shareholders, and the applicability of event study methods may be limited by a 
number of aspects. These studies engender quite dissimilar results, and whether 
M&As transactions create value for shareholders remains debatable in China‟s current 
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M&As market.  
 
Zhang (2003) studied the EPS (Earnings per Share) of public firms, the returns on net 
asset and main corporate profitability. The signals were tested by an accounting 
research methods in the 3 years before and after M&As transactions. The results point 
out that short-run performances of target firms developed considerably although the 
performances improvements required diligence, and there were decreasing trends 
indicated in the performance of bidder firms after the M&As. Furthermore, the M&As 
can generate interests for target firm, then the financial indicators of target firms then 
improve. The stock premium increased to 29.05%, which exceeded 20% of the 
average global levels. However, there were also some negative effects for the incomes 
of the shareholders of the bidder firm, affecting the total financial performance. The 
stock premium of the bidders achieved -16.76%. Because the majority of public firms 
were target firms, the M&As increased stock prices but also caused a capital loss for 
bidder firms.  
 
Zhang Z.X. (2003) selected the principal component analysis method to investigate 4 
indexes of M&As firms and evaluated M&As performance for public firms: net 
income/total assets, earnings per share, net assets yield and prime operating 
revenue/total assets. The study concluded that performance declined in the year of the 
transaction and then improved significantly, reaching the best performances in first 
year after transactions. Nevertheless, in second year after the transactions, 
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performances declined significantly. In four years, from year before the transaction to 
second year after transaction, performance enhancement of public firms demonstrated 
no significant effect.  
 
These findings demonstrate non-unified results that all use the accounting research 
method; however, the majority of the results indicated that financial performances of 
the companies declined after M&As transaction. Additional comprehensive studies 
indicated that the management efficiency of the firm improved although profitability 
declined after the M&As transactions.  
 
3.3.5 Accounting Research Method  
The accounting research method is also the method of financial performance analysis. 
It generally uses financial indicators that can reflect the performance and capability of 
company management, for example, ROA (return on assets), ROE (return on equity) 
and ROS (return on sales), which directly reflect company probability and operating 
performance. 
 
Meeks (1977) studied 233 M&As transactions in the U.K. between 1964 and 1972, 
determining that the ROA of bidder firms generally decreased during the transactions. 
Muelle (1979) stated in a U.S. senate presentation that the performance of companies 
related to M&As did not improve associated with firms that were not involved in 
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M&As. The earnings of shareholders were also similar in these two company statuses. 
Mueller studied the M&As performance in 7 countries: the U.S., the U.K., Germany, 
France, Sweden Belgium and Netherlands. The findings indicated that the increasing 
and decreasing profitability of these countries was caused by M&As, which was not 
consistent with other findings. M&As may lead to the improvement of profitability 
but may also reduce profitability in different countries. The findings indicated that the 
M&As may have affected company profitability 3 to 5 years after the transactions. 
M&As cannot change economic efficiency. Mueller selected ROA, ROE, and ROS to 
investigate 287 M&As transactions between 1962 and 1972. He determined that 
performance of firms involved in the M&As deals was poorer than in non-M&As 
companies while the outcomes were not extremely significant (Mueller, 1980). 
Mueller also conducted two other studies that examined the largest 100 companies 
involved in M&As between 1985 and 1989 and determined that the market share of 
these companies experienced heavy losses (Mueller, 1985, 1989).  
 
Healy et al. (1992) investigated the top 50 M&As transactions between 1979 and 
1984 in the U.S. Their findings indicated that the asset turnover of companies 
improved considerably after the M&As although the marginal operating cash flows 
did not indicate any significant abnormal growth (Healy et al., 1992). Healy et al. 
(1997) also investigated the same sample group in 1997, and the results indicated that 
the growth of cash flow caused by M&As had no more paid premiums than the target 
firms. Hence, in M&As, the net cash flows were zero, and the stock price movements 
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during M&As announcements were associated with the cash flows after the M&As 
transactions. 
 
Dickerson et al. (1997) investigated 613 M&As transactions between 1948 and 1977; 
the ROA of bidder firms in first 5 years after transactions was 2% lower than for non- 
M&As companies. 
 
3.3.6 The evaluation of M&As performance 
The combined performance of cross-border and domestic transactions may be 
characterized as follows: event studies focus on short-term movements of the wealth 
and earnings of shareholders. For instance, most of research begin observation 
window [-10, 30] on trading day. The observation periods were too short and thus 
only reflected the short-term effects of M&As transaction on the interests of 
shareholders. The short-term effects had no conclusive effects on large shareholders 
and strategic investors. 
 
Many of the studies reached no consistent conclusions. However, the differences 
indicated that the performance of M&As requires further research. 
 
The M&As transactions always involve numerous stakeholders. The gain or loss of 
the interests of shareholders and management may not fully reflect the increases and 
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decreases of the M&As value changes. Studies may focus on behaviour motivation 
and gains and losses in the interests of other stakeholders and investors in M&A 
transactions. 
 
Although the abnormal earning returns model in M&A transaction performances 
observations have been broadly adopted, its adaptation remains limited and affected 
by several influences. For previous studies, markets model was adopted to assess 
abnormal return that were based on the volatility of equity prices to evaluate the 
change in company assets. In the current Chinese stock market, the most significant 
issue is that the Chinese stock markets are not quite effective. If stock markets itself 
are ineffective, the equity price movement cannot measure changes in company assets. 
Although some researchers determined that Chinese equity markets was weakly 
effective, Wu (1996) observed that growth of Chinese stock market is long-run 
procedure. The Chinese equity markets remains in the development period, and 
investors continue to be educated. Obvious gaps exist between the developed market 
and the emerging market in such areas as information integrity, effectiveness and 
distribution uniformity. Stock may be simply affected by various factor. Wu examined 
conclusions that the Chinese stock market had become weakly efficient. From another 
perspective, the Chinese equity market may appear to be less effective; however, the 
massive majorities of public firms presently have several non-tradable stocks, and 
non-tradable shareholder may not obtain or lose from equity markets. Therefore, it is 
challenging to measure the changes in the interests of non-tradable shareholders 
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because of the stock price volatility of public companies. The performance of public 
companies may not be accurately measured. 
 
The prices study methods stated is an approach to assess corporation‟s operating 
performances. Furthermore, alternative approach is to take accounting and financial 
data to process comparative analysis (Parrino and Harris, 1999). While accounting 
profits goal is regularly manipulated, an empirical study of Chen and Liu (1999) 
observed that surplus digital data of Chinese public company reporting had strong 
credibility. In addition, they believed that the accounting data manipulation was only 
temporary and that the regulations would become tighter. Over a longer period of time, 
a company‟s performance should be reflected in its financial statements. Therefore, 
the research notes the importance of financial accounting data for the verification of 
the performance of public companies before and after M&As transactions. For more 
objective and accurate results, the research may follow the process below. 
 
First, select Chinese public companies, use numerous factors to screen the M&A 
transactions, and collect equity price data before and after the date of M&As 
announcement. 
 
Second, use the factors to test the effectiveness of public companies‟ performance and 
stock price volatility. 
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Third, test in different time periods: 1 day before and after the M&A announcement, 3 
days before and after M&A announcements, and 5 days before and after M&A 
announcements to test the factors and construct a comprehensive evaluation model. 
Then measure the composite performance of the stock prices of each public company 
in these different periods before and after the M&As announcement.  
 
Finally, list the correlations of each factor related to M&A performance, and based on 
the outcomes, summarize the best execution of M&As transactions. 
 
Previous studies on the performance of M&As transactions indicated that in term of 
M&A theories, the U.S., Europe and other developed countries experienced multiple 
waves of M&As. The transactions were quite active during those periods. These areas 
provided a large quantity of transaction data for research to investigate and develop 
the relative theories. The majorities of researches on M&A performances used broad 
event studies method and the accounting analysis method. These two methods may 
achieve similar results although when it comes time to draw conclusions, the 
fundamental question of whether M&As create value cannot be consistently answered 
for many different reasons.  
 
The limitations of each study, including this dissertation, may dictate a narrower 
direction for further research on Chinese M&As. Using different methods to assess 
the performance of M&A transactions separately has advantages and disadvantages. 
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However, it must be accepted that different methods help to identify different results. 
The selection of the sample in the Chinese market remains relatively small, and the 
time was relatively short. The majority of studies sought to address M&A results and 
methods; this dissertation attempts to help Chinese investors and foreign investors 
make decisions in the Chinese public market. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Summary Statistics 
3.4.2.1 Entire Sample 
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for entire sample of Chinese acquirers 
engaging in cross-border M&As. This table indicates yearly transaction volume and 
the value of transactions. The second column compares the number of public target 
and non-public target transactions. In the sample, only 18% of target firms were 
publicly listed, and 82% of target firms were not public companies. The last column 
presents the breakdown of cumulative abnormal returns by year. 
 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
 
A distinctive portion of this table indicates a significant increase in the value and 
number of transactions since 2006 and quite an active period after 2012; the 
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transaction volume and the value of transactions remained high between 2013 and 
2016. This related to the Chinese opening-up policy, which included supportive 
policies: SAFE issued offshore investment guidelines in 2009,
6
 and the Ministry of 
Commerce issued an administrative approach in 2014.
7
 These regulations guided 
Chinese institutions to invest in overseas markets in a regulated fashion. For the 
method of payment, the majority of Chinese investors chose to pay without cash. The 
cumulative abnormal returns performed better after 2011, and before that, their 
performance was negative and volatile. The financial crisis in 2007 caused a poor 
CAR performance, consistent with the global trend; however, this was also an 
opportunity for numerous assets to be valued cheaper (Chor and Manova, 2012 and 
Grave et al., 2012). Chinese companies began to buy overseas assets during this 
period, leading to the high trading volume. In the early stages, the majority of 
transactions were not extremely successful although there were many mega-deals 
conducted in 2007 that reaped rewards in 2011. 
 
3.4.2.2 Transaction Distribution 
Panel A of Table 3.2 reports numbers and proportions of transactions that Chinese 
acquirers made in the twelve major industries. The results indicate that bidding 
                                                   
6 SAFE (State Administration of Foreign Exchange) issued “Regulations of Domestic Institutions Overseas Direct 
Investment on Foreign Exchange” on 13 July 2009. 
7 The Ministry of Commerce issued “Offshore Investment Management Approach” Document No.3 in 2014. 
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companies were generally focused on industrials, materials and high technology. Panel 
B of Table 4.2 reports numbers and proportions of transactions for foreign targets 
(excluding China) in the twelve major industries. The results indicate that Chinese 
buyers preferred companies from industrials, materials and financials. Panel C of Table 
4.2 reports numbers and proportions of transactions for foreign targets that were 
divided into four geographic areas. The results indicate that the most target firms were 
located in Asia-Pacific. 
 
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
 
The major industry sectors of acquirers and targets were highly matched, suggesting 
that numerous transactions occurred within the same industry. Within the Asia-Pacific 
targets, 36% (68 transactions) were from Hong Kong because Hong Kong is always 
exposed to global investors and there is no capital monitoring. Hong Kong became the 
first priority platform for Chinese investors to access the global market (Zhao, 2003; 
Ruyi et al., 2012). European countries and the U.S. were also primary destinations of 
Chinese buyers because of the more effective financial systems, legal protections and 
tax transparency that reduced the risk for international investors (Zhang, 2017; 
Anderson and Sutherland, 2015). From a company perspective, the E.U. and U.S. 
companies had better corporate governance, financial performance, complementarity 
and technology access in those developed markets (Kashif and Sardar, 2013; Tang, 
2015). 
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3.4.2.3 Univariate Test 
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for entire sample and univariate comparison 
between choosing public and private target firms. In the sample, 18% of target firms 
were publicly listed; more transactions traded with non-public firms (82% of the 
sample).  
 
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 3.3 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
acquiring public targets was 0.04% (t=1.89) and 0.02% (t=1.90), respectively; the 
mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquiring private targets was 0.50% 
(t=2.02) and 0.36% (t=2.52), respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets 
underperformed transactions acquiring private targets by -0.46% (t=2.07) on average. 
Moreover, the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions acquiring public targets 
was 0.09% (t=2.03) and 0.07% (t=2.01), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] 
for transactions acquiring private targets was 0.53% (t=2.08) and 0.55% (t=2.88), 
respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets underperformed transactions 
acquiring private targets by -0.44% (t=2.05) on average. 
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Panel B of Table 3.3 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions acquiring 
public and non-public overseas targets. The panel clearly identifies the differences in 
financial performance for these two groups. First, companies acquiring public targets 
had higher debt levels. Second, the companies acquiring public targets had better 
earning capacity with a higher ROE but a lower ROA, indicating a poorer quality of 
assets, which is consistent with the higher leverage. Third, the companies acquiring 
private targets had a higher P/E valuation in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, the 
companies acquiring public targets had much higher EBITDA and EBITDA/share, 
which indicates better financial and operational performances. Finally, the companies 
acquiring public targets had much higher total assets and sales, which indicate that 
size and business of these companies were larger. Overall, the differences in leverage, 
ROE, ROA, P/E and EBITDA/share were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.3 indicates transaction characteristics for transactions acquiring 
public and non-public overseas targets. The mean and median market value for 
acquirer companies acquiring public targets was much higher than for the acquirer 
companies acquiring private targets. The value of transactions acquiring public targets 
was significantly higher than the value of transactions acquiring private targets. The 
mean and median of relative size for transactions of public and private target 
companies were 1.78 (0.57) and 1.57 (0.73), respectively. The relative size of 
transactions acquiring private targets was significantly smaller than the relative size of 
transactions acquiring public targets. According to the comparisons of market value 
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and transaction value, it may be concluded that larger companies tended to acquire 
larger overseas public targets and smaller companies tended to acquire smaller 
overseas private targets. 
 
In summary, Table 3.3 demonstrates that transactions acquiring private targets created 
significantly higher short-term returns. This result is consistent with hypothesis of 
Chapter 3. In fact, these transactions were conducted with smaller companies that had 
limited capital and liquidity to buy public companies; however, smaller companies 
were more active in business and in addressing growth needs. This result explains 
why there were more transactions acquiring private companies. Larger companies 
demonstrated a stronger financial performance and capital-raising capability, which 
encouraged them to acquire foreign public firms. These results are consistent with 
existing studies by Chang (1998) and Da Silva Rosa et al. (2004). Netter et al. (2011) 
identified evidence of transaction characteristics such as the size of transactions, the 
amount of transactions and the significance of non-publicly owned firms and 
cross-border acquisitions. They observed that large transactions compose a significant 
portion of transaction values, and they concluded that for the aggregate market, all 
M&A activity increases overall wealth and that acquirer‟s benefit in most takeovers 
although acquirer announcements create returns. 
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3.4.2 Regional Univariate Test 
3.4.2.1 North America 
Table 3.4 presents summary statistics for entire sample and univariate comparison 
between choosing public and private target firms in North America. In the sample, 18% 
of target firms were publicly listed, and there were more transactions traded with 
non-public firms (82% of the sample).  
 
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 3.4 indicated both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
acquiring public targets was -1.88% (t=-1.95) and 1.23% (t=-1.79), respectively; the 
mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquiring private targets was -0.80% 
(t=-2.96) and -0.21% (t=-2.67), respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets 
underperformed transactions acquiring private targets by -1.08% (t=2.68) on average. 
The mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions acquiring public targets were -2.56% 
(t=-2.24) and -1.87% (t=-1.97), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for 
transactions acquiring private targets was -1.35% (t=-2.96) and -0.72% (t=-2.85), 
respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets underperformed transactions 
acquiring private targets by -1.21% (t=2.87) on average. 
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Panel B of Table 3.4 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions acquiring 
public and non-public North American targets. Panel B compares the financial 
performance of the two groups. First, companies acquiring public targets had higher 
debt levels. Second, the companies acquiring private targets had better earning 
capacity with higher ROE and ROA, which suggests better assets. Third, the 
companies acquiring private targets had higher P/E valuation in the Chinese stock 
market. Fourth, the companies acquiring public targets had much higher EBITDA and 
EBITDA/share, indicating better financial and operational performance. Finally, the 
companies acquiring public targets had much higher total assets and sales, indicating 
larger size and more business. Overall, the differences in leverage, ROE, ROA, P/E, 
EBITDA/share and total assets were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.4 presents the characteristics of transactions acquiring public and 
non-public North American targets. The mean and median of market value for acquirer 
companies acquiring public targets were much higher than for acquirer companies 
acquiring private targets. The value of transactions for acquiring public targets was 
significantly higher than the value of transactions acquiring private targets. The mean 
and median of relative size for transactions of public and private target companies 
were 0.37 (0.53) and 0.74 (1.58), respectively. The relative size of transactions 
acquiring private targets was significantly smaller than the relative size of transactions 
acquiring public targets. According to the comparisons of market value and 
transaction value, larger companies tended to acquire larger overseas public targets, 
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and smaller companies tended to acquire smaller overseas private targets. This result 
is consistent with the entire sample 
 
To summarize, Table 3.4 demonstrates that transactions acquiring private targets 
create significantly higher short-term returns. This result is not consistent with 
hypothesis of Chapter 3. Although these transactions occur with smaller companies 
that have limited capital and liquidity to buy public companies, smaller companies are 
more active in business and focusing on growth; the higher ROE and ROA also 
support this finding. This result explains why there are more transactions to acquire 
private companies. Larger companies have stronger financial performance and 
capital-raising capability, which encourages them to acquire foreign public firms. 
 
3.4.2.2 Pan-Europe 
Table 3.5 demonstrates summary statistics for entire sample and univariate 
comparison between choosing public and private target firms. In the sample, 14% of 
target firms were publicly listed, and more transactions occurred with non-public firms 
(86% of the sample).  
 
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 3.5 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
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Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
acquiring public targets was 1.40% (t=2.33) and 1.22% (t=2.53), respectively; the 
mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquiring private targets was 1.13% 
(t=1.79) and 0.78% (t=1.84), respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets 
outperformed transactions acquiring private targets by 0.27% (t=1.77) on average. 
Moreover, the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions acquiring public targets 
was 2.00% (t=2.71) and 1.82% (t=2.81), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] 
for transactions acquiring private targets was 1.23% (t=1.97) and 0.93% (t=1.88), 
respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets outperformed transactions acquiring 
private targets by 0.76% (t=1.85) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.5 compares acquirer characteristics of transactions acquiring 
public and non-public overseas targets. The panel clearly identifies the difference 
between those two types of companies in financial performance. First, companies 
acquiring public targets had much higher debt levels. Second, the companies 
acquiring private targets had higher ROE but lower ROA. Third, the companies 
acquiring private targets had higher P/E valuation in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, 
the companies acquiring public targets had much higher EBITDA and close 
EBITDA/share, indicating better financial and operational performance. Finally, the 
companies acquiring public targets had much lower total assets but higher sales, 
indicating a larger size and more business for these companies. Overall, the 
differences in P/E, EBITDA and total assets were significant. 
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Panel C of Table 3.5 presents the characteristics of transactions acquiring public and 
non-public overseas targets. The mean and median of market value for acquirer 
companies acquiring public targets were much higher than for the acquirer companies 
acquiring private targets. The value of transactions acquiring public targets was 
significantly higher than the value of transactions acquiring private targets. The mean 
and median of relative size for transactions of public and private target companies 
were 4.11 (2.44) and 2.10 (0.91), respectively. The relative size of transactions 
acquiring private targets was significantly smaller than the relative size of transactions 
acquiring public targets. According to the comparisons of market value and 
transaction value, larger companies tended to acquire larger overseas public targets, 
and smaller companies tended to acquire smaller overseas private targets. This result 
is consistent with the entire sample 
 
To summarize, Table 3.5 demonstrates that transactions acquiring public targets create 
significantly higher short-term returns. This result is not consistent with hypothesis of 
Chapter 3. In fact, the European market has strong labour unions and legal protection. 
Many factors determine investment returns. Anderson et al. (2009) claimed that 
bidders are forced to offer higher premiums and targets have relatively greater 
bargaining power in strong investor protection environments. This may explain why 
the results are different in the European market. 
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3.4.2.3 Asia-Pacific 
Table 3.6 demonstrates summary statistics for entire sample and univariate 
comparison between choosing public and private target firms in Asia-Pacific. In the 
sample, 22% of target firms were publicly listed, and more transactions occurred with 
non-public firms (78% of the sample).  
 
[Insert Table 3.6 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 3.6 presents both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
acquiring public targets was 0.27% (t=1.74) and 0.20% (t=1.78), respectively; the 
mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquiring private targets was 0.37% 
(t=2.12) and 0.33% (t=2.38), respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets 
underperformed transactions acquiring private targets by -1.10% (t=2.95) on average. 
Moreover, the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions acquiring public targets 
was 0.43% (t=2.03) and 0.44% (t=2.08), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] 
for transactions acquiring private targets were 0.51% (t=2.55) and 0.38% (t=2.88), 
respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets underperformed transactions 
acquiring private targets by -0.08% (t=2.00) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.6 compares acquirer characteristics of transactions acquiring 
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public and non-public Asia-Pacific targets. The panel clearly identifies the difference 
between those two types of companies in financial performance. First, companies 
acquiring public targets had higher debt levels. Second, the companies acquiring 
private targets had similar ROE and ROA. Third, the companies acquiring public 
targets had slightly higher P/E valuation in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, the 
companies acquiring public targets had much higher EBITDA and EBITDA/share, 
indicating better financial and operational performance. Finally, the companies 
acquiring public targets had much higher total assets and sales, suggesting that size 
and business of these companies were larger. Overall, the differences in ROE, ROA, 
P/E, EBITDA and EBITDA/share were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.6 presents transaction characteristics for transactions acquiring 
public and non-public Asia-Pacific targets. The mean and median of market value for 
acquirer companies acquiring public targets were much higher than the acquirer 
companies acquiring private targets. The value of transactions acquiring public targets 
was significantly higher than the value of transactions acquiring private targets. The 
mean and median of relative size for transactions of public and private target 
companies were 1.38 (1.01) and 1.50 (1.05), respectively. The relative size of 
transactions acquiring private targets was significantly smaller than the relative size of 
transactions acquiring public targets. According to the comparisons of market value 
and transaction value, larger companies tended to acquire larger overseas public 
targets, and smaller companies tend to acquire smaller overseas private targets. This 
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result is consistent with the entire sample 
 
To summarize, Table 3.6 indicates that transactions acquiring private targets created 
significantly higher short-term returns; this result is consistent with hypothesis of 
Chapter 3. Although these transactions occurred with smaller companies that had 
limited capital and liquidity to buy public companies, smaller companies are more 
active in business and address growth needs. Higher ROE and ROA also support this 
finding. This result explains why there are more transactions to acquire private 
companies. Larger companies have stronger financial performance and capital-raising 
capability, which encourages them to acquire foreign public firms. 
 
3.4.2.4 Other Countries 
Table 3.7 demonstrates summary statistics for entire sample and univariate 
comparison between choosing public and private target firms in other countries. In the 
sample, 8% of target firms were publicly listed although more transactions occurred 
with non-public firms (92% of the sample).  
 
[Insert Table 3.7 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 3.7 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese acquirer companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
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acquiring public targets was -0.26% (t=-2.14) and -0.12% (t=-1.82), respectively; the 
mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquiring private targets was 2.01% 
(t=2.67) and 0.94% (t=2.26), respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets 
underperformed transactions acquiring private targets by -2.26% (t=2.45) on average. 
The mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions acquiring public targets was -0.66% 
(t=-2.58) and -0.38% (t=-2.29), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for 
transactions acquiring private targets was 2.71% (t=2.84) and 1.49% (t=2.47), 
respectively. Transactions acquiring public targets underperformed transactions 
acquiring private targets by -2.37% (t=2.85) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.7 compares acquirer characteristics of transactions acquiring 
public and non-public targets in other countries. The panel clearly identifies the 
differences between those two types of companies in financial performance. First, 
companies acquiring public targets had higher debt levels. Second, the companies 
acquiring private targets had better earning capacity with slightly higher ROA but 
lower ROE. Third, the companies acquiring public targets had much higher P/E 
valuation in the Chinese stock market. Fourth, the companies acquiring private targets 
had much higher EBITDA and EBITDA/share, indicating better financial and 
operational performance. Finally, the companies acquiring public targets had much 
higher total assets but much lower sales, which may explain why companies acquiring 
public targets are experiencing greater business growth. Overall, the differences in 
leverage, ROE, ROA, P/E, EBITDA, EBITDA/share, total assets and sales were 
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significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.7 indicates characteristics of transactions acquiring public and 
non-public targets in other countries. The mean and median of market value for 
acquirer companies acquiring public targets were much higher than the acquirer 
companies acquiring private targets. The value of transactions for acquiring public 
targets was significantly higher than the value of transactions for acquiring private 
targets. The mean and median of relative size for transactions financed with cash and 
non-cash were 0.91 (1.03) and 1.99 (1.69), respectively. The relative size of 
transactions acquiring private targets was significantly smaller than the relative size of 
transactions acquiring public targets. According to the comparisons of market value 
and transaction value, therefore, larger companies tended to acquire larger overseas 
public targets, and smaller companies tended to acquire smaller overseas private 
targets. This result is consistent with the entire sample. 
 
To summarize, Table 3.7 indicates that transactions acquiring private targets created 
significantly higher short-term returns. This result is consistent with hypothesis of 
Chapter 3. Although these transactions occurred with smaller companies that had 
limited capital and liquidity to buy public companies, smaller companies were more 
active in business and addressing growth needs. The higher sales also supported this 
finding. This result explains why there were more transactions to acquire private 
companies. Larger companies had stronger financial performance and capital-raising 
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capability, which encouraged them to acquire foreign public firms. Overall, excepting 
Pan-European transactions, the other three areas of transactions had generally similar 
results. 
 
3.4.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 3.8 illustrates the results of short-term regression analysis. The dependent 
variables were the CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] of Chinese public bidding companies. 
The key explanatory variable was the public status of target firms. The public status 
included overseas public target firms, and the rest were non-public, which included 
private, joint venture, and subsidiary. 
 
[Insert Table 3.8 here] 
 
The CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] indicate that public targets are significantly negative, 
approximately -0.49% and -0.73% each, compared with the entireprivate sample. This 
result indicated a negative relation between market response before and after an 
acquisition announcement in public firm targets. The control variables, listed in Table 
3.8, included target nations, acquirer financial performance and different target 
industries. The results also indicated that when a target was from developed countries 
or was in finance, technology, real estate or the retail industry, the CAR was 
significantly positive. The results were also significantly negative when the acquirer 
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had a high leverage ratio, high return on equity and high market value. This result 
indicated that larger firms performed worse when acquiring large overseas public 
companies; the results for private firm targets were more favourable, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1 in this chapter. This result is consistent with Chang 
(1998), Draper and Paudyal (2006) in the U.K. market, and Da Silva Rosa et al. 
(2004). Fuller et al. (2002) tested samples of firms that made five or more acquisitions 
in 1990s for which abnormal return were higher for firm acquiring private firm or 
subsidiaries than for firm acquiring public firm. It is more difficult to acquire public 
companies because of the strong competition in the stock market. Public target 
companies have stronger negotiating power, which causes the bidder company to pay 
a higher premium in the transactions. This may result in a negative market reaction to 
short-term returns. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
To summarize, this chapter reviewed existing literature and identified some empirical 
evidence regarding cross-border M&As of public Chinese firms. Chinese public 
companies were rewarded with a higher return when acquiring private firms. Previous 
studies indicated that M&As transactions did generate more return for bidder firms 
when acquiring private firms. This dissertation identified little evidence consistent 
with other studies. The Chinese cross-border M&As market only became more active 
after 2007. This thesis completed and updated research in this field. Therefore, this 
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thesis may be an essential component in updating the empirical research as evidence 
of current validity. The outcomes of the research are more specific to the Chinese 
M&As markets, which is the most active emerging market globally. This dissertation 
has explored the empirical evidence to examine relevant principles and theories. In 
addition, in the investor structure difference in China, over 90% of investors are 
individuals, which causes more volatility. The result may be different when compared 
with U.S. and European or other developed markets. 
 
The results of this paper demonstrate that cross-border transactions traded with 
private firms brought higher premiums to Chinese bidder companies because the 
stock prices of public targets responded to the announcement quickly; buyers 
normally tend to pay a higher premium. Private targets had no such issues during 
transactions. The Chinese government also encourages local companies going aboard 
to utilize techniques and resources. In the regional analysis, only the European market 
realized a lower return when acquiring private targets although the returns in the U.S. 
market were also negative, which is consistent with the results of Chapter 2. The 
transactions in other countries contributed the highest returns, and the returns for the 
buyer who acquired a public target were significantly negative. 
 
There has been little research on targets‟ public status in M&As transactions; however, 
the details of these transactions tend to be confidential. It may also be difficult to reflect 
all relevant factors in data collection, which is why this dissertation focused on listed 
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companies. In fact, over 80% of transactions occurred with private companies, and to 
acquire a public target is difficult. The author attempted to find Chinese evidence in this 
field to demonstrate this theory. 
 
Nevertheless, as stated above, access to information and data collection remain 
difficult, preventing a complete observation in this area. In the Chinese cross-border 
M&As market, majority of transactions are traded by private companies. Their 
investor information is also confidential. The long-term validity also requires 
measurement and observation. 
 
The hypotheses were all validated and, according to the empirical results, are quite 
significant. The significant empirical results adapted to explain the practices and 
effective findings also support this topic. This dissertation selected an event study to 
observe and gather the abnormal return in both the pre- and post-announcement 
periods of M&As. The time frame also significantly affected the results. The author 
will select a longer period in the future to produce better and more accurate results. In 
addition, the author will continue to work in the institutional investment field, 
enabling him to access more confidential information. Additional years of working 
experience will engender more comprehensive and underlying information to develop 
new theories and conduct empirical analysis. 
  
198 
 
Tables 
Table 3.1. Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample 
This table summarizes the primary characteristics of merger transactions in the entire sample of Chinese acquirers. The sample comprised 465 completed or uncompleted 
M&As transactions in the cross-border market from 2002 to 2016 in which all acquirers were listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and all targets 
were worldwide companies (excluding China), either public or private. The first column lists the number or transactions announced year by year from 2002 to 2016. The 
second column lists the total value of the transactions by year from 2002 to 2016 in USD millions. The third column categorizes the acquirers according to public status. The 
public refers to companies that are listed on the stock exchange, and non-public refers to company that are private, subsidiaries, joint ventures or government-owned. The 
fourth column reports the results of the OLS regressions of the acquirer‟s short-term performance for the entire sample year by year. The sample included all M&A 
cross-border transactions in which the acquirers were listed companies in the Chinese market from the Thomson One Banker (SDC) transactions database during 2002 to 
2016. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistics. 
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Full   Total   Target Public Status   CARs 
Year 
All 
Sample 
  
Value of 
Transaction ($mil.) 
  Public Non-public 
  
CAR [-2, 2] CAR [-5, 5] 
                Mean t-value Mean t-value 
2002 5   394.00    2 3   0.0610  (1.40) 0.0730* (1.81) 
2003 4   227.98    1 3   0.0154* (1.78) 0.0393** (2.36) 
2004 7   80.66    1 6   -0.0211  (-1.10) -0.0222  (-1.89) 
2005 5   54.35    3 2   -0.0079  (-1.22) -0.0109  (-1.25) 
2006 10   4,497.08    3 7   0.0182* (1.81) 0.0423*** (2.63) 
2007 23   10,288.30    4 19   -0.0546*** (-2.47) -0.1104** (-2.02) 
2008 34   4,639.58    10 24   -0.0637*** (-2.48) -0.0746** (-2.02) 
2009 29   3,044.09    8 21   0.0163*** (2.68) 0.0941*** (2.88) 
2010 37   5,461.94    9 28   -0.0161  (-1.40) -0.0172  (-1.47) 
2011 33   1,282.28    6 27   0.0240*** (2.51) 0.0262*** (2.51) 
2012 46   2,908.47    7 39   0.0252*** (2.29) 0.0261*** (2.98) 
2013 47   6,622.70    5 42   0.0455*** (2.74) 0.0635*** (2.78) 
2014 40   6,579.51    5 35   0.0169* (1.89) 0.0632** (2.28) 
2015 80   6,349.93    11 69   0.0111  (1.01) 0.0116  (1.64) 
2016 65   4,792.63    7 58   0.0121  (1.17) 0.0183  (1.62) 
SUM 465   57,223.48    82 383           
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics for the Acquirer and Target Sectors and Regions 
Panel A reports the number and proportion of acquirers in 12 industry sectors. Panel B reports the 
number and proportion of targets in 12 industry sectors. Panel C reports the number and proportion of 
targets in 4 regional distributions. The region of North America is a continent entirely within the 
Northern Hemisphere and nearly entirely within the Western Hemisphere. The region of Pan-Europe is 
a continent that comprises the westernmost portion of Eurasia. Europe is bordered by the Arctic Ocean 
to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea to the south and includes Russia. 
The region of Asia-Pacific is the portion of the world in or near the Western Pacific Ocean. It typically 
includes much of East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia. The region of other countries 
includes countries worldwide but not in North America, Pan-Europe or Asia-Pacific. For a list of the 
countries involved with the sample, please see Appendix 2.2. 
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Panel A         
Number of Deals Percentage% Acquirer Industry Sector 
21 4.52% Consumer Products and Services 
45 9.68% Energy and Power 
49 10.54% Financials 
22 4.73% Healthcare 
63 13.55% High Technology 
112 24.09% Industrials  
81 17.42% Materials  
8 1.72% Media and Entertainment 
7 1.51% Real Estate 
7 1.51% Retail 
37 7.96% Consumer Staples  
13 2.80% Telecommunications 
465 100.00%       
          
Panel B         
Number of Deals Percentage% Target Industry Sector 
28 6.02% Consumer Products and Services 
44 9.46% Energy and Power 
72 15.48% Financials 
26 5.59% Healthcare 
59 12.69% High Technology 
92 19.78% Industrials  
77 16.56% Materials  
7 1.51% Media and Entertainment 
3 0.65% Real Estate 
10 2.15% Retail 
31 6.67% Consumer Staples  
16 3.44% Telecommunications 
465 100.00%       
          
Panel C         
Number of Deals Percentage% Target Nation 
101 21.72% North America 
136 29.25% Pan Europe 
189 40.65% Asia-Pacific 
39 8.39% Others 
465 100.00%       
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Table 3.3. Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample of Transactions Bid on by Public and Private Firms 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of all countries targeting cross-border transactions; the target firms were public and private firms. Panel A presents 
acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 11-day 
market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over total 
capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return on 
assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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All Countries All Deals Public-target (P) Non-public Target (N) Difference (P) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 0.42%*** 0.33%** 465 0.04%* 0.02%* 82 0.50%** 0.36%*** 383 -0.46%** (2.07) -0.34%** (2.03) 
 
(2.34) (2.16) 
 
(1.89) (1.90) 
 
(2.02) (2.52) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 0.46%*** 0.32%** 465 0.09%** 0.07%** 82 0.53%** 0.55%*** 383 -0.44%** (2.05) -0.48%** (2.14) 
 
(2.41) (2.31) 
 
(2.03) (2.01) 
 
(2.08) (2.88) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 48.54 47.89 465 56.87 55.20 82 46.75 46.55 383 10.11* (1.90) 8.65* (1.87) 
ROE 12.95 11.75 465 13.07 12.28 82 12.93 11.89 383 0.14*** (2.41) 0.40*** (2.51) 
ROA 7.92 7.00 465 6.41 5.29 82 8.24 7.33 383 -1.83* (1.91) -2.03 (-1.72) 
P/E 41.23 32.06 465 37.81 23.60 82 41.97 33.39 383 -4.15*** (2.36) -9.79** (-1.97) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 46.39 30.45 465 114.62 71.18 82 31.79 22.57 383 82.84 (1.52) 48.61 (0.00) 
EBITDA/share 0.87 0.67 465 0.87 0.62 82 0.87 0.67 383 0.00** (2.10) -0.04** (2.17) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 606.10 147.27 465 1,224.55 253.03 82 473.69 125.67 383 750.86 (1.50) 127.36** (2.01) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 145.04 151.86 465 516.52 276.96 82 65.51 32.79 383 451.01 (1.50) 244.18** (2.09) 
Relative Size 1.60 1.32 465 1.78 0.57 82 1.57 0.73 383 0.21*** (2.34) -0.17*** (2.41) 
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Table 3.4. Summary Statistics for the North American Sample of Transactions Bid on by Public and Private Firms 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of North American targeting cross-border transactions; the target firms were public and private firms. Panel A 
presents acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 
11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return 
on assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
 
  
205 
 
North America All Deals Public-target (P) Non-public Target (N) Difference (P) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] -0.99%* -1.06%* 101 -1.88%* -1.23%* 18 -0.80%*** -0.21%*** 83 -1.08%*** (2.68) -1.01%*** (2.04) 
 
(-1.77) (-1.95) 
 
(-1.95) (-1.79) 
 
(-2.69) (-2.67) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] -1.57%* -1.78%** 101 -2.56%*** -1.87%* 18 -1.35%*** -0.72%*** 83 -1.21%*** (2.87) -1.16%*** (2.73) 
 
(-1.84) (-2.18) 
 
(-2.24) (-1.97) 
 
(-2.96) (-2.85) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 41.25 44.95 101 45.60 48.51 18 40.30 43.54 83 5.30* (1.88) 4.97 (1.73) 
ROE 11.63 10.84 101 9.65 7.83 18 12.06 11.41 83 -2.40* (1.85) -3.58* (1.95) 
ROA 7.89 6.75 101 5.83 3.67 18 8.34 7.33 83 -2.51* (1.76) -3.67* (1.89) 
P/E 63.83 38.75 101 42.86 24.64 18 68.37 4.08 83 -25.52** (1.95) 20.56** (2.06) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 14.94 14.04 101 38.03 24.43 18 9.93 5.11 83 28.10* (1.91) 19.31** (2.16) 
EBITDA/share 0.73 0.63 101 0.59 0.44 18 0.76 0.63 83 -0.17* (1.80) -0.19* (1.88) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 182.15 150.17 101 514.85 389.33 18 110.00 51.65 83 404.85 (1.50) 337.69*** (2.42) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 101.70 104.00 101 346.90 54.69 18 48.52 10.00 83 298.37 (1.51) 44.69** (2.25) 
Relative Size 0.67 0.69 101 0.37 0.53 18 0.74 1.58 83 -0.37** (2.14) -1.06*** (-2.41) 
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Table 3.5.Summary Statistics for the Pan-European Sample of Transactions Bid on by Public and Private Firms 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Pan-European targeting cross-border transactions; the target firms were public and private firms. Panel A 
presents acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 
11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return 
on assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Pan Europe All Deals Public-target (P) Non-public Target (N) Difference (P) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 1.17%*** 0.80%** 136 1.40%** 1.22%*** 19 1.13%* 0.78%* 117 0.27%* (1.77) 0.44%* (1.82) 
 
(2.44) (2.22) 
 
(2.33) (2.53) 
 
(1.79) (1.84) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 1.34%*** 0.88%** 136 2.00%*** 1.82%*** 19 1.23%* 0.93%* 117 0.76%* (1.85) 0.89%* (1.92) 
 
(2.53) (2.32) 
 
(2.71) (2.81) 
 
(1.97) (1.88) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 49.07 49.93 136 68.49 64.28 19 45.92 46.27 117 22.58** (2.33) 18.01*** (2.42) 
ROE 14.23 12.56 136 16.95 16.48 19 13.79 12.14 117 3.17* (1.82) 4.34* (1.76) 
ROA 8.46 7.70 136 5.85 4.17 19 8.88 7.86 117 -3.04* (1.78) -3.69* (1.94) 
P/E 38.39 29.23 136 31.79 16.55 19 39.46 30.80 117 -7.67** (2.11) -14.24 (1.61) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 93.59 72.37 136 253.25 99.32 19 67.66 32.94 117 185.60 (1.54) 66.38 (1.46) 
EBITDA/share 0.97 0.62 136 1.11 0.53 19 0.95 0.67 117 0.16** (2.03) -0.14* (1.75) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 1,291.51 633.90 136 2,625.80 1,074.64 19 1,074.83 427.36 117 1,550.97 (1.64) 647.28 (1.63) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 259.05 119.63 136 1,524.86 566.95 19 53.49 15.26 117 1471.38** (2.17) 551.69** (2.03) 
Relative Size 2.38 1.87 136 4.11 2.44 19 2.10 0.91 117 2.01** (2.02) 1.52*** (2.41) 
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Table 3.6. Summary Statistics for the Asia-Pacific Sample of Transactions Bid on by Public and Private Firms 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Asia-Pacific targeting cross-border transactions; the target firms were public and private firms. Panel A presents 
acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 11-day 
market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over total 
capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return on 
assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Asia-Pacific All Deals Public-target (P) Non-public Target (N) Difference (P) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 0.35%** 0.26%* 189 0.27% 0.20%* 42 0.37%** 0.33%*** 147 -0.10%* (1.95) -0.13%** (2.06) 
 
(2.08) (1.79) 
 
(1.74) (1.78) 
 
(2.12) (2.38) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 0.49%** 0.42%** 189 0.43%** 0.44%** 42 0.51%** 0.38%*** 147 -0.08%* (2.00) 0.07%** (2.16) 
 
(2.24) (2.13) 
 
(2.03) (2.08) 
 
(2.25) (2.88) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 51.39 49.60 189 56.40 56.57 42 49.96 48.55 147 6.44 (1.61) 8.01* (1.78) 
ROE 12.51 12.48 189 12.66 11.72 42 12.46 12.54 147 0.19*** (2.45) -0.82 (1.51) 
ROA 7.35 6.54 189 6.88 5.45 42 7.49 6.81 147 -0.61** (2.02) -1.36*** (2.59) 
P/E 35.61 27.42 189 38.27 27.42 42 34.85 28.40 147 3.43 (1.55) -0.98 (1.53) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 38.42 33.93 189 92.34 47.01 42 23.01 11.62 147 69.33*** (2.68) 35.40** (2.31) 
EBITDA/share 0.86 0.68 189 0.91 0.74 42 0.85 0.68 147 0.06** (2.24) 0.06** (2.28) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 458.77 245.46 189 975.01 680.01 42 311.27 215.43 147 663.74 (1.50) 464.58** (2.07) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 112.41 74.45 189 165.07 81.63 42 97.37 49.12 147 67.69 (1.66) 32.51* (1.78) 
Relative Size 1.48 1.63 189 1.38 1.01 42 1.50 1.05 147 -0.12*** (2.44) -0.04*** (2.41) 
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Table 3.7. Summary Statistics for the Other Countries Sample of Transactions Bid on by Public and Private Firms 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of other countries targeting cross-border transactions; the target firms were public and private firms. Panel A 
presents acquirer short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 
11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROA is measured as return 
on assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement. EBIDA/share is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by number of shares the last trading day before the announcement. Panel C reports 
transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in 
all sample, cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the 
differences between cash-financed transactions and non-cash-financed transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return 
different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Other Countries All Deals Public-target (P) Non-public Target (N) Difference (P) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 1.83%*** 1.66%** 39 -0.26%** -0.12%* 3 2.01%*** 0.94%** 36 -2.26%*** (2.45) -1.06%** (2.30) 
 
(2.55) (2.05) 
 
(-2.14) (-1.82) 
 
(2.67) (2.26) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 2.45%*** 1.88%** 39 -0.66%*** -0.38%** 3 2.71%*** 1.49%*** 36 -3.37%*** (2.85) -1.87%*** (2.68) 
 
(2.99) (2.10) 
 
(-2.58) (-2.29) 
 
(2.84) (2.47) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 51.72 51.35 39 57.30 62.20 3 51.25 51.35 36 6.05*** (2.18) 10.85* (1.75) 
ROE 14.10 12.77 39 14.81 15.16 3 14.04 12.59 36 0.77*** (2.40) 2.58 (1.58) 
ROA 8.86 8.53 39 6.97 10.40 3 9.02 8.46 36 -2.04*** (2.35) 1.95* (1.80) 
P/E 19.89 16.05 39 39.21 55.32 3 18.28 15.77 36 20.92 (1.51) 39.55* (1.82) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 1.94 1.75 39 8.09 19.05 3 1.42 19.49 36 6.67** (2.04) -0.44 (1.71) 
EBITDA/share 0.94 0.73 39 0.61 0.41 3 0.97 0.74 36 -0.36* (1.98) -0.34** (2.09) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 27.84 16.39 39 101.74 41.42 3 21.68 13.47 36 80.06 (1.51) 27.95* (1.81) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 17.81 13.17 39 68.34 88.34 3 13.60 5.75 36 54.73 (1.51) 82.58* (1.75) 
Relative Size 1.90 1.79 39 0.91 1.03 3 1.99 1.69 36 -1.07** (2.22) -0.67*** (-2.41) 
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Table 3.8 OLS Regressions of Acquirer Short-Term Performance 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of acquirer short-term performance for the entire 
sample. In these models, this chapter regresses acquirer CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] against a number 
of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variable is public status (Public). The public dummy 
variable equals 1 if the target is a publicly listed firm; the dummy variable equals 0 if the target is not a 
publicly listed firm. For transaction characteristics, other control variables include diversification and 
nation. The diversification variable equals 1 if the acquirer and target were classified as being in the 
same industry; the dummy variable equals 0 if the acquirer and target are not classified as being in the 
same industry. The nation variable equals 1 if the target is from a developed market; the dummy 
variable equals 0 if the target is from an emerging market. For firm characteristics, other control 
variables include the proportion of top 10 shareholders and the proportion of largest shareholder. 
Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at fiscal year-end before the announcement. ROE 
is measured as return on equity at t fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as price 
to earnings ratio at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnSize is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnAsset is the natural 
logarithm of total assets measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnSales is the natural 
logarithm of total sales measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. For industry sector 
characteristics, other control variables included 12 different industries. Industry1 dummy equals 1 if the 
bidding firm was classified in the sector of Financials. Industry2 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm 
was classified in the sector of Consumer Products and Services. Industry3 dummy equals 1 if the 
bidding firm was classified in the sector of Consumer Staples. Industry4 dummy equals 1 if the bidding 
firm was classified in the sector of Energy and Power. Industry5 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm 
was classified in the sector of Healthcare. Industry6 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified 
in the sector of High Technology. Industry7 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the 
sector of Industrials. Industry8 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of 
Materials. Industry9 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified as the sector of Media and 
Entertainment. Industry10 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Real 
Estate. Industry11 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Retail. Industry12 
dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Telecommunications. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ 
represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, 
based on one-tail t statistic. 
 
    CAR [-2, 2]   CAR [-5, 5] 
          
Public   -0.4910***   -0.7326*** 
    (-3.13)   (-3.97) 
Diversification   -0.0802    -0.0986  
    (-1.07)   (-1.14) 
Nation   0.2496***   0.2867*** 
    (2.43)   (2.56) 
Top 10   0.1298    0.1667  
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    (1.31)   (1.67) 
Top 1   0.0766    0.0832  
    (1.01)   (1.06) 
Leverage   -0.2412**   -0.3110** 
    (-2.27)   (-2.31) 
ROE   -0.2406***   -0.3211*** 
    (-2.38)   (-2.64) 
PE   0.0869    0.0951  
    (1.09)   (1.15) 
LnSize   -0.1943**   -0.1962** 
    (-2.21)   (-2.31) 
LnAsset   0.1538    0.1626  
    (1.59)   (1.64) 
LnSales   0.1650    0.1693  
    (1.68)   (1.72) 
Industry1   0.2811***   0.3532*** 
    (2.47)   (2.95) 
Industry2   0.0889    0.0903  
    (1.05)   (1.11) 
Industry3   0.1236    0.1534  
    (1.47)   (1.61) 
Industry4   0.1682    0.1819  
    (1.65)   (1.73) 
Industry5   0.1584    0.1738  
    (1.68)   (1.73) 
Industry6   0.2495**   0.3220*** 
    (2.35)   (2.65) 
Industry7   0.1306    0.1432  
    (1.24)   (1.29) 
Industry8   0.1303    0.1307  
    (1.17)   (1.18) 
Industry9   0.0910    0.0979  
    (1.07)   (1.13) 
Industry10   0.1948*   0.2556** 
    (1.92)   (2.29) 
Industry11   0.2728***   0.2996*** 
    (2.65)   (2.79) 
Industry12   0.1353    0.1397  
    (1.49)   (1.51) 
Constant   0.1987    0.2503  
    (2.17)   (2.34) 
N   465   465 
R Square   0.161    0.229  
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Adjusted R Square   0.153    0.213  
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Appendix 
Appendix 3.1. Definition of Control Variables 
The table below defines control variables in the regressions of the chapter. The definition of each variable is presented in the table. Panels A, B and C present transaction 
characteristics, company characteristics and industry sectors, respectively. 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Transaction Characteristics 
Cash Dummy variable equals 1 if the deal is fully paid by cash; dummy variable equals 0 if the deal is not fully paid by cash. 
Diversification 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the acquirer and target are classified as the same industry; dummy variable equals 0 if the acquirer and target are not 
classified as the same industry. 
Nation Dummy variable equals 1 if the target is from developed market; dummy variable equals 0 if the target is from emerging market. 
Panel B: Company Characteristics 
Top 10 The proportion of top 10 shareholders. 
Top 1 The proportion of largest shareholder. 
Leverage Total debt over total capital. 
ROE Return on equity. 
PE Price to Earnings 
Lnsize The logarithm of the acquirer market value at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Lnasset The logarithm of the acquirer total asset at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Lnsales The logarithm of the acquirer sales revenue at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
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Panel C: Industry Sector 
Industry 1 The acquirer is classified by Financials (FINANCE). 
Industry 2 The acquirer is classified by Consumer Products and Services (CPS). 
Industry 3 The acquirer is classified by Consumer Staples (STAPLES). 
Industry 4 The acquirer is classified by Energy and Power (ENERGY). 
Industry 5 The acquirer is classified by Healthcare (HEALTH). 
Industry 6 The acquirer is classified by High Technology (HT). 
Industry 7 The acquirer is classified by Industrials (IND). 
Industry 8 The acquirer is classified by Materials (MATERLS). 
Industry 9 The acquirer is classified by Media and Entertainment (MEDIA). 
Industry 10 The acquirer is classified by Real Estate (REALEST). 
Industry 11 The acquirer is classified by Retail (RETAIL). 
Industry 12 The acquirer is classified by Telecommunications (TELECOM). 
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Appendix 3.2. Definition of Regions of Entire Sample 
The region of North America is a continent entirely within the Northern Hemisphere and nearly completely within the Western Hemisphere. The Region of Pan-Europe is a 
continent that comprises the westernmost portion of Eurasia. Europe is bordered by the Arctic Ocean to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea 
to the south and includes Russia. The region of Asia-Pacific is the portion of the world in or near the Western Pacific Ocean. It typically includes much of East Asia, South 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia. The region of other countries is countries worldwide but not in North America, Pan-Europe and Asia-Pacific. The group of countries is 
the sample of transactions where the target firms are located. 
 
Target Nation Group of Countries 
North America British Virgin, Canada, Cayman Islands, Dominican Rep, United States 
Pan Europe 
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland-Rep, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Russian Fed, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom 
Asia-Pacific 
Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Macau, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
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Others 
Argentina, Brazil, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Dem Rep Congo, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan 
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4. Chapter IV: The Chinese Target of Cross-border 
Takeovers 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates Chinese listed companies acquired by overseas companies. 
The control variable was whether the bidder firm is a financial institution. In the 
Chinese M&As market, more than half of transactions were conducted by foreign 
financial companies. 
 
Antoniou et al. (2007) reached conclusions that were opposite to Fuller et al. (2002), 
who claimed that acquiring private and subsidiary companies created value for the 
bidding companies. There are dependable assumptions regarding bidder shareholder 
property effects that cannot be identified in short-term event studies. There are many 
studies that measure stock returns received by targets and acquiring companies before 
and after the acquiring announcement. Several studies observed that target firms‟ 
shareholder obtain positive and significant abnormal return in a short period before 
and after the acquiring announcements. The predictable result is high premiums for 
the target companies. Clearly, the shareholders normally benefit from mergers. This 
thesis identifies the difference between financial institutional bidders and other 
industry buyers. 
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The existing literature contains observable disagreements on whether M&As activity 
creates value for shareholders of acquirer companies in financial industry. Overall, 
initial motivations of M&As activity were to increase the profitability of the bidder 
firms to create more value for their shareholders. The bidder firms adopted different 
methods to obtain as much interest as possible from the target firms. Thus, 
theoretically, M&As activities must generate more interest for the shareholders of 
bidder firms; that is the most important benefit. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence 
indicated some different findings. Negative returns were identified, particularly in 
pre-merger returns. In addition, during the period of financial crisis in 2008, there 
were large amounts of value destruction connecting the M&As in the financial 
industry. Consequently, some studies stated that M&As activities were more 
beneficial to the interests of senior managers than shareholders. For example, Gorton 
and Rosen (1995) reported that in M&As transactions in financial industry, the 
interests of managers became the primary motive, ignoring the interests of 
shareholders.  
 
The empirical evidence of long-run abnormal return for shareholders in financial 
industry bidder firms remains inconsistent. Consequently, post-M&As transaction, 3 
to 5 years or even longer, value creation would normally exist. Because of the 
empirical evidence in the existing literature, the outcomes may be separated into 2 
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situations, the positive and negative long-term abnormal returns. There was a positive 
abnormal return in the majority of cases; nevertheless, numerous studies indicated that 
the negative abnormal return is more typical in financial industry bidder firms 
(DeLong, 2003). 
 
Motivated by the above-mentioned facts and issues, this chapter examines short-term 
performance analysis. The dependent variables were CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] of 
Chinese public target firms. The key explanatory variable was whether the overseas 
acquirer was a financial company. Of 413 transactions, 62% of acquirers were from 
the financial industry. This study compared the findings with the existing literature to 
assess whether M&As transactions generated benefits for the shareholders of financial 
industry bidder firms. The research also examined whether the results applied to 
China‟s market, particularly when the target was a listed Chinese financial company. 
The research adopted the event study method and empirical analysis to determine 
whether empirical evidence supports previous studies. The findings will hopefully 
create a reasonable contribution to decrease the variations among empirical and 
theoretical theories. The findings may also make more efficient contributions to 
research on the financial industry. 
 
This research supports to M&As literatures in following respects. First, the literature 
on financial institutional investors is quite limited. In this chapter, the author realized 
that over 60% of transactions were made by overseas financial investors. Because of 
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the ownership structures of these bidders, only limited information is obtainable from 
bidder prospects. The author chose to begin from their Chinese public targets. This is 
a unique angle for cross-border M&As research. 
 
Second, because there are regional and industrial studies in this thesis, it may also 
provide advice to overseas investors when they consider acquiring a Chinese target. 
The thesis introduces China‟s M&As market environment, regulations and statistical 
data of historical transactions. China‟s opening-up policies sought to attract offshore 
corporations to invest in China; however, investigation remains difficult. A better 
understanding of China‟s market and policies helps to complete transactions. 
 
Third, this paper supports the shareholders of Chinese companies in identifying 
overseas buyers and financial investors. To become an overseas buyer‟s target is a sort 
of reward for a firm‟s business and operations. Of course, a hostile takeover is not 
welcome; however, financial or strategic investors should be encouraged by Chinese 
companies. Optimizing the ownership structure and improving management or 
financial support are all shareholder benefits. This thesis attempts to provide academic 
support in this field. 
 
4.1.1 Market Background 
In the rapidly growing global economy in recent decades, there were inside and 
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outside approaches to achieving company development (Langford and Male, 2001). 
The inside approach was to invest in capital to establish a fresh firm whereas the 
outside approach was to create a blend by contractual covenants. One of the core 
outside approaches to reorganizing a company is M&As. Moreover, M&As were 
recognized as a common approach to obtain target firms (Choi and Russel 2004). 
Theoretically, M&As are the most effective approach. They help firms obtain more 
resources, increase revenues and cut costs. M&As are the combining of 2 or more 
separate firms that may belong to the same or different industries. The relation 
between these 2 or more firms is that a company may be completely taken over by 
another different firm or a similar firm. The ultimate purposes of M&As are normally 
defined as strategic decisions or for purely financial investment. The target of 
transactions with various issues is to achieve diversification of business or investment 
(Müller-Stewens et al., 2010). 
 
To achieve a greater market share and more competitive opportunities, all firms chase 
the maximization of profits by diverse strategies. In capital markets, M&As have 
become the key long-term strategy. Beginning in the 20th century, M&As occurred in 
different sectors worldwide and involved numerous academics and policy-makers 
(Bertrand and Betschinger, 2011). In particular, in recent decades, increasingly more 
M&As transactions occurred in multiple emerging market such as China and India. In 
2010, a total of 3 trillion U.S. dollars were connected with 40,983 transactions; 923.5 
billion and 14,700 transactions were associated with emerging markets (Bertrand and 
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Betschinger, 2011).  
 
In China since 2004, M&As activities increased quickly and ranked 4th worldwide. In 
2010, 622 M&As transactions occurred, an increase of 111.6% over 2009. Disclosed 
merger funds were valued at more than 34.8 billion dollars. According to this report, 
Chinese transactions accounted for 10% of worldwide transactions, ranking just 
below the U.S. (Report on Foreign Investment in China, 2013). In local and 
cross-border M&As in Chinese market, it is unclear whether these transactions hold 
enhanced company performance. Cross-border M&As may have had more effects 
because firms that go abroad have access to more resources and techniques than in 
domestic markets and there is an increased probability of discovering more potential 
to enhance performance by casting off domestic market restrictions (Luo and Tun 
2007). Because of the difficult business environment in China, it is necessary to 
achieve outcomes in this field whether a company‟s performance improved through a 
M&A or did not. Nevertheless, the history and volume of M&As in China remain 
insufficient. It is also remarkable that markets worry about the potential risks and 
problems and whether transactions generate value for the economy post-merger 
(Healy, Palepu and Ruback 1990). This study endeavours to investigate whether 
M&As are able improve company performance in China. In addition, this study 
examines whether M&As assist both bidder companies and target companies. A 
purpose of this research is to identify whether the performance of Chinese listed 
companies is significantly affected by M&As. Hence, it is necessary to make the 
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above assumptions. The research examines both pre-merger and post-merger stock 
price data to directly evaluate the abnormal returns performance resulting from 
transactions. All of the investigations selected historical stock price data collected 
from the Thomson One and CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) 
database. For research design, the experience of the developed markets helped to 
explain China‟s situation, and China‟s government and companies identified potential 
risks and problems in numerous M&As transactions. Bidders and investors learned 
and grew from these transactions in legal, tax, and business areas.  
This research sought to analyse M&As using both theoretical and empirical data and 
literature to identify the features that influence company performance. The solutions 
may help bidders and targets make correct decisions and create value. Therefore, the 
literature review encompasses all factors that may involve explaining the purposes 
stated above. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Hypothesis 
Theoretically, M&As activities should generate absolute return for acquirer 
companies in the financial industry if the transactions are executed for financial 
investment rather than a management takeover. Furthermore, neoclassical profit 
theory suggests that primary motivation of M&As activities are to create value for 
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investors; in fact, this theory works better for financial institutional investors in the 
financial industry. After the financial crisis in 2007, M&As activities became more 
active because of the asset value depreciations in the market. Currently, the economic 
recovery has demonstrated its influences when measuring long-term abnormal returns. 
For example, 3 to 5 years after the announcements date of a M&A are also time 
period that the long-term financial investor seeks. 
 
In the environment of an efficient market as hypothesis, M&As activities should 
completely reflect investor expectations on both acquirer and target companies‟ stock 
prices if they are public companies. According to Fama (1970), the efficient market 
hypothesis is that stock price not only fully represents all information in the market 
but also delivers accurate information regarding the capital allocation to investors. 
Efficiency means that the abnormal returns should be effectively realized shortly after 
the M&As announcement date. Therefore, if M&As activities create value for 
acquirer companies‟ shareholders in the financial industry, the positive abnormal 
returns on stock prices should be a clear conclusion. Nevertheless, as stated above, 
this study focuses on abnormal returns for target companies and whether acquirer 
companies are in the financial industry. This is a blank area in which no research has 
previously been conducted. It is clear that target companies do gain positive abnormal 
return in M&A transactions, but what are the differences among acquirers in different 
industries? 
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Therefore, this chapter focuses on the acquirer industry effects on M&A returns for 
target firms. Three hypotheses follow: 
H1: Listed Chinese companies receive positive abnormal returns in the short term 
when they are acquired by overseas firms. 
H2: Listed Chinese companies receive positive abnormal returns in the short term 
when they are acquired by overseas financial companies. 
H3: Companies acquired by financial firms outperform companies acquired by other 
industries. 
 
The financial bidder companies in cross-border M&As transactions account for over 
60% of transactions. These hypotheses are consistent with the findings of Bajo et al. 
(2013) and Silveri (2009). The reason may be that these financial investors are 
basically unlisted first; they are not large banks, more likely private investment fund 
companies. These investors are more professional and will improve the business of 
target firms. 
 
There are a couple of reasons that Chinese target firm would receive a positive return 
upon acquisition by foreign firms. First, when a firm become an acquisition target, it 
would receive positive stock price premium from the market. Second, the target firm 
usually own good quality of asset, or good business, or considerable market share and 
client. This is sort of reward that overseas investors are able to pay attention on its 
business. Third, the target firm is not only gain capital, it also possibly receive better 
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management, financial, operational, technical support etc. The structure of 
shareholders became more diversify at the same time. Therefore, investors in the 
market would have a positive expectation in the short-time period when the transaction 
is announced. For political prospects, local government encourages overseas 
investment. 
 
4.2.2 Motivation of M&As 
There are numerous motives for M&As activities, and these motives may be changing. 
To explore the relevant theories would be valuable to deepen understanding of the 
value creations of M&As transactions and the motives behind them. Therefore, the 
literature review also involves existing theories that were extensively used to 
investigate and analyse M&As activities. 
 
In the fully competitive market environment, the neoclassical profit maximization 
theories decree that the motives of M&As must maximize the interests of shareholders 
(Anderson, 1982). In particular, theory demands that if the M&As transaction is based 
on the shareholders‟ profits of bidder firms, these firms agree to the M&A (Firth, 
1980). These M&As must create value for shareholders. To achieve this target, 
companies use diversified methods to develop their profitability, such as synergy or 
directly involving the management in target firm. Synergy is about economies of 
scales and scopes. The economy of scale is related to M&As activities that assist 
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bidder firms to enhance their productivity, thereby improving profitability. The 
economy of scope is when a company acquiring a target firm is able to increase the 
volume of products and services so that total costs decline. The empirical evidence of 
Delong (2003) highlighted that synergy is the significant aspect that creates value for 
the shareholders of bidder firms. 
 
In theory, creating value for shareholder of acquirer companies is recognized as 
primary motivator. Asquith et al. (1983) and Schipper and Thompson (1983) agreed 
that if companies announced their future strategy regarding long-term growth and 
purposes, such as M&As activity, their stock prices would quickly increase. Gregory 
(1997) believed that the reactions of stock prices reflect that the information is an 
effective indicator of value creation, which is a manner of saying that M&As 
activities create value. Nevertheless, restrictions influence these motivations involving 
M&As activities. Precisely, considering the perfectly competitive market environment, 
if these large firms are so desirous of acquiring target firms that they will bid against 
competitors, the potential benefits may vanish (Mandelker, 1974). 
 
In addition, neoclassical profits maximization theory may also clarify why M&As 
activities occur and where the profits come from. In Harford (2005), the neoclassical 
profits maximization theory precisely clarified the origins of merger waves and 
accrued more support and recognition. The theory also indicates that, theoretically, 
M&As activities can create value for shareholders of acquirer firms. 
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In fact, M&As transactions in financial industry is not able to create value for bidder 
firms and may even create value destruction. With regard to the existing empirical 
evidence of synergies and economy of scope, perhaps there is no apparent effect on 
the financial industry‟s M&As transactions. According to Rhoades (1993), analysing 
the cost savings from M&As transactions in the financial industry from 1981 to 1986 
indicated that the cost decreases generated by M&As in the financial industry did not 
appear. Moreover, M&As transactions in the financial industry occurred during a 
financial crisis, which is also a perceptible deviation. 
 
HSBC signed an agreement in 2003 to take over Household International, which was 
one of the largest financial service companies in the U.S. (Norris, 2009). HSBC 
thought that lending to subprime mortgage clients was a reasonable business practice. 
The primary motives of the transaction were that HSBC supposed it would borrow 
money at a much lower level or interest rate to offer Household International much 
higher profit margins (Lambkin and Muzellec, 2008). Nevertheless, the transaction 
was hurt by the financial crisis. During the crisis, Household International‟s 
borrowing costs grew, and its stock price fell to a seven-year low, which caused HSBS 
to suffer extreme value destruction. In 2009, HSBC had to accept defeat, and the 
majority of HSBC damage was caused by Household International. Finally, HSBC 
had to raise $18 billion capital by selling stock (Norris, 2009). 
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A comparable situation occurred with J.P. Morgan during the financial crisis. That 
company was penalized $13 billion, and 80% of the penalty was caused by the 2008 
transactions to acquire Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual (Brunnermeier, 2008). 
This case also indicated that the financial crisis revealed the risk in the financial 
industry and emphasized that the M&As transaction may have caused the value 
destruction although the primary motivation was to obtain benefits.  
 
The competition theory indicates that M&As transactions may not generate value 
growth for the shareholder of acquirer companies. The theory of maximization of 
management utility is a component of competition theory. This theory concentrates on 
growing the earnings of managers and executives instead of shareholders. Grossman 
and Hart (1980) declared that management is certainly an important influence in 
M&As transactions and that the beneficiaries of M&As transactions may not be the 
shareholders of the bidder company. The reason is that specifically in the financial 
industry, the most significant motivation of M&As decisions is not the interests of its 
shareholders; M&As transactions may not generate value for the shareholder of 
bidder companies. 
 
These problems were related to the neoclassical profit maximization theory. The 
primary view of the theory is that it may be used to analyse the motives of M&As 
activities, creating value for shareholders. Stock price movements in pre-merger and 
post-merger periods were also related to core research question of this study. 
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4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample Selection and Data Description 
These selected samples all contain M&A transactions (complete or incomplete) 
involving Chinese public companies as targets from 1994 to 2016. The primary data 
were collected from the Thomason One Banker transactions (SDC) and GTA 
(CSMAR) database. Similar to Fuller et al. (2002), the selected samples fit the 
following criteria: 
 
1. The target must be Chinese firm which is listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges.  
2. To test the hypotheses requires all announced transactions that include all Chinese 
listed firms‟ cross-border transactions. 
3. The acquirer firm may be public, private or other and must be a non-Chinese firm. 
4. The target firm must have been publicly listed for at least 1 year before and after 
the acquisition announcement. 
 
The sample began in 1994, when Chinese public companies became M&As target of 
foreign companies, until the end of 2016. There were 413 acquisition announcements 
involving Chinese listed companies as the M&As targets. 
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4.3.2 Methodologies 
For all transactions, the targets were classified into two groups and the performance of 
the targets was divided into financial and non-financial bidders acquired; these groups 
were tested separately. The target short-term performance was observed for several 
days, beginning approximately 2-5 days before acquisition announcements and ending 
approximately 2-5 days after the announcement. 
 
When all data samples were collected, testing followed Brown and Warner (1985). 
The modified markets model was applied to appraise daily abnormal return (ARs), 
which are the bidder‟s daily return minus the value-weighted stock return of Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges: 
ARi,t = Ri,t − (αt̅ + βi̅RM,t) 
Compute cumulative value of average abnormal returns of entire sample throughout 
events periods. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇
𝑁
𝑖=0
 
This equation indicates general average effects of firm's transactions of sample events 
for whole equity return. 
Abnormal returns were summarized for the periods 5 and 11 days before and after 
each acquisition announcement (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) as 
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CARi,t = ∑ (Ri.t − RM,t)
t+2,5 
t−2,5 
 
where Ri,t is the returns (i) of an individual firm at day t and RM,t is Shanghai and 
Shenzhen value-weighted stock return at day t.  
 
The specific steps of calculations are same as the 2.3.2.
8
 
 
4.3.3 Empirical Analysis 
In general, M&As activities are defined as the reorganization of 2 or more firms into 1 
firm, which may be the primary firm or a fresh firm (Weinberg and Blank, 1979). 
Some academics described M&As as a method that combines 2 firms; one survives 
and assumes all of the asset and liability of the target firm (Gaughan, 2002).  
 
There were several explanations why firms pursue M&As as a development strategy 
in corporate decisions. The four purposes of M&As are personal, market, economic 
and strategic motivations (Oduro and Agyei, 2013). Personal motivations are the 
agency problems and management over-confidence. Market motivations are a quick 
approach for the company to access a new market in diverse fields or regions by 
M&As transactions. Economic motivations are the creation of economic scales. 
                                                   
8 The result is robust by using different model, for example, Fama–French three-factor model and  Fama–French 
five-factor model 
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Strategic motivations are the strength of company strategies such as synergy effects, 
the competitive strength of a company, market dominant enhancement, and more 
resources, products and strength (Oduro and Agyei 2013). 
 
As stated above, 2 theories support the imposition of M&As, the redistribution theory 
and the value creation theory (Berkovith and Narayanan, 1993 and Vijgen, 2007). The 
agency problem and hubris theories together form the redistribution theory of M&As. 
The agency problems assume that manager and shareholder have dissimilar interest. 
Managers chase their self-interest instead of the interests of shareholders. Additionally, 
the free cash flow may be another effect on M&As activities because the cash may be 
financed as dividends to shareholders. The hubris theory states that managers and 
shareholders may have similar interests and synergies value may not be as much as 
these scholars assumed. The value was lower than incoming premiums (Roll, 1986). 
The value creation theories suggested that manager think through the interests of their 
shareholder when they plan to obtain premium value. As for economic perspective, 
there are more value in merged entity than in total of bidder and target separately 
(Vijgen, 2007). Numerous studies have indicated that the effect of M&As on 
corporate financial performance may be positive or negative. Correspondingly, 
accounting data are continuously applied to clarify the influence of M&As on changes 
in profitability of target company (Oduro and Agyei, 2013). M&As are the 
management of corporate finance. Previous studies identified several problems in 
buying or selling firms or combining or dividing firms. Firms that have experienced 
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M&As regularly anticipate rapid development in their industry regardless of the 
market. In the worldwide markets, target firms regularly expose the development of 
their asset productivity (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001). Groff et al. (2007) 
adopted the data envelopment research approach to observe whether the performance 
of hospitals improved after M&As transactions. The results indicated dramatic 
improvements from the second year after the transactions. Nevertheless, Glodberg 
(1983) investigated 20 studies for 40 years. He studied post-M&As transactions and 
concluded that a number of firms expanded their business scale although their 
performance did not improve. A number of firms even indicated that profits had 
dramatically decreased after the M&As transactions. He also observed that only the 
firm‟s shareholders were able to make a profit.  
 
As stated above, M&As may be defined as domestic M&As and cross-border M&As. 
In recent years, volume of cross-border M&As transactions has grown. This is a sign 
that the M&As activities are becoming more globalized (Dension et al., 2011). The 
integration of the two U.S. firms HP (Hewlett-Packard Company) and EDS Alumni 
(Electronic Data Systems Corporation) affected many operations that needed to 
compete worldwide and not only in the U.S. The cross-border M&As were significant 
foreign direct Investments (FDI) activities (United Nations Conference, 2006). Hence, 
the cross-border M&As always include exposure and access for companies to enter an 
overseas market or industry; this is also an approach of value creation strategy 
(Shimizu, 2004). In general, the empirical evidence demonstrates the performance of 
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diverse domestic and cross-border M&As. Mostly, the findings indicate that M&As 
activities raise the value of target firms and decline the value of bidder firms. The 
transaction may bring higher value for bidders. Nevertheless, a number of the studies 
discovered that company value decreased or was unaffected after the M&As 
transactions, which is defined as underperformance (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). In 
theory, The M&As may include synergies, economy of scales, improvement of 
operations and cost reductions. The transactions may lower costs or increase revenues; 
however, in practice, the empirical evidence demonstrates that a number of bidders 
unable to reach the goals (Ismail, Abdou and Annis 2011). There were two major 
forms of previous researches, markets measured-based research and accounting 
measured-based research. 
 
4.3.3.1 Financial Leverage 
Financial leverage is an important method of M&As. Leveraged buyouts are a type of 
transaction in which smaller companies acquire larger companies with large debt; the 
main channel of high debts is commercial bank loans and issuing bonds to raise 
sufficient funds. The process includes controlling the lack of optimism and then 
completing the split; when financial statements become better, one sells the stock to 
make profits. The bidder, the target, and the government are the participants. They 
each have their own different positions, using financial innovation to make diversified 
transactions and develop depth. Whether operating performance in fact improves after 
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the transaction remains a factor that requires study. 
 
Financial leverage may be why cash acquisitions outperform stock acquisitions and 
may be related to monitoring the debt. Ghosh and Jain (2000) showed that financial 
leverage affects the operating performance of M&As. Financial leverage may increase 
following transactions because cash transactions are more likely to increase debt than 
are stock transactions. This may explain why more debt leads to better investment 
decisions. To assess the different effects of payment on change in post-acquisition 
cash flow, those authors used the change in regression in relative performance testing. 
Methods of payment from 1981 to 1995 have been analysed regarding the 
performance of cash, stock, and a mixture of both. M&As are classified by whether 
bidders are related or unrelated industries to the target firms. 
 
Capital structure theory and empirical research methods generally focus on two 
aspects. First, academic researchers are more focused on the relation between capital 
structure and enterprise value. Second, academic researchers identify important 
elements of capital structure. There are two primary methods of capital structure and 
enterprise value. The first method is event study (Masulis, 1980). This method 
emphasizes the disclosure of changing information regarding financial leverage. The 
second method regards cross-sectional regression analysis (Weston, 1953). Enterprise 
value and the cost of capital are the dependent variables, and financial leverage is the 
explanatory variable. Using these variables, one constructs regression equations. The 
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studies regarding the factors of capital structure also concentrate on two aspects. One 
is to test the company issuing debt or equities by the Probit Model or the Logit Model 
(Marsh, 1982; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Hovakimian et al., 2001). Another aspect is the 
debt ratio of capital structure factors regression analysis (Titman and Roberto, 1988). 
These studies have contributed numerous findings in this field. 
 
4.3.3.2 Method of Payment 
A number of market measured-based studies demonstrated diverse findings regarding 
company performances by M&As transactions. Choi and Russell (2004) investigated 
CARs (cumulative abnormal return) of 171 deals to demonstrate improvements in 
corporate performance. They discovered that firms do not experience considerable 
growth in corporate performance following M&As transactions. The authors also 
observed that transaction time, methods of payments and target public status do not 
influence company performances. Furthermore, Andre et al. (2004) investigated 267 
M&As transactions between 1980 and 2000. For the researches, they tested 3 factors 
that may influence M&As performance: methods of payments, value of bidders, and 
cross-border and domestic transactions relating to company performances. The 
findings revealed bidders‟ significant under-performance in post-merger period. 
Nevertheless, in the researches, there are no comparisons with control groups of 
similar companies to test influences. Yook (2003) tested company performances in the 
post-merger period by EVA (Economic Value Added). Vook‟s research also observed 
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that the bidder companies experienced significant under-performance in the 
post-merger period. The findings identified 3 factors that affect M&As performance: 
methods of payment, types of acquisitions and business similarity. However, the 
research failed to identify the relation between corporate EVA and the 3 factors above. 
In response to the diverse findings of the three previous studies, Megginson et al. 
(2004) effectively identified relation between post-merger performance and effect 
factors: methods of payment, time effect, the level to which firms participated, the 
effect of bidders and the effect of merger attitudes. That study investigated samples of 
204 M&As deals from 1977 to 1996. The findings pointed out that attitudes of 
corporation affected the post-merger performance and that cash-financed transactions 
had better outcomes than stock-financed transactions. To investigate whether 
successful M&As improved corporate performance, Kling (2006) conducted a study 
in Germany and investigated the effect variables that affect M&As. This study 
observed 35 German firms and concluded that M&As positively influenced corporate 
performance. The outcomes of this study were significant because the time period 
observed was sufficiently long for long-term research. 
 
4.3.3.3 Size 
Accounting measures-based analysis may reveal more specific outcomes. Heron and 
Lie (2002) investigated 959 M&As to identify correlation between methods of 
payments, management earning and company performances. In their researches, they 
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primarily compared pre-merged firms with same-industry firms, and the study also 
compared post-merged firms. By investigating operating incomes over sales, the 
authors concluded that bidder companies outperformed controlled groups. To 
investigate influence of M&As on company performances, Yeh and Hoshino (2002) 
investigated 86 Japanese M&As transactions. The investigation focused on M&As‟ 
profitability, efficiency, and growth by observing total productivity, ROE (return on 
equity) and ROA (return on assets) to measure corporate performances. The outcomes 
indicated that M&As transactions had negative influence on corporate performances 
in Japanese markets. However, this research focused only on domestic M&As 
activities. Gugler et al. (2003) observed samples of 45,000 M&As worldwide. Their 
goal was to identify effects on corporate performance across different markets, 
regions and sectors. The outcomes were investigated by measuring sales and 
profitability. The results demonstrated that cross-border M&As and domestic M&As 
were not significantly different. The diversifications of sales and profits were tested. 
Efficiency power, which increases both sales and profits, is more successful than 
market power, which increases profits but allows sales to decline. The research has 
some disadvantages as well. The study ignores the effects of industrial changes before 
M&As transactions and focuses only on post-merger sales growth and profitability, 
not pre-merger profitability. Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) observed post-merger 
financial performances in H.K. The study investigated the relation between company 
performances and firm size, methods of payment, compensation policy and the 
industry. The sample was 162 M&As transactions over a period of 5 years, and the 
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study adopted operating cash flow return to measure performance. The results 
indicated that M&As activities may cause significant improvements in corporate 
performance for the entire sample. In addition, firm size was correlated with negative 
effects on company performances. Shimizu et al. (2004) observed that M&As may not 
improve corporate financial performance. Their researches adopted the meta-analysis 
techniques to test company performances. They observed that firm size does not affect 
financial performance. Feroz et al. (2005) selected sample of 45 M&As in the U.S.; 
their outcomes demonstrated that 82% of sample firms showed significant 
performance growth after the M&As transactions. This research adopted DEA (Data 
Envelopment Analysis) to investigate managerial efficiency effects and investigated 
combined efficiency during the post-merger period. To determine whether different 
time periods affected operating performance, Cabanda and Pajara-Pascual (2007) 
investigated Philippine firms 3 years before the M&As transaction, 3 years after the 
M&As transaction and 7 years after the M&As transaction. The study selected 
conventional accounting and financial approaches to evaluate corporate performance 
after M&As transactions. In general, the results indicated that the M&As did not 
develop corporate performances in either short-term or long-term in Philippine market. 
Another study by Mantravadi and Reddy (2008) tested the size of M&As firms. Their 
results indicated that size influences companies in the Indian market. That study used 
financial ratios to measure performance. The outcomes demonstrated positive relation 
between firms size and corporate financial performances. Kumar (2009) investigated 
30 firms in the Indian market to identify synergy effects. That study selected 
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accounting data to investigate the effects on corporate performance and concluded 
that M&A activities do not generate improvement. Ismail et al. (2010) investigated 
M&As activities among Egyptian firms. They investigated the 5 measurements of 
profitability, liquidity efficiency, cash flow position and solvency. However, their 
results indicated that M&As activities caused improvements in profitability only. 
 
4.3.3.4 Regions 
The literatures observed that M&As are generally unsuccessful in reaching goals 
when M&As occur in emerging markets such as India, the Philippines and Egypt. 
Because the volume of M&As activity in China is becoming one of the largest 
worldwide, more studies to investigate the difficulties of M&As for Chinese firms are 
necessary. Chen and Young (2009) investigated 39 M&As transactions to measure 
stock market reactions. The results demonstrated a negative relation between 
government ownership and CAR (cumulative abnormal returns). Ryu and Lee (2009) 
observed the significance of ethnic networks that may affect company performances 
in M&As transactions. Gao (2003) observed that Chinese networks may be quite an 
important factor in Chinese markets. The ethnic networks may exchange information, 
matching potential buyers and sellers in financial markets. They deliver 
recommendations for M&As activities in China based on experience and studies of 
foreign markets. Even the domestic markets in China have a limited history; thus, 
studies remain lacking in empirical evidence. However, the past 15 years have seen 
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massive amounts of historical data. Thus, although the time period may not be 
sufficiently long, the volume of transactions may be sufficient to demonstrate an 
explicable outcome. 
 
To summarize the literature, the influence of financial performance in M&As 
activities may be classified as 2 measurements, market measured-based research and 
accounting measures-based research. The influences of corporate performance on 
M&A activities were investigated by a number of previous studies. Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) observed only slight growth of abnormal returns, and a few studies 
observed a positive relation between M&As and abnormal returns. There were even 
decreases in abnormal returns after M&As in some studies, such as Kiling (2006). 
However, there are also some questionable outcomes from adopting accounting 
measures-based research. Some studies demonstrate an insignificant improvement in 
financial performance (Heron and Lie 2002). For these studies, there are an amount of 
factors that may influnce corporate performance after M&A, for example methods of 
payment (stock and cash), domestic and cross-border M&As transactions, firm size, 
time periods, the ownership structure, and ethnic networks. These factors were 
investigated in previous studies. This paper contributes to the cross-border M&As in 
China, which helped global investors and Chinese managers to understand the market 
and to make the right decisions. 
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4.3.3.5 Sectors 
Previous studies have made many contributions to M&As transactions. In this section, 
the sectors will be considered as another important factor of M&A transactions. 
Andrade et al. (2001) identified evidence of industry shock, which may help to 
explain a large volume of merger and acquisition transactions in the 1990s as well as 
in recent decades. Andrade et.al (2001) divided their study into several sections and 
noted the two most related empirical features, that mergers arise in waves and that 
mergers cluster by industries. Andrade et al. (2001) obtained data from the CRSP 
(Centre for Research in Security Prices), the NYSE (the New York stock exchange) 
and the AMEX (American Stock Exchange) during 1960s, 1980s and 1990s on both 
targets and acquirers in U.S.-based publicly traded companies. Their research first 
identified the gaps between the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s; they discovered that the 
1980s were the time of reallocations of massive assets through M&As. Those authors 
cited evidence that M&As in the 1990s most often used stock as the payment method 
and indicated that merging counterparts were normally closely related industries. 
 
However, when mergers come in waves, the industrial level is shocked, as with 
technological innovations, supply chain changes, and deregulation, which may lead to 
company restructuring. Andrade et al. (2001) assumed deregulation as a transaction 
factor to analyse because “deregulation precipitated widespread consolidation and 
restructuring of a few industries in the 1990s, frequently accomplished through 
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merger”.  
 
According to Andrade et al. (2001), value of mergers and acquisitions equalled 48% 
of non-residential gross investment, which suggests the importance of measuring 
value in both increments and destruction, which are the results of merger activities, 
and how the incremental value is allocated. The second portion of their study 
discussed the reaction of stock markets to merger announcements and long-term 
abnormal returns. First, short-window event research analysed whether merger 
activities create profitability for shareholders in either bidder or target firms. To 
explore markets responses to the M&As announcement, the three-day event window 
was considered, which is from the day prior to the mergers announcements to the day 
after. The longer events window is from several days before announcement to the end 
of the merger transaction. The results regarding merger transactions of both bidder 
and target companies on behalf of the stock market reactions exposed two types of 
estimations to measure the average returns per year. Target companies had three-day 
abnormal returns of 16%, which can increase to 24% as long as time period continues. 
Moreover, shareholders of target firms consider 16-month period to be a normal 
expected time over the 3-day event window. 
 
Those estimates for target companies indicated stable situations for decades, and 
every decade was connected to merger activities in different industries; however, they 
all had consistent abnormal returns at 16%. Andrade et al. (2001) concluded by 
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observation that merger abnormal returns were normally close to one another across 
different transactions and that target firms‟ shareholders were definitively profit 
gainers. As for bidder firms, the abnormal returns of an average of 3-day and longer 
event windows were negative, ranging from -0.7 to -3.8%. This result suggests that 
bidder firms‟ shareholders are not the receivers of benefits. 
 
Harris and Rravenscraft (1995) observed that in research-intensive industries, the 
frequency of cross-border M&As appears to be relatively higher, and both companies 
may receive benefits. Caves (1989) observed that monopolies within the industry may 
receive more benefits from international diversification. Because of different factors 
in industries such as the level of development and the business cycle, the probability 
of success of cross-border M&As in different sectors may also differ. 
 
4.3.4 Event Study 
An event study investigates the effect on a listed company‟s stock price after an 
acquisition and also measures the enterprise value change. Therefore it is necessary to 
measure the effect of the company on the event by some method. Generally, event 
studies adopt Cumulative Average Event study as a measurement; this method 
compares the company's actual income (R) when the acquisition is announced with 
normal earnings E(R), assuming no event influences the market. Then the method 
suggests abnormal returns AR, as AR = R - E(R) (Aharon et al., 2010). 
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Events study uses financial markets data to assess effect on company by specific 
economic events (Eastman et al., 2010). This method assumes that the market is 
reflecting effectively, and the event effect immediately reflects the price of the 
security. By observing relatively short-term prices of securities, the method is able to 
define the probability of the effect of a market event. However, event study has 
limitations. In a market that is at half strength, this method primarily exposes fully 
announced information and cannot constitute sufficient conditions but only a 
necessary condition in a market whose effectiveness is at half strength. Excepting 
information omissions, the event study method has some other limitations. This 
method primarily indicates results that rely on the calculation method and data 
selection of events, companies and calculations on abnormal returns (Campbell et al., 
2010). The market response is massively diverse for different events, and sometimes 
the event has no significant effect on profitability and does not represent any other 
events with identical effects (Da Graca, 2010). Therefore, in the financial market in an 
identical period, this method results in different conclusions when analysing different 
events. This is also true when calculating abnormal returns. Therefore, it is important 
to use rational models to measure the effects of acquisition events when analysing 
massive market data. 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Summary Statistics 
4.4.1.1 Entire Sample 
Table 4.1 indicates summary statistics for the entire sample of Chinese targets that 
were acquired by foreign buyers. The table indicates the yearly transaction volume 
and value of transactions. The third column compares the number of transactions 
financed with cash and non-cash payments. In the sample, only 19% of transactions 
were financed with cash; 81% of the transactions were financed with no cash. The 
fourth column indicates the number of transactions in which the acquirer was a public 
company. The results indicated that only 33% of acquirers were publicly listed. The 
fifth column presents the number of transactions in which the acquirer was a financial 
company. The results indicated that 62% of acquirers were from a single industry. The 
last column presents the breakdown of cumulative abnormal returns by year. 
 
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
 
A distinctive portion of this table indicates that there was a significant growth in value 
of transactions and number of transactions since 2002. A quite active period occurred 
from 2002 to 2009. This time period may explain the timing of China‟s joining the 
WTO in 2001 during the financial crisis. This is echoed by the Chinese opening-up 
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policy and other supportive policies. For example, the Ministry of Commerce issued a 
policy
9
 in 2001 (Chong, 2007; Chen and Young, 2009; Dong and Guo, 2013; Gao, 
2003) These regulations allowed the foreign investor to enter the Chinese market in a 
more regulated manner. The overall percentage of transactions indicated that private 
financial companies preferred to buy Chinese targets, which explains why more 
private funds were involved in the Chinese M&As market. The cumulative abnormal 
returns performed better after 2002, which also explains the benefit of joining the 
WTO. However, this trend ended with the financial crisis, and the situation turnover 
from this point can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
4.4.1.2 Transaction Distribution 
Panel A of Table 4.2 reports numbers and proportions of transactions that foreign 
(excluding China) acquirers conducted in the thirteen major industries. The results 
indicated that bidding companies were extremely focused on financials. Panel B of 
Table 4.2 reports numbers and proportions of transactions for Chinese targets in twelve 
major industries. The results indicated that Chinese targets were primarily in financials, 
industrials, materials and consumer staples. Panel C of Table 4.2 reports numbers and 
proportions of transactions of foreign buyers, which are divided into four geographic 
areas. The results indicated that the majority of buyers were from Asia-Pacific. 
 
                                                   
9 Ministry of Commerce issued “China Absorbed Foreign Investment Policy” on 15/02/2001. 
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[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
 
The majority of bidder companies were financial companies; combining the results in 
Table 4.1 suggests that the majority of acquirers were not publicly listed. Clearly, 
these investors were basically private equity buyout funds, and the chosen targets 
were quite diversified. With the low interest rates and volatile credit access to 
emerging markets, foreign companies required specialized private advantages to 
optimize opportunities in China, and it appears that Chinese public financial 
companies were more attractive (Daniel, 2012). Of the Asia-Pacific acquirers, 66% 
(113 transactions) were from Hong Kong. Hong Kong is sixth largest stock market 
globally and second in Asia behind Tokyo. Hong Kong is the sixth largest financial 
centre for foreign exchange trading. It is always exposed to global investors, and there 
is no capital monitoring (Meyer, 2015; Li, 1995).  
 
4.4.1.3 Univariate Test 
Table 4.3 demonstrates summary statistics for entire sample and univariate 
comparison between financial and non-financial bidders. In the sample, 62% of 
overseas bidders were financial companies; only 38% of transactions were bid on by 
other industries.  
 
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
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Panel A of Table 4.3 presents both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese target companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquired 
by financials was 5.18% (t=4.27) and 3.44% (t=2.16), respectively; the mean and 
median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquired by non-financials was 5.10% (t=2.05) 
and 2.86% (t=1.99), respectively. Transactions acquired by financials outperformed 
transactions acquired by non-financials by 0.08% (t=3.17) on average. The mean and 
median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions acquired by financials was 6.51% (t=4.45) and 
3.68% (t=2.24), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions 
acquired by non-financials was 6.44% (t=3.00) and 3.43% (t=2.14), respectively. 
Transactions acquired by financials outperformed transactions acquired by 
non-financials by 0.06% (t=2.51) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.3 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions acquired by 
financials and non-financials. The panel clearly demonstrates the difference between 
those two types of target companies in financial performance. First, the stock prices 
were quite close. Second, non-financial acquirers tended to acquire higher ROE and 
ROA targets. Third, the EPS and BVPS were both quite low in both groups, which is 
why they became targets. Fourth, the financial companies acquired higher EBITDA 
targets, which suggests the target had better financial and operational performance. 
Finally, the companies acquired by financials had much greater total assets and 
slightly higher sales, which suggests that financial acquirers tended to choose larger 
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but weaker business growth companies. Overall, the differences in price per share, 
ROE, ROA, EBITDA and sales were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 4.3 presents characteristics for transactions for companies acquired 
by financial and non-financial entities. The mean of market value for target companies 
acquired by financials was much higher than the target companies acquired by 
non-financials. The value of transactions acquired by financial entities was also 
significantly higher than the value of transactions acquired by non-financial entities. 
The mean and median of relative size for transactions acquired by financial and 
non-financial entities were 2.18 (1.22) and 1.45 (1.14), respectively. The relative size 
of transactions acquired by financials was significantly larger than the relative size of 
transactions acquired by non-financials. According to the comparisons of market 
value and transaction value, therefore, it may be concluded that financial companies 
tended to acquire larger Chinese targets, and non-financial companies tended to 
acquire smaller Chinese targets. 
 
To summarize, Table 4.3 displays Chinese public companies acquired by foreign 
financial bidders. These companies may see higher short-term return. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis of Chapter 3. In fact, these targets obtained significant 
positive abnormal returns by any sector‟s acquirer in cross-border M&As transactions; 
moreover, acquirers from the financial sector contributed the most transactions. The 
reason may be that financial institution investors have much greater capability to raise 
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capital, which is also consistent with the result that larger targets and larger 
transactions are made by financial acquirers. These results are consistent with 
previous literature Bajo et al. (2013), Silveri (2009) and Yeh (2012) noted that in 
takeover bids by private equity funds raised by large investment companies such as 
Morgan Stanley
10
, KKR
11
, Warbury Pincus
12
, and Newbridge,
13
 the announcements 
of buyouts caused a significantly positive stock market reaction. The target 
experienced significant average improvement in operating performance, and the 
improvement was consistent with size of positive market response to the buyout 
announcement. The buyout action may cause value increases, which are attributed to 
the more efficient use of assets and a reduction in operating costs. Financial 
institutions are better able to identify institutional investors to raise capital in a short 
period of time to guarantee cash flexibility on investment. In this chapter, the author 
investigates Chinese public target performance, however overseas financial 
institutional investors such as private firms rather than public companies. This focus 
is consistent with the findings in Chapter 3: private targets bring better performance to 
their bidder companies. 
                                                   
10 Morgan Stanley announced investing in Wuliangye Yibin Co. Ltd. (the largest Chinese wine company) on 
28/06/2006. The transaction was not completed but caused significant CAR in the short term. 
11 KKR announced the acquisition of Fujian Sunner Dvlp. Co. Ltd. (owned and operated chicken farms) in 
26/08/2014 for over 18% of shares. 
12 Warbury Pincus announced investment in Beijing Wangfujing Dept. Store (owned and operated department stores) 
on 29/09/2006. The transaction was not completed but caused significant CAR in the short term. 
13 Newbridge announced acquiring Shenzhen Dvlp. Bank Co. Ltd. (owned and operated chicken farms) in 
29/05/2004 for over 17% of shares. 
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4.4.2 Regional Univariate Test 
4.4.2.1 North America 
Table 4.4 presents summary statistics for entire sample and univariate comparison 
between financial and non-financial bidders from North America. In the sample, 49% 
of overseas bidders were financial companies; 51% of transactions were bid on by 
other industries.  
 
[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 4.4 presents both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese target companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquired 
by financials was 2.29% (t=2.32) and 1.96% (t=2.23), respectively; the mean and 
median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquired by non-financials was 1.76% (t=1.75) 
and 1.57% (t=1.83), respectively. Transactions acquired by financials outperformed 
transactions acquired by non-financials by 0.53% (t=1.79) on average. Moreover, the 
mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for transactions acquired by financials was 2.88% 
(t=2.61) and 2.25% (t=2.35), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for 
transactions acquired by non-financials was 2.29% (t=1.95) and 1.73% (t=1.85), 
respectively. Transactions acquired by financials outperformed transactions acquired 
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by non-financials by 0.59% (t=1.99) on average. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.4 compares acquirer characteristics for transactions acquired by 
financial and non-financial entities. The panel clearly demonstrates the differences 
between those two types of target companies in financial performance. First, the stock 
prices of companies acquired by financials were slightly higher. Second, non-financial 
acquirers tended to acquire higher ROE and ROA targets. Third, the EPS and BVPS 
were quite low in both groups, which is why they became targets. Fourth, the 
financial companies acquired lower EBITDA targets, which suggest the target had 
poorer financial and operational performance. Finally, the companies acquired by 
financials had much higher total assets and sales, which suggests that financial 
acquirers tended to select larger companies. Overall, the differences in price per share, 
ROE, ROA, EBITDA and sales were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 4.4 presents characteristics for transactions acquired by financial and 
non-financial bidders from North America. The mean of market value for target 
companies acquired by financials was much higher than for the target companies 
acquired by non-financials. The value of transactions acquired by financials was also 
significantly larger than the value of transactions acquired by non-financials. The mean 
and median of relative size for transactions acquired by financials and non-financials 
were 2.78 (1.52) and 2.97 (1.24), respectively. The relative size of transactions 
acquired by financials was significantly lower than the relative size of transactions 
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acquired by non-financials although the level was high for both groups. According to 
comparisons of market value and transaction value, therefore, it may be concluded 
that financial and non-financial companies both tended to acquire larger Chinese 
targets from the North American market. 
 
In summary, Table 4.4 indicates that Chinese public companies acquired by foreign 
financial bidders may enjoy higher short-term return. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis of Chapter 3. In fact, these targets received significant positive abnormal 
returns by any sector‟s acquirer in cross-border M&As transactions; moreover, 
acquirers from the financial sector contributed the most transactions. The reason may 
be that financial institution investors have a much stronger capability to raise capital, 
which is also consistent with the result that larger targets and larger transactions are 
conducted by financial acquirers. 
 
4.4.2.2 Pan-Europe 
Table 4.5 demonstrates summary statistics for entire sample and univariate 
comparison between financial and non-financial bidders from Pan-Europe. In the 
sample, 40% of overseas bidders were financial companies; 60% of transactions were 
bid on by other industries.  
 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
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Panel A of Table 4.5 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese target companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions 
acquired by financials was 3.57% (t=2.44) and 3.17% (t=2.35), respectively; the mean 
and median CAR [-2, 2] for transactions acquired by non-financials was 5.41% 
(t=3.42) and 3.33% (t=2.76), respectively. Companies acquired by financials 
underperformed companies acquired by non-financials by -1.84% (t=2.23) on average. 
Moreover, the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for companies acquired by financials 
was 4.99% (t=2.85) and 4.15% (t=2.78), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 
5] for companies acquired by non-financials was 7.08% (t=4.50) and 4.69% (t=3.15), 
respectively. Companies acquired by financials underperformed companies acquired 
by non-financials by -2.09% (t=2.29) on average. However, the return levels remained 
attractive. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.5 compares acquirer characteristics for companies acquired by 
financial and non-financial entities. The table clearly identifies the difference between 
those two types of target companies in financial performance. First, the stock prices of 
companies acquired by financials were slightly lower. Second, non-financial acquirers 
tended to acquire higher ROA targets, and financial acquirers tended to acquire higher 
ROE targets. Third, the EPS and BVPS were quite low in two groups, which is why 
they became targets. Fourth, financial companies acquired higher EBITDA targets, 
which suggest the target exhibited better financial and operational performance. 
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Finally, the companies acquired by financials had much higher total assets and sales, 
which suggests that financial acquirers tended to select larger companies. Overall, the 
differences in EBITDA, total assets and sales were significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 4.5 presents transaction characteristics for companies acquired by 
financial and non-financial bidders from Pan-Europe. The mean of market value for 
target companies acquired by financials was much larger than for the target companies 
acquired by non-financials. The value of companies acquired by financial entities was 
also significantly higher than the value of companies acquired by non-financial 
entities. The mean and median of relative size for companies acquired by financial 
and non-financial entities were 1.53 (1.15) and 1.48 (1.48), respectively. The relative 
size of companies acquired by financials was significantly larger than the relative size 
of companies acquired by non-financials. According to the comparisons of market 
value and transaction value, therefore, it may be concluded that financial companies 
tended to acquire larger Chinese targets, and non-financial companies tended to 
acquire smaller Chinese targets. 
 
To summarize, Table 4.5 indicates that Chinese public companies acquired by foreign 
non-financial bidders may obtain higher short-term returns. This result is not 
consistent with the hypothesis of Chapter 3. In fact, these targets obtained significant 
positive abnormal returns by any sector‟s acquirer in a cross-border M&As 
transaction. 
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4.4.2.3 Asia-Pacific 
Table 4.6 presents summary statistics for entire sample and univariate comparison of 
financial and non-financial bidders from Asia-Pacific. In the sample, 49% of overseas 
bidders were financial companies; 51% of transactions were bid on by other industries. 
Most transactions were within the Asia-Pacific, and there were 113 transactions made 
by Hong Kong investors. 
 
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 4.6 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese target companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for companies acquired 
by financials was 6.55% (t=3.52) and 2.60% (t=1.89), respectively; the mean and 
median CAR [-2, 2] for companies acquired by non-financials was 6.11% (t=2.69) and 
1.81% (t=2.02), respectively. Companies acquired by financials outperformed 
companies acquired by non-financials by 0.45% (t=1.90) on average. Moreover, mean 
and median CAR [-5, 5] for companies acquired by financials was 8.81% (t=3.88) and 
2.64% (t=1.95), respectively; the mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for companies acquired 
by non-financials was 7.57% (t=4.28) and 1.88% (t=2.04), respectively. Companies 
acquired by financials underperformed companies acquired by non-financials by 1.24% 
(t=1.91) on average. However, the results of CAR [-5, 5] were not consistent with the 
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entire sample; the return created in this area remains the highest. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.6 compares acquirer characteristics for companies acquired by 
financial and non-financial entities. The panel clearly indicates the difference between 
those two types of target companies in financial performance. First, stock prices of 
companies acquired by financials were slightly higher. Second, non-financial 
acquirers tended to acquire higher ROA targets, and financial acquirers tended to 
acquire higher ROE targets. Third, the EPS and BVPS were quite low in both groups, 
which is why they became targets. Fourth, financial companies acquired higher 
EBITDA targets, which suggest the targets presented a better financial and operational 
performance. Finally, the companies acquired by financials had much higher total 
assets and sales, which suggests that financial acquirers tended to choose larger 
companies. Overall, the differences in price per share, ROE, ROA and EPS were 
significant. 
 
Panel C of Table 4.6 indicates transaction characteristics for companies acquired by 
financial and non-financial bidders from Asia-Pacific. The mean of market value for 
target companies acquired by financials was much higher than for the target 
companies acquired by non-financials. The value of companies acquired by financial 
entities was also significantly higher than the value of companies acquired by 
non-financials. The mean and median of relative size for companies acquired by 
financial and non-financial entities were 1.99 (1.41) and 0.91 (0.85), respectively. The 
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relative size of companies acquired by financials was significantly larger than the 
relative size of companies acquired by non-financials. According to the comparisons 
of market value and transaction value, therefore, it may be concluded that financial 
companies tended to acquire larger Chinese targets and non-financial companies 
tended to acquire smaller Chinese targets. 
 
To summarize, Table 4.6 indicates that Chinese public companies acquired by foreign 
financial bidders may obtain higher short-term returns. This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis of Chapter 3. In fact, these targets obtained significant positive 
abnormal returns by any sector‟s acquirer in cross-border M&As transactions; 
moreover, acquirers from the financial sector contributed the most transactions. The 
reason may be that financial institution investors have a much stronger capability to 
raise capital, which is consistent with the result that financial acquirers pursued larger 
targets and larger transactions. 
 
4.4.2.4 Other Countries 
Table 4.7 demonstrates summary statistics for entire sample and univariate 
comparison between financial and non-financial bidders from other countries. In the 
sample, 100% of overseas bidders were financial companies; there were no companies 
bid on by other industries.  
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[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 4.6 indicates both 5-day and 11-day abnormal returns for listed 
Chinese target companies. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for companies acquired 
by financials was 5.28% (t=3.47) and 2.28% (t=2.42), respectively. Moreover, the 
mean and median CAR [-5, 5] for companies acquired by financials was 6.09% (t=3.85) 
and 3.80% (t=2.80), respectively.  
 
Panel B of Table 4.7 compares acquirer characteristics for companies acquired by 
financial and non-financial entities. The panel clearly identifies the differences 
between those two types of target companies in financial performance. First, the stock 
prices of companies acquired by financials were not extremely high. Second, financial 
acquirers tended to acquire higher ROE targets. Third, the EPS and BVPS were both 
quite low, which is why they became targets. Fourth, financial companies acquired 
low EBITDA targets. Finally, companies acquired by financials had low total assets 
and sales, which suggest that financial acquirers tended to select small companies.  
 
Panel C of Table 4.6 indicates characteristics for companies acquired by financial and 
non-financial bidders from other countries. The mean of market value for target 
companies acquired by financials was low. The value of companies acquired by 
financial entities was small as well. The mean and median of relative size for 
companies acquired by financial entities were 2.33 and 0.72, respectively. The relative 
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size of companies acquired by financials was slightly large. According to market 
value and transaction value, it may therefore be concluded that financial companies 
from other countries tended to acquire small Chinese targets. 
 
To summarize, Table 4.7 indicates that Chinese public companies acquired by foreign 
financial bidders may obtain high short-term returns. This result is basically consistent 
with hypothesis of Chapter 3. 
 
4.4.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 4.8 illustrates the results of short-term regression analysis. The dependent 
variables were the CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] of Chinese public target firms. The 
key explanatory variable was whether the overseas acquirer was a financial company.  
 
[Insert Table 4.8 here] 
 
The CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] indicated that the Chinese targets were significantly 
positive when overseas acquirers were financials, which were approximately 0.22% 
and 0.27%, respectively, over the entire sample. Thus, there was a positive relation 
between market response before and after the acquisition announcement of a public 
Chinese target and overseas financial bidders. There were control variables as listed in 
Table 4.8, which included acquirer nations, target financial performance and different 
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target industries. The results also indicated when the acquirer was from a developed 
country and the same industry as the target. The target firms in finance, consumer 
staples, technology, real estate and the telecom industry experienced premium bidding. 
The table also indicates significantly negative results when the acquirer had a high 
return on equity and high market value. This result suggests that most transactions 
were conducted by overseas private equity buyout funds or other financial 
institutional investors, and these fund managers preferred defensive, good quality, 
high-value stock. This also echoes Hypothesis 1 of this chapter. This result is 
consistent with Bajo et al. (2013) and Silveri (2009). Bi and Wang (2014) observed 
that large institutional investors such as mutual funds have robust incentives to trade 
and realize profits by takeovers in the Chinese capital market. The financial 
institutions understand operations and financial performance better; for example, 
private fund managers normally worked at the senior levels of the top 500 world 
companies; some were retired CEOs. Institutional investors give advice or are directly 
involved in management to improve business. In other words, these investors know 
how to maximize company value. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
To summarize, this chapter reviewed existing literature and identified some empirical 
evidence in cross-border M&As in financial industry. Financial institutional investors 
may create more value for Chinese public target companies. Previous studies indicate 
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that M&As transactions did generate more return for target firms when the bidder 
belonged to the financial industry. The essential point is updating the empirical 
research and evidence to investigate current validity. This study is specific to the 
Chinese M&As market, which is the most active emerging market globally. This 
dissertation explored the empirical evidence to examine principles and theories. 
Moreover, the assumptions focused on the differences between the financial industry 
and other industries and whether M&As transactions can create more value for 
shareholders of target firm.  
 
The result of this study demonstrated that the financial industrial bidder brought a 
higher premium to its Chinese target company because stock market investors 
strongly believed that the target company is good business. Better management and 
financial status are expected. The Chinese government also encouraged foreign capital 
and investments to support local economies. For the regional studies, only European 
financial institutional investors created less return than the average returns of other 
industries although the return was nevertheless positive and high. The transactions 
within Asia-Pacific contributed the highest return to the shareholders of target firms. 
 
There is extremely little research focusing on financial institutional investors‟ activities 
because these transactions tend to be confidential. Data collection may also be quite 
difficult. Thus, this dissertation focused on listed target companies. In fact, financial 
bidder companies contributed over half of the transactions in the M&As market. This 
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should not be ignored even with limited access to information. This dissertation 
attempts to fill a gap in this area. 
 
Nevertheless, the access of information and data collection remain difficult, limiting 
complete observation in this area. In the cross-border M&As market, asset 
management companies and private fund companies are main players. They normally 
do not go public, which means there is no access to public information. Their investor 
information is also confidential. Therefore, the only solution is to identify what they 
invest in, and they basically prefer to invest in private companies rather than public 
companies.
14
 Therefore, only scant information is available from public target 
companies. Moreover, long-term validity also requires measurement and observation. 
 
The hypotheses have all been validated, and according to the empirical results, they 
are quite significant. The significant empirical results explain the practices and 
effective findings and support this topic. This author selected the event study method 
to observe and gather the abnormal returns in both pre- and post-announcement 
periods of M&As. Moreover, the time frame was also a significant influence on 
results. In the future, author would select a longer sample period to better explain and 
improve the accuracy of the results. The author will continue to work in the 
institutional investment field and will be able to access more confidential information. 
                                                   
14 Asset management invests in public companies in their equity strategies; however, it will be an extremely small 
portion of its share (below 3%). This is not for a M&A purpose. 
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Additional years of working experience will engender more comprehensive and 
underlying information helping to develop theory and empirical analysis. 
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Tables 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample 
This table summarizes the primary characteristics of merger transactions in the entire sample of Chinese acquirers. The sample comprises 413 completed or uncompleted 
M&A transactions in the cross-border market from 1994 to 2016, in which all targets were listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. All acquirers 
were worldwide companies (excluding China), either public or private. The first column presents the number or transactions announced yearly from 1994 to 2016. The second 
column presents the total value of transactions traded by year from 1994 to 2016 in USD millions. The third column categorizes merger activities according to method of 
payment. Cash payment refers to transactions that were100% financed with cash or mainly traded in cash. Non-cash payment refers to transactions that were completed with 
no cash. The fourth column categorizes the acquirers according to public status. Public refers to companies that are listed on the stock exchange, and non-public refers to 
private companies, subsidiaries, joint ventures or government-owned companies. The fifth column categorizes the acquirers according to industry. Financial refers to financial 
service companies such as banks, insurance companies, and fund companies. Non-financial refers to companies in any industry excluding the financial industry. The six 
column reports the results of the OLS regressions of the target‟s short-term performance for the entire sample year by year. The sample included all M&A cross-border 
transactions in which the targets were listed companies in the Chinese market from the Thomson One Banker (SDC) transactions database during 1994 to 2016. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ 
represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistics. 
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Full Value of 
Transaction 
($mil.) 
Method of Payment Acquirer Public Status Acquirer Sector CARs 
Year 
All 
Sample 
Cash 
Payment 
Non-cash  
Payment 
Public Non-public Financial Non-financial CAR [-2, 2] CAR [-5, 5] 
                  Mean t-value Mean t-value 
1994 2 0.18  1 1 1 1 0 2 -0.0738  (-1.01) -0.0426  (-1.38) 
1995 5 68.49  0 5 2 3 3 2 0.0499* (1.81) 0.0846* (1.81) 
1996 8 33.60  4 4 6 2 3 5 -0.0069  (-1.21) -0.0037  (-1.07) 
1997 14 974.74  2 12 7 7 7 7 0.0623*** (2.44) 0.0802*** (2.97) 
1998 7 57.42  1 6 7 0 1 6 0.0102  (1.44) 0.0177  (1.67) 
1999 9 179.02  0 9 3 6 6 3 -0.0561*** (-2.44) -0.1136*** (-2.46) 
2000 12 216.33  1 11 7 5 4 8 -0.0398** (-2.30) -0.0445*** (-2.64) 
2001 14 292.01  1 13 7 7 4 10 -0.0207** (-2.31) -0.0269** (-2.29) 
2002 25 1,148.40  3 22 10 15 15 10 0.0377* (1.75) 0.0477* (1.77) 
2003 30 686.72  4 26 12 18 17 13 0.0083* (1.82) 0.0137** (1.99) 
2004 34 2,529.49  6 28 11 23 25 9 0.0170** (2.11) 0.0201*** (2.38) 
2005 44 10,956.00  9 35 10 34 29 15 0.0384*** (2.53) 0.0587*** (2.91) 
2006 53 5,534.94  7 46 24 29 28 25 0.0710*** (2.57) 0.1011*** (2.64) 
2007 31 3,724.82  4 27 8 23 21 10 0.1078* (1.87) 0.1539** (2.07) 
2008 27 1,804.04  3 24 10 17 19 8 0.0800*** (2.57) 0.0978*** (2.51) 
2009 23 4,101.15  4 19 5 18 17 6 0.0809*** (2.92) 0.0919*** (3.69) 
2010 13 3,601.16  3 10 2 11 9 4 0.0892** (2.34) 0.1385*** (2.48) 
2011 8 3,618.34  1 7 0 8 6 2 0.1165** (2.17) 0.1777** (2.18) 
2012 13 10,404.01  5 8 0 13 10 3 0.0096  (1.36) 0.0194  (1.61) 
2013 8 1,573.80  2 6 1 7 6 2 0.0179  (1.61) 0.0226  (1.69) 
2014 14 2,761.78  10 4 0 14 12 2 0.1044*** (2.58) 0.1176*** (3.19) 
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2015 9 902.64  4 5 1 8 7 2 0.1283* (1.96) 0.1559** (1.99) 
2016 10 1,868.17  3 7 3 7 7 3 0.0147  (1.13) 0.0437  (1.28) 
SUM 413 57,037.25  78 335 137 276 256 157         
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics for the Acquirer and Target Sectors and Regions 
Panel A reports the number and proportion of acquirers in 12 industry sectors. Panel B reports the 
number and proportion of targets in 12 industry sectors. Panel C reports the number and proportion of 
targets in 4 regional distributions. The region of North America is a continent entirely within the 
Northern Hemisphere and nearly entirely within the Western Hemisphere. The region of Pan-Europe is 
a continent that comprises the westernmost portion of Eurasia. Europe is bordered by the Arctic Ocean 
to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea to the south and includes Russia. 
The region of Asia-Pacific is the portion of the world in or near the Western Pacific Ocean. It typically 
includes much of East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia. The region of other countries 
includes countries worldwide but not in North America, Pan-Europe or Asia-Pacific. For a list of the 
countries involved with the sample, please see Appendix 4.2. 
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Panel A         
Number of Deals Percentage% Acquirer Industry Sector 
3 0.73% Consumer Products and Services 
12 2.91% Energy and Power 
255 61.74% Financials 
8 1.94% Government and Agencies 
1 0.24% Healthcare 
18 4.36% High Technology 
36 8.72% Industrials  
29 7.02% Materials  
1 0.24% Media and Entertainment 
12 2.91% Real Estate 
4 0.97% Retail 
29 7.02% Consumer Staples  
5 1.21% Telecommunications 
413 100.00%       
          
Panel B         
Number of Deals Percentage% Target Industry Sector 
9 2.18% Consumer Products and Services 
23 5.57% Energy and Power 
83 20.10% Financials 
23 5.57% Healthcare 
41 9.93% High Technology 
77 18.64% Industrials  
64 15.50% Materials  
5 1.21% Media and Entertainment 
21 5.08% Real Estate 
10 2.42% Retail 
54 13.08% Consumer Staples  
3 0.73% Telecommunications 
413 100.00%       
          
Panel C         
Number of Deals Percentage% Acquirer Nation 
59 14.29% North America 
68 16.46% Pan Europe 
171 41.40% Asia-Pacific 
115 27.85% Others 
413 100.00%       
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Table 4.3. Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample of Transactions Bid on by Financial and Non-Financial Companies 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Chinese target cross-border transactions in which all countries‟ acquirers were financial and non-financial 
companies. Panel A reports target short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR 
[-5, 5] is the 11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports target firm characteristics. Price per share is measured as 
the stock price on the last trading day before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement 
of a Chinese target firm. ROA is measured as return on asset at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. P/E is measured as price to earnings 
ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EPS is measured as the earnings per share at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a 
Chinese target firm. BVPS is measured as the book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EBIDA is measured as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. Panel C reports transaction characteristics. 
Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. Relative Size is measured as 
the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in all sample, financial bidder 
transactions and non-financial bidder transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the differences between financial 
bidder transactions and non-financial bidder transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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All Countries All Deals Financials Acquirer (F) Non-financials Acquirer (N) Difference (F) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 5.15%*** 3.14%** 413 5.18%*** 3.44%** 255 5.10%** 2.86%** 158 0.08%*** (3.17) 0.58%* (1.83) 
 
(3.48) (2.28) 
 
(4.27) (2.16) 
 
(2.05) (1.99) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 6.48%*** 3.52%*** 413 6.51%*** 3.68%** 255 6.44%*** 3.43%** 158 0.06%*** (2.51) 0.25%* (1.94) 
 
(3.68) (2.70) 
 
(4.45) (2.24) 
 
(3.00) (2.14) 
     
Panel B: Target Firm Characteristics 
Price Per Share 1.31 0.83 413 1.22 0.86 255 1.44 0.68 158 -0.22** (1.98) 0.19*** (2.50) 
ROE 11.30 9.71 413 10.72 9.15 255 12.23 10.03 158 -1.51** (2.14) -0.87** (-1.96) 
ROA 2.16 1.72 413 1.34 1.02 255 3.48 3.43 158 -2.13 (1.52) -2.41* (-1.78) 
EPS 0.03 0.01 413 0.03 0.01 255 0.02 0.02 158 0.01 (1.69) -0.00 (-1.65) 
BVPS 0.25 0.19 413 0.25 0.17 255 0.25 0.21 158 0.01* (1.81) -0.04 (1.53) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 51.80 42.17 413 62.25 42.17 255 34.92 43.09 158 27.34** (2.23) -0.91 (1.58) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 518.92 507.54 413 597.99 393.38 255 391.31 328.13 158 206.68 (1.50) 65.25* (1.95) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 114.53 64.06 413 129.45 90.00 255 90.45 41.05 158 39.00 (1.51) 48.95* (1.86) 
Relative Size 1.90 1.15 413 2.18 1.22 255 1.45 1.14 158 0.73* (1.76) 0.08*** (2.41) 
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Table 4.4. Summary Statistics for the North American Sample of Transactions Bid on by Financial and Non-Financial Companies 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Chinese target cross-border transactions in which North American acquirers were financial and non-financial 
companies. Panel A reports target short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR 
[-5, 5] is the 11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports target firm characteristics. Price per share is measured as 
the stock price on the last trading day before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement 
of a Chinese target firm. ROA is measured as return on asset at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. P/E is measured as price to earnings 
ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EPS is measured as the earnings per share at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a 
Chinese target firm. BVPS is measured as the book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EBIDA is measured as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. Panel C reports transaction characteristics. 
Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. Relative Size is measured as 
the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in all sample, financial bidder 
transactions and non-financial bidder transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the differences between financial 
bidder transactions and non-financial bidder transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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North America All Deals Financials Acquirer (F) Non-financials Acquirer (N) Difference (F) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 2.02%** 1.80%* 59 2.29%** 1.96%** 29 1.76%* 1.57%* 30 0.53%* (1.79) 0.38%* (1.89) 
 
(2.27) (1.78) 59 (2.32) (2.23) 
 
(1.75) (1.83) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 2.58%*** 1.93%* 59 2.88%*** 2.25%*** 29 2.29%* 1.73%* 30 0.59%** (1.99) 0.52%* (1.76) 
 
(2.58) (1.89) 59 (2.61) (2.35) 
 
(1.95) (1.85) 
     
Panel B: Target Firm Characteristics 
Price Per Share 0.94 0.99 59 1.10 1.02 29 0.80 0.97 30 0.30*** (2.38) 0.05** (2.04) 
ROE 13.20 9.74 59 12.48 9.97 29 13.89 8.20 30 -1.41*** (2.17) 1.77 (1.63) 
ROA 4.06 2.37 59 3.31 2.37 29 4.79 3.20 30 -1.48 (1.69) -0.83* (1.90) 
EPS 0.04 0.02 59 0.05 0.02 29 0.03 0.02 30 0.02* (1.92) 0.00* (1.75) 
BVPS 0.28 0.21 59 0.32 0.17 29 0.25 0.23 30 0.07* (1.86) -0.07* (1.79) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 71.80 51.89 59 102.89 76.20 29 41.74 34.05 30 61.15** (2.19) 42.15 (1.67) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 872.95 770.61 59 1,326.36 1,030.06 29 434.65 343.37 30 891.72* (1.92) 686.69* (1.83) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 215.98 81.21 59 330.88 91.36 29 104.90 40.00 30 225.98* (1.86) 51.36* (1.84) 
Relative Size 2.88 1.30 59 2.78 1.52 29 2.97 1.24 30 -0.19* (1.91) 0.28*** (2.41) 
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Table 4.5. Summary Statistics for the Pan-European Sample of Transactions Bid on by Financial and Non-Financial Companies 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Chinese target cross-border transactions in which Pan-European acquirers were financial and non-financial 
companies. Panel A reports target short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR 
[-5, 5] is the 11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports target firm characteristics. Price per share is measured as 
the stock price on the last trading day before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement 
of a Chinese target firm. ROA is measured as return on asset at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. P/E is measured as price to earnings 
ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EPS is measured as the earnings per share at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a 
Chinese target firm. BVPS is measured as the book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EBIDA is measured as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. Panel C reports transaction characteristics. 
Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. Relative Size is measured as 
the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in all sample, financial bidder 
transactions and non-financial bidder transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the differences between financial 
bidder transactions and non-financial bidder transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Pan Europe All Deals Financials Acquirer (F) Non-financials Acquirer (N) Difference (F) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 4.68%*** 3.28%*** 68 3.57%*** 3.17%*** 27 5.41%*** 3.33%*** 41 -1.84%** (2.23) -0.16%* (1.75) 
 
(3.15) (2.58) 
 
(2.44) (2.35) 
 
(3.42) (2.76) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 6.25%*** 4.29%*** 68 4.99%*** 4.15%*** 27 7.08%*** 4.69%*** 41 -2.09%** (2.29) -0.54%* (1.79) 
 
(3.82) (3.07) 
 
(2.85) (2.78) 
 
(4.50) (3.15) 
     
Panel B: Target Firm Characteristics 
Price Per Share 1.88 1.27 68 1.75 1.77 27 1.96 0.90 41 -0.21* (1.81) 0.87 (1.61) 
ROE 13.46 10.82 68 16.02 13.28 27 11.77 8.96 41 4.25* (1.96) 4.32* (1.90) 
ROA 2.93 1.20 68 1.75 0.66 27 3.71 3.44 41 -1.96 (1.66) -2.78* (1.89) 
EPS 0.04 0.02 68 0.04 0.02 27 0.04 0.02 41 0.00* (1.94) 0.00* (1.92) 
BVPS 0.31 0.23 68 0.30 0.28 27 0.32 0.22 41 -0.02* (1.81) 0.06 (1.57) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 74.83 65.81 68 71.71 66.79 27 76.88 52.75 41 -5.18** (2.09) 14.04** (2.02) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 824.64 677.71 68 842.46 601.00 27 812.90 505.02 41 29.57** (2.05) 95.98** (2.04) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 170.92 82.06 68 238.20 122.84 27 126.61 63.51 41 111.59** (2.01) 59.34* (1.98) 
Relative Size 1.50 1.23 68 1.53 1.15 27 1.48 1.48 41 0.05** (1.98) -0.33*** (2.41) 
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Table 4.6. Summary Statistics for the Asia-Pacific Sample of Transactions Bid on by Financial and Non-Financial Companies 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Chinese target cross-border transactions in which Asia-Pacific acquirers were financial and non-financial 
companies. Panel A reports target short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. CAR 
[-5, 5] is the 11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports target firm characteristics. Price per share is measured as 
the stock price on the last trading day before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. ROE is measured as return on equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement 
of a Chinese target firm. ROA is measured as return on asset at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. P/E is measured as price to earnings 
ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EPS is measured as the earnings per share at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a 
Chinese target firm. BVPS is measured as the book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EBIDA is measured as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. Panel C reports transaction characteristics. 
Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the transaction. Relative Size is measured as 
the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are indicated in all sample, financial bidder 
transactions and non-financial bidder transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the differences between financial 
bidder transactions and non-financial bidder transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Asia-Pacific All Deals Financials Acquirer (F) Non-financials Acquirer (N) Difference (F) - (N) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-Value Median t-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 6.33%*** 2.44%* 171 6.55%*** 2.60%* 84 6.11%*** 1.81%** 87 0.45%* (1.90) 0.80%* (1.83) 
 
(3.41) (1.79) 
 
(3.52) (1.89) 
 
(2.69) (2.02) 
     
CAR [-5, 5] 8.18%*** 2.44%* 171 8.81%*** 2.64%* 84 7.57%*** 1.88%** 87 1.24%* (1.91) 0.76%* (1.84) 
 
(4.25) (1.80) 
 
(3.88) (1.95) 
 
(4.28) (2.04) 
     
Panel B: Target Firm Characteristics 
Price Per Share 1.52 0.61 171 1.63 0.61 84 1.43 0.60 87 0.20** (2.17) 0.01* (1.81) 
ROE 12.13 10.63 171 12.39 11.07 84 11.88 10.22 87 0.50** (2.27) 0.85*** (2.56) 
ROA 2.31 2.86 171 1.68 1.58 84 2.91 3.53 87 -1.23* (1.97) -1.95* (1.93) 
EPS 0.02 0.01 171 0.03 0.01 84 0.01 0.01 87 0.02* (1.77) 0.00* (1.83) 
BVPS 0.25 0.18 171 0.29 0.17 84 0.21 0.21 87 0.07 (1.62) -0.04* (1.78) 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 32.84 23.52 171 53.60 46.75 84 12.79 8.90 87 40.82* (1.81) 37.86* (1.89) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 224.83 126.48 171 273.64 143.34 84 177.69 118.73 87 95.95 (1.58) 24.61* (1.85) 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 89.10 42.01 171 110.51 55.47 84 68.43 36.29 87 42.08 (1.66) 19.19* (1.76) 
Relative Size 1.44 1.09 171 1.99 1.41 84 0.91 0.85 87 1.08** (2.17) 0.56*** (2.41) 
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Table 4.7. Summary Statistics for the Other Countries Sample of Transactions Bid on by Financial and Non-Financial Companies 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample of Chinese target cross-border transactions in which other countries‟ acquirers were non-financial companies 
(there is no financial acquirer from other countries). Panel A reports target short-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding the announcement. CAR [-5, 5] is the 11-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Panel B reports target firm 
characteristics. Price per share is measured as the stock price on the last trading day before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. ROE is measured as return on equity at 
the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. ROA is measured as return on asset at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target 
firm. P/E is measured as price to earnings ratio at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. EPS is measured as the earnings per share at the fiscal 
year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. BVPS is measured as the book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target 
firm. EBIDA is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at the fiscal year end before the announcement of a Chinese target firm. Panel C 
reports transaction characteristics. Market value is market value of equity measured the last trading day before the announcement. Transaction Value is the value of the 
transaction. Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity the last trading day before the announcement. The t-values are 
indicated in all sample, non-financial bidder transactions for the mean and median, CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5], respectively. The t-test indicates the all sample and 
non-financial bidder transactions in means and medians, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, based on one-tail t statistic. 
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Other Countries All Deals Financials Acquirer 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] 5.28%*** 2.28%*** 115 5.28%*** 2.28%*** 115 
 
(3.47) (2.42) 
 
(3.47) (2.42) 
 
CAR [-5, 5] 6.09%*** 3.80%*** 115 6.09%*** 3.80%*** 115 
 
(3.85) (2.80) 
 
(3.85) (2.80) 
 
Panel B: Target Firm Characteristics 
Price Per Share 0.84 0.51 115 0.84 0.51 115 
ROE 7.82 5.60 115 7.82 5.60 115 
ROA 0.50 0.58 115 0.50 0.58 115 
EPS 0.02 0.00 115 0.02 0.00 115 
BVPS 0.21 0.16 115 0.21 0.16 115 
EBITDA ($Mil.) 56.11 15.34 115 56.11 15.34 115 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Market Value ($Mil.) 593.83 453.56 115 593.83 453.56 115 
Transaction Value ($Mil.) 66.96 72.61 115 66.96 72.61 115 
Relative Size 2.33 0.72 115 2.33 0.72 115 
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Table 4.8 OLS Regressions of Acquirer Short-Term Performance 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of the target short-term performance for the entire 
sample. In these models, this chapter regresses acquirer CAR [-2, 2] and CAR [-5, 5] against a number 
of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variable is Acfin. Acfin dummy equals 1 if the acquirer 
company is classified as a sector of financials by Thomson One Banker. For transaction characteristics, 
other control variables included method of payment (cash), public status (public), diversification and 
cross-border nations (nation). The cash dummy variable equals 1 if the transaction is fully financed 
with cash; the dummy variable equals 0 if the transaction is not fully financed with cash. The public 
dummy variable equals 1 if the acquirer is a publicly listed firm; the dummy variable equals 0 if the 
acquirer is not a publicly listed firm. For transaction characteristics, other control variables include 
diversification and nation. The diversification variable equals 1 if the acquirer and target were 
classified as being in the same industry; the dummy variable equals 0 if the acquirer and target are not 
classified as being in the same industry. The nation variable equals 1 if the target is from a developed 
market; the dummy variable equals 0 if the target is from an emerging market. For firm characteristics, 
other control variables include the proportion of top 10 shareholders and the proportion of largest 
shareholder. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at fiscal year-end before the 
announcement. ROE is measured as return on equity at t fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E 
is measured as price to earnings ratio at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnSize is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnAsset 
is the natural logarithm of total assets measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. LnSales is 
the natural logarithm of total sales measured at fiscal year-end before the announcement. For industry 
sector characteristics, other control variables included 12 different industries. Industry1 dummy equals 
1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Financials. Industry2 dummy equals 1 if the bidding 
firm was classified in the sector of Consumer Products and Services. Industry3 dummy equals 1 if the 
bidding firm was classified in the sector of Consumer Staples. Industry4 dummy equals 1 if the bidding 
firm was classified in the sector of Energy and Power. Industry5 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm 
was classified in the sector of Healthcare. Industry6 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified 
in the sector of High Technology. Industry7 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the 
sector of Industrials. Industry8 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of 
Materials. Industry9 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified as the sector of Media and 
Entertainment. Industry10 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Real 
Estate. Industry11 dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Retail. Industry12 
dummy equals 1 if the bidding firm was classified in the sector of Telecommunications. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ 
represent the significance of average return different from zero, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, 
based on one-tail t statistic. 
 
    CAR [-2, 2]   CAR [-5, 5] 
          
Acfin   0.2158**   0.2700*** 
    (1.98)   (2.36) 
Cash   0.2324**   0.2335*** 
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    (2.32)   (2.41) 
Public   0.1219    0.1386  
    (1.15)   (1.27) 
Diversification   0.2142**   0.2511** 
    (2.05)   (2.20) 
Nation   0.2496***   0.2667*** 
    (2.43)   (2.62) 
Top 10   0.2268**   0.2375*** 
    (2.30)   (2.38) 
Top 1   0.1587    0.1681  
    (1.52)   (1.59) 
Leverage   0.1270    0.1356  
    (1.25)   (1.30) 
ROE   -0.2001**   -0.3678*** 
    (-2.29)   (-2.78) 
PE   0.1251    0.1274  
    (1.09)   (1.13) 
LnSize   -0.1243    -0.1852  
    (-1.21)   (-1.54) 
LnAsset   0.1838    0.1866  
    (1.68)   (1.73) 
LnSales   0.1869    0.1896* 
    (1.74)   (1.76) 
Industry1   0.1974*   0.2592** 
    (2.03)   (2.34) 
Industry2   0.1088    0.1464  
    (1.02)   (1.22) 
Industry3   0.2850***   0.3432*** 
    (2.41)   (2.55) 
Industry4   0.1576    0.1899  
    (1.57)   (1.67) 
Industry5   0.1329    0.1682  
    (1.45)   (1.52) 
Industry6   0.2451***   0.2563*** 
    (2.39)   (2.44) 
Industry7   0.1576    0.1745  
    (1.45)   (1.67) 
Industry8   0.1862    0.1869  
    (1.69)   (1.71) 
Industry9   0.1402    0.1583  
    (1.32)   (1.41) 
Industry10   0.2457**   0.2783** 
    (2.18)   (2.33) 
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Industry11   0.0687    0.0820  
    (1.04)   (1.16) 
Industry12   0.2210***   0.3719*** 
    (2.34)   (2.68) 
Constant   0.1271    0.1505  
    (1.46)   (1.63) 
N   413   413 
R Square   0.189    0.218  
Adjusted R Square 0.159    0.178  
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.1. Definition of Control Variables 
The table below defines control variables in the regressions of the chapter. The definition of each variable is presented in the table. Panels A, B and C present transaction 
characteristics, company characteristics and industry sectors, respectively. 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel B: Transaction Characteristics 
Acfin Dummy variable equals 1 if the Acquirer is classified by Financials; dummy variable equals 0 if the acquirert is not a financial firm. 
Cash Dummy variable equals 1 if the deal is fully paid by cash; dummy variable equals 0 if the deal is not fully paid by cash. 
Public Dummy variable equals 1 if the target is a publicly listed firm; dummy variable equals 0 if the target is not a publicly listed firm. 
Diversification 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the acquirer and target are classified as the same industry; dummy variable equals 0 if the acquirer and target are not 
classified as the same industry. 
Nation Dummy variable equals 1 if the target is from developed market; dummy variable equals 0 if the target is from emerging market. 
Panel A: Company Characteristics 
Top 10 The proportion of top 10 shareholders. 
Top 1 The proportion of largest shareholder. 
Leverage Total debt over total capital. 
ROE Return on equity. 
PE Price to Earnings 
Lnsize The logarithm of the acquirer market value at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Lnasset The logarithm of the acquirer total asset at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
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Lnsales The logarithm of the acquirer sales revenue at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Panel C: Industry Sector 
Industry 1 The target is classified by Financials (FINANCE). 
Industry 2 The target is classified by Consumer Products and Services (CPS). 
Industry 3 The target is classified by Consumer Staples (STAPLES). 
Industry 4 The target is classified by Energy and Power (ENERGY). 
Industry 5 The target is classified by Healthcare (HEALTH). 
Industry 6 The target is classified by High Technology (HT). 
Industry 7 The target is classified by Industrials (IND). 
Industry 8 The target is classified by Materials (MATERLS). 
Industry 9 The target is classified by Media and Entertainment (MEDIA). 
Industry 10 The target is classified by Real Estate (REALEST). 
Industry 11 The target is classified by Retail (RETAIL). 
Industry 12 The target is classified by Telecommunications (TELECOM). 
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Appendix 4.2. Definition of Regions of Entire Sample 
The region of North America is a continent entirely within the Northern Hemisphere and nearly completely within the Western Hemisphere. The Region of Pan-Europe is a 
continent that comprises the westernmost portion of Eurasia. Europe is bordered by the Arctic Ocean to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea 
to the south and includes Russia. The region of Asia-Pacific is the portion of the world in or near the Western Pacific Ocean. It typically includes much of East Asia, South 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia. The region of other countries is countries worldwide but not in North America, Pan-Europe and Asia-Pacific. The group of countries is 
the sample of transactions where the target firms is located. 
 
Acquirer Nation Group of Countries 
North America British Virgin, Bermuda, United States 
Pan Europe Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Asia-Pacific Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam 
Others Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Kuwait, Mauritius, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
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5. Chapter V: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
To summarize, this dissertation reviewed existing literature and identified some 
empirical evidence in cross-border M&As of listed China‟s enterprises. Chapter 2 
demonstrated that transactions financed with cash outperformed transactions financed 
with stock although more Chinese public companies chose stock to finance 
transactions. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the acquirer of a public overseas target 
underperformed compared with companies pursuing private targets. The transaction 
volume indicated that most bidder companies made the right decision. Chapter 4 
demonstrated that overseas financial institutions were more likely (over 60% of 
transactions) to acquire Chinese public companies in all industries. These investors 
brought abnormal returns to their target companies. 
 
Chinese public companies realized more return when transactions were financed with 
cash. Previous studies indicated that the M&As transactions did generate more return 
for bidder firms when the transactions were financed with stock. This dissertation 
identified little evidence of the opposite result. The majority of research has been 
completed for over a decade. The Chinese cross-border M&As market became more 
active after 2007. Therefore, this thesis may be essential to updating the empirical 
research and evidence to investigate current validity. This study is more specific to the 
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Chinese M&As market, which is the most active emerging market globally. This 
dissertation explored the empirical evidence to examine principles and theories. 
Because of the different investor structure in China, over 90% of investors were 
individuals, which caused more volatility. The results indicated that cross-border 
transactions financed with cash brought a higher premium to the Chinese bidder 
company because stock market investors strongly believe that the bidder company has 
good cash flow. Executive management and financial status expect a strong 
performance. The Chinese government encourages local companies to go abroad to 
access techniques and resources. For the regional analysis, only the U.S. market 
created a negative return for the Chinese buyer; Europe and other countries rewarded 
positive high returns. Asia-Pacific contributed the most transactions although the 
returns for transactions financed with cash or stock were not remarkable. 
 
Previous studies indicated that the M&As transactions did generate more return for 
bidder firms when acquiring private firms. This dissertation identified little evidence 
that is consistent with other research. The Chinese cross-border M&As market 
became more active after 2007. This thesis completes and updates the research in this 
field. Therefore, this thesis may be essential in updating the empirical research and 
evidence to investigate current validity. This study is more specific to the Chinese 
M&As market, which is the most active emerging market globally. This dissertation 
explored the empirical evidence to examine principles and theories. The investor 
structure is different in China; over 90% of investors are individuals, which causes 
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more volatility. The results may be different from U.S. and European or other 
developed markets. The results indicated that cross-border transactions traded with 
private firms brought higher premiums to their Chinese bidder companies because the 
stock prices of public targets may respond to the announcement quite quickly. Buyers 
normally tend to pay a higher premium. Private targets have no such issue in the 
transaction. The Chinese government encourages local companies to go abroad to 
access techniques and resources. For the regional analysis, only the European market 
created a lower return when acquiring a private target; the returns in the U.S. market 
were also negative, which is same comparing with the findings in Chapter 2. And the 
transactions in other countries contributed the highest return, and the returns for the 
buyer who acquired a public target were significantly negative. 
 
Financial institutional investors created more value for Chinese public target 
companies. Previous studies indicated that the M&As transactions did generate more 
return for target firms when the bidder belonged to the financial industry. The 
essential goal was updating the empirical research and evidence to investigate current 
validity. This research is more specific to the Chinese M&As market, which is the 
most active emerging market globally. This dissertation explored the empirical 
evidence to examine principles and theories. Moreover, the assumptions focused on 
the differences between the financial industry and other industries and whether M&As 
transactions can create more value for the shareholders of target firms. Its result may 
demonstrate that the financial industrial bidder brings a higher premium to the 
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Chinese target company because stock market investors strongly believe the target 
company is a good business. Better management and financial status are expected. 
The Chinese government also encourages foreign capital and investments to support 
local economies. In the regional studies, only European financial institutional 
investors created less return than the average returns of other industries; the returns 
remain positive and high. The transactions within Asia-pacific contributed the highest 
return to the shareholders of target firms. 
 
In November 2016, China originally presented new regulation to control irrational 
outbound investments among accelerated capital outflows. As such measures took 
influence and the RMB steadied in 2017, the Chinese government officially issued the 
guideline for outbound investments in August 2017. These guidelines evidently clear 
encouraged, restricted and prohibited outbound investments and established the 
Chinese government‟s supports for investment that could support enhance the national 
long-term growth potentials and economic benefits, while restricted irrational 
investments. In December 2017, China NDRC (national development and reform 
commission) additionally simplified the regulation process for outbound investment, 
with the most distinguished adjustment being the elimination of the NDRC 
pre-clearance condition. Robust craving for transaction that drop under the encouraged 
category, chiefly those in infrastructures, energy and power and utilities sectors to 
encourage the One Belt One Road initiative. While not precisely stated in the 
encouraged list, the government encourages outbound investment related to food 
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safeties, healthcare and pharmaceuticals and business with strong brand recognitions 
and the complementary international presence. 
 
5.2 Implications 
This thesis has implications for both research and practice. First, this thesis covered 
half of the cross-border transactions in China and all public companies involved in 
transactions, completed or not. The time period covered all transactions since the 
Chinese stock exchange was established. This thesis utilized a unique data set in 
Chinese public companies‟ cross-border M&As. The cross-border transactions were 
rather limited and had a shorter history. 
 
The Chinese government‟s opening-up policy offered opportunities to this type of 
business activity. The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China 
monitors all overseas direct investment, including cross-border M&As. The author 
expects this research to help Chinese bidder companies select better targets. The 
regional research in this thesis may help Chinese regulators develop better guidelines 
to approve investable projects and stop losses in a risky market. This thesis grouped 
markets as North America, Pan-Europe, Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world, and 
included 12 major industries. Future research on regional and industrial factors may 
be based on this thesis. Chinese companies have been in the M&As market for an 
extremely short time. Successful transactions are limited, and many transactions were 
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uncompleted. However, Chinese companies are fast learners; the teams are more 
professional than they were 10 years ago; have a better understanding of the market, 
culture, management, laws and taxes; and have begun helping transactions to 
completion. In the past two years, there were several remarkable transactions in 
Germany and Japan. This thesis provides better academic support for those activities. 
The results may also provide a guide to investors and future studies. 
 
The literature on method of payment is scant, and there have been few updates in 
recent years. Business activities may have to be changed because of a different 
investor structure, fiscal and monetary economic policies, culture, market size, etc. 
Therefore, it is necessary to update this special market. The majority of Chinese 
buyers finance their transactions with stock payments; however, the results indicated 
that those transactions underperformed compared with cash transactions. This thesis 
chose Chinese public companies as a starting point to evaluate their cross-border 
performance. The majority of bidder companies in China acquired overseas private 
firms as the previous literature suggested. This is a good situation for Chinese 
investors. This thesis attempted to specifically explain the regional differences in 
North America, Pan-Europe, Asia-Pacific and rest of the world; and other factors may 
affect performance in the short time period. This thesis could assist investors in 
choosing targets and creating a better return for their shareholders. 
 
The literature on financial institutional investors is also quite limited. In this thesis, 
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the author concluded that over 60% of transactions are conducted by overseas 
financial investors. Because of the ownership structures of these bidders, only very 
limited information may be obtained from bidder prospects. The author chose to begin 
with Chinese public targets. This is a unique perspective for cross-border M&A 
research. Because there are regional and industrial studies in this thesis, it may also 
provide advice to overseas investors when they consider acquiring a Chinese target. 
The thesis has introduced China‟s M&As market environment, regulations and data 
statistics of historical transactions. The Chinese opening-up policies sought to attract 
offshore corporations to invest in China; however, investigation remains difficult. 
Better understanding of China‟s market and policies is helping transaction completion. 
This also encourages the shareholders of Chinese companies to identify overseas 
buyers and financial investors. To become an overseas buyer‟s target is a sort of 
reward for its business and operations. Of course, hostile takeovers are not welcome 
although financial or strategic investors should be encouraged by Chinese companies. 
To optimize the ownership structure and improve management or financial support 
benefits shareholders. This thesis attempted to provide academic support in this field. 
 
5.3 Limitations 
There is blank space in this dissertation that the author will pursue in the future. This 
thesis selected Chinese public companies as the observation objects. The information 
and data were more accessible, and there were a clear trend and stock price volatility. 
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This dissertation only tested CAR for 2 and 5 days before and after the M&As 
announcement date. The long-term performance was not considered because of the 
volatility of the stock market in China. In recent decades, China experienced rapid 
development and economic reform, and the market environment and regulations 
changed frequently. There would be too much noise to test long-term performance. 
Government guidelines for industrial development in particular may have major 
effects on performance. There has been little research on method of payment in M&As 
transactions, and the details of the transactions tend to be confidential. It may be 
difficult for data collection to reflect all relevant factors. This is why this dissertation 
focused on listed companies. Although over 60% of transactions were financed with 
stock, this dissertation attempted to demonstrate that cash may be a better option to 
complete the transaction. Nevertheless, access to information and data collection 
remain difficult; thus, observation in this area is incomplete. In the Chinese 
cross-border M&As market, over half of transactions were traded by private 
companies.  
 
This is why this dissertation focused on listed companies. In fact, over 80% of 
transactions occurred with private companies, and acquiring a public target may 
render it difficult to complete the transaction. The author attempted to find Chinese 
evidence in this field to prove the theory. Nevertheless, access to information and data 
collection remain difficult, causing observation in this area to be less than complete. 
In the Chinese cross-border M&A market, the majority of transactions were traded by 
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private companies. Their investor information is confidential. Therefore, this 
dissertation covers less than 50% of transactions in China‟s cross-border M&As 
market. The results do not explain all situations and factors in this field. When private 
financial institutional investors seek investment opportunities, particularly buyout 
private equity funds, the investor information is confidential. It is quite difficult to 
access that information. And some of financial investors have no management effects 
on their acquisition targets. More underlying research may be required in the future. 
This dissertation attempted to fill a small gap in this area. Nevertheless, limited access 
to information and data collection renders it difficult to experience a complete 
observation in this area. In the cross-border M&As market, asset management 
managers and private funds are main players. They normally do not go public, which 
means there is no public information access. Their investor information is also 
confidential. Therefore, the only solution is to identify what they invest in, and they 
basically prefer to invest in private companies rather than public companies. 
Therefore, little information is available from public target companies. Moreover, 
long-term validity requires measurement and observation. 
 
5.4 Future Research 
M&As activities are also extremely active in the private market. In fact, this 
dissertation is more applicable when public companies acquire private targets. In 
Chapter 4, most transactions of overseas bidder firms were conducted with private 
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companies. Therefore, this thesis covered only approximately 50% of transactions, 
and the data and information disclosure in the Chinese stock market were insufficient. 
If there is more information obtainable, studies will be able to test more factors. This 
thesis conducted only shot-term performance analysis. Long-term performance 
analysis may also be conducted although there are many factors and circumstances 
that are not measurable. This test followed Lyon et al. (1999) to examine the BHARs 
(buy-and-hold abnormal returns) and to measure the 2-year long-term performance of 
acquisitions. BHARs may be calculated for a sample for more than 2 years after the 
transaction is completed. However, the author would be attempting to solve the data 
access issue on private transactions. Public and private transactions combined will 
demonstrate the results more accurately. 
300 
 
References 
Achampong, F. and Zemedkun, W. (1995) “An empirical and ethical analysis of 
factors motivating managers' merger decisions”, Journal of Business Ethics, 
14(10), pp.855-865. 
Agrawal, A. and Jaffe, J. (2000) “The Post Merger Performance Puzzle”, Advances in 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 1, pp.119-156. 
Aharon, D. Y., Gavious I. and Yosef R. (2010) “Stock Market Bubble Effects on 
Mergers and Acquisitions”, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 10, 
pp.456-70. 
Amihud, Y. and Lev, B. (1981) “Risk reduction as a managerial motive for 
conglomerate mergers”, The bell journal of economics, pp.605-617. 
Anderson, D., Haynes, A. and Heaney, R. (1994) “Company Takeovers and Equity 
Returns: The Target Size Effect”, Australian Journal of Management, 19(1), 
pp.1-30. 
Anderson, Hamish D., Marshall, Ben R. and Wales, Ryan (2009) “What is the 
relationship between investor protection legislation and target takeover returns? 
Evidence from Europe”, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 19(4), 
pp.291-305. 
Anderson, P. F., (1982) “Marketing, strategic planning and the theory of the firm”, The 
Journal of Marketing, 46(2), pp.15-26. 
Anderson, J. and Sutherland, D. (2015) “Developed economy investment promotion 
agencies and emerging market foreign direct investment: the case of Chinese FDI 
in Canada”, Journal of world business, 50(4), pp.815-825. 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E. (2001) “New evidence and perspectives on 
mergers”, Journal of Economic Perspective, 15(2), pp.103-120. 
301 
 
Andre, P., Kooli, M., and L‟Her, J., (2004) “The Long-Run Performance of Mergers and 
Acquisitions: Evidence from Canadian Stock Marker”, Financial Management, 
33(4), pp.27-43. 
Angwin, D. (2007) Mergers and Acquisitions, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. 
Antoniou A., Petmezas D. and Zhao H. (2007) “Bidder Gains and Losses of Firms 
Involved in Many Acquisitions”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 34, 
(7-8), pp.1221-1244. 
Arzac, Enrique R. (2004) Valuation for Mergers, Buyouts and Restructuring, Social 
Science Electronic Publishing, 2
nd
 Edition.  
Asquith, P., Bruner, R. F. and Mullins, D. W. Jr, (1983) “The Gains to Bidding Firms 
from Merger”, Journal of Financial Economics, 11, pp.121-139. 
Baik, K. (1995) “Horizontal Mergers of Price-Setting Firms with Sunk Capacity Costs”, 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 35(3), pp.245-256. 
Bajo, Emanuele, Barbi, Massimiliano, Bigelli, Marco and Hillier, David (2013) “The 
role of institutional investors in public-to-private transactions”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 37(11), pp.4327-4336. 
Ball, Ray (1978) “Anomalies in relationships between securities' yields and 
yield-surrogates”, Journal of Financial Economics, 6, pp.103-126. 
Barber, B.M. and Lyon, J.D. (1997) “Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: the 
empirical power and specification of test statistics”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 43, pp.341-372. 
Barkema, H. and Vermeulen, F. (1998) “International expansion through start-up or 
acquisition: a learning perspective”, Academy of Management, 41(1), pp.7–27. 
Beckenstein, A.R. (1979) Merger Activity and Merger Theories: An Empirical 
Investigation, Antitrust Bulletin 24: Antitrust Bull. 
302 
 
Berkovitch, E. and Narayanan, M.P. (1993) “Motives for takeovers: An empirical 
investigation”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28(03), 
pp.347-362. 
Berger, P. and Ofek, E. (1995) “Diversification's effect on firm value”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 37(1), pp.39-65. 
Berry, J., (1983) “Acculturation: A comparative analysis of alternative forms”, In R. 
Samuda & S. Woods. (ed.) Perspectives in immigrant and minority education, 
MD: University Press of America, pp.66-77. 
Bert, A. and Timothy, M. D. (2003) “Two Merger Integration Imperatives: Urgency 
and Execution”, Strategy and Leadership, 31(3), pp.42-49. 
Bertrand, O. and Betschinger, M. (2011) “Performance of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions: empirical evidence from Russian acquirers”, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
Berkovith, E. and Narayanan, M. P. (1993) “Motives of Takeovers: an empirical 
investigation”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Economics, 28, 
pp.347-362. 
Black, E., Guo, M., Doukas, A. J. and Xing, X. (2013) “Gains to Chinese Bidder 
Firms: Domestic vs. Foreign Acquisitions”, European Financial Management. 
Blake, R. and Mouton S. (1985) “The managerial grid III: a new look at the classic 
that has boosted productivity and profits for thousands of corporations 
worldwide”, Gulf Publishing Company. 
Bloomberg Briefs (2014) Lenovo heeds Jiang’s ‘go out’ call in second China M&A 
wave, Available at: 
http://briefs.blpprofessional.com/issue?id=eB3OrkYxuzcVK2N9bWg7tQ__ 
Bi, Xiao Gang and Wang, Danni (2014) “Mutual Fund's Trading and Chinese Mergers 
and Acquisitions”, Procedia Economics and Finance, 14, pp.82-89. 
Bradley, M., Desai, A. and Kim, E. (1988) “Synergistic gains from corporate 
acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring 
firms”, Journal of Financial Economics, 21(1), pp.3-40. 
303 
 
Brealey, R., Myers, S. and Allen, F. (2006) Corporate finance, London: McGraw-Hill 
Irwin. 
Bresman, Henrik and Birkinshaw, (1999) “Knowledge Transfer in International 
Acquisitions”, Journal of International Business Studies, 30(3), pp.439. 
Brown, Stephen J. and Warner, Jerold B. (1985) “Using Daily Stock Returns: The 
Case of Event Studies”, Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), pp.3-31. 
Bruner, R.F. (2002) “Does M&A pay? A survey of evidence for the decision-maker”, 
Journal of Applied Finance, 12(1), pp.48-68. 
Bruner, R.F. (2004) Applied mergers and acquisitions, Hoboken, N.J.; Chichester: 
John Wiley&Sons. 
Bruner, R.F. (2004) “Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker”, 
Journal of Applied Finance, 12(1), pp.48-68. 
Boateng, A. and Glaister, W. (2003) “Strategic motives for international joint venture 
formation in Ghana”, Management International Review, 43(2), pp.107–128. 
Bouwman, Christa H.S., Fuller, K. and Nain, M.S. (2003) “Stock market valuation 
and mergers”, MIT Sloan Management Review, pp.9-11. 
Bouwman, C.H., Fuller, S.K. and Nian, A.S.  (2008) “Market Valuation and 
Acquisition Quality: Empirical Evidence”, Review of Financial Studies 
Forthcoming. 
Bouwman, C.H.S., Fuller, K., and Nain, A.S., (2009) “Market valuation and 
acquisition quality: empirical evidence”, The Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 
pp.633-679. 
Buono and Bowditch (1989) The Human Side Of Mergers And Acquisitions, 
Washington, DC: BeardBooks. 
Boateng, Q. and Wang, T. Yang. (2008) “Cross-border M&As by Chinese firms: An 
analysis of strategic motives and firm value”, Thunderbird International 
Business Review, 50(4), pp.259–270. 
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B. (1985) “Using daily stock returns: The case of event 
304 
 
studies”, Journal of financial economics, 14(1), pp.3-31. 
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2008) “Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-08”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), pp.77-100. 
Campa, J. and Kedia, S. (2002) “Explaining the Diversification Discount”, Journal of 
Finance, 57(4), pp.1731-1762. 
Campbell, Cynthia J., Cowan, Arnold R. and Salotti, V. (2010) “Multi-country 
Event-Study Methods”, Journal of Banking and Finance, pp.3078-90. 
Chang, S. and Hong, J. (2002) “How much does the business group matter in Korea?”, 
Strategic Management Journal, 23(3), pp.265-274. 
Chen, Gongmeng, Firth, Michael, and Xu Liping, (2009) “Does the type of ownership 
control matter? Evidence from China‟s listed companies”, Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 33(1), pp.171-181. 
Chong, S. (2007) The law and practice of mergers and acquisitions in the People's 
Republic of China, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cabanda, E. and Pajara-Pascual, M. (2007) “Merger in the Philippines: Evidence in 
the Corporate Performance of William, Gothong, and Aboitiz (WG&A) Shipping 
Companies”, Journal of Business Case Studies, 3(4) pp.87-100. 
Calomiris, C.W, Fisman R. and Wang, Y. (2010) “Profiting from government stakes in 
a command economy: evidence from Chinese asset sales”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 96, pp.399–412. 
Cao, Yanling (2013) Empirical research on the value creation of merger & 
acquisition—Data from Chinese listed companies, Information Management, 
Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII), 2013 6th 
International Conference. 
Capron, L. and Pistre, N. (2002) “When Do Acquirers Earn Abnormal Returns?”, 
Strategic Management Journal, 23, pp.781-794. 
Cartwright, S. and Cooper, C. (1993) “The Role of Culture Compatibility in 
Successful Organizational Marriage”, Academy Management Review, 7(2), 
pp.57-70. 
305 
 
Cassiman, B. and Colombo, M. G. (2006) Mergers & Acquisitions: the Innovation 
Impact, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Caves, R. E. (1989) “Mergers, takeovers, and economic efficiency: Foresight vs. 
hindsight”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 7(1), pp.151-174. 
Chang, S. (1998) “Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payments, and 
Bidder Returns”, The Journal of Finance, 53 (2), pp.773-784. 
Chatterjee, S., Lubatkin, M., Schweiger, D.M. and Weber, Y. (1992) “Cultural 
Differences and Shareholder Value in Related Merger: Linking Equity and 
Human Capital”, Strategic Management Journal, 13(5), pp. 319-334. 
Chatterjee, S. (1986) “Types of synergy and economic value: the impact of 
acquisitions on merging and rival firms”, Strategy Management Journal, 7 (2), 
pp.119–139. 
Chen, G., Firth, M. and Xu, L. (2009) “Does the type of ownership control matter? 
Evidence from china‟s listed companies”, Journal of Bank Finance, 33 (1), 
pp.171–181. 
Chen X. and Liu Z. (1999) The usefulness research on A-share market surplus report, 
Beijing: Economic Research Press, pp.21-28. 
Chen X. and Zhang Y. (1999) Market reaction of assets restructuring, Beijing: 
Economic Research Press, pp.25-27. 
Chen, Y.Y. and Young, M. N. (2009) “Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions by 
Chinese Listed Companies: A Principal-Principal Perspective”, Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management, 27(3), pp.523-539. 
Chen, F. and Wang, Y. (2012) “Integration Risk in Cross-border M&A Based on 
Internal and External Resource: Empirical Evidence from China”, Quality and 
Quantity, 48(1), pp. 281-295. 
Choi, J. and Russell, J. (2004) “Economic Gains around Mergers and Acquisitions in 
the Construction Industry of the United States of American”, Canadian Journal 
of Civil Engineering, 31(3), pp.513-525. 
Chor, D. and Manova, K. (2012) “Off the cliff and back? Credit conditions and 
306 
 
international trade during the global financial crisis”, Journal of International 
Economics, 87, pp.117-133. 
Chung, W. and Alcacer, J. (2002) “Knowledge Seeking and Location Choices of 
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States”, Management Science, 48(12), 
pp.1534-1554. 
Claessens, Stijn, Erik, Feijen and Luc, Laeven (2008) “Political connections and 
preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 88(3), pp.554-580. 
Coase.H. (1937) “The Natural of the Firm”, Journal Economics, 4(16), pp.386-40. 
Coeurdacier, N., De Santis, R.A. and Aviat, A. (2009) “Cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and European integration”, Economic Policy, pp.55-106. 
Copeland, Thomas, E. and Weston, J. Fred (1988) Financial Theory and Corporate 
Policy, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley. 
Cornett, Marcia Millon, Ors, Evren and Tehranian, Hassan (2002) “Bank Performance 
around the Introduction of a Section 20 Subsidiary”, 57, pp.501-521. 
Croci, E., Petmezas, D. and Vagenas-Nanos, E. (2010) “Managerial Overconfidence 
in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions”, International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 19(5), pp.368-378. 
Cull, Robert and Lixin Colin Xu. (2003) “Who gets credit? The behavior of 
bureaucrats and state banks in allocating credit to Chinese state-owned 
enterprises”, Journal of Development Economics, 71(2), pp.533-559. 
Da Graca Tarcisio B. (2010) “Improving the Statistical Power of Financial Event 
Studies: The Inverse Variance Weighted Average-Based Test”, Journal of 
Empirical Finance, pp.803-817. 
Daniel, Betty C. (2012) “Private Sector Risk and Financial Crises in Emerging 
Markets”, Economic Journal, 122(561), pp.825-847. 
Da Silva Rosa, Raymond, Limmack, Robin, Supriadi and Woodliff, David (2004) 
“The Equity Wealth Effects of Method of Payment in Takeover Bids for 
Privately Held Firms”, Australian Journal of Management, 29(1), pp.93-110. 
307 
 
Datta, D.K. (1991) “Organizational Fit and Acquisition Performance: Effects of 
Post-acquisition Integration”, Strategic Management Journal, 12(4), pp.281-297. 
Datta, D. K., Pinches, G. E. and Narayanan, V.K. (1992) “Factors influencing Wealth 
Creation from Mergers and Acquisition: A Meta-analysis”, Strategic 
Management Journal, 13(1), pp.67-84. 
Datta, D. K. and Puia, G. (1995) “Cross-border acquisitions: An examination of the 
influence of relatedness and cultural fit on shareholder value creation in US 
acquiring firms”, Management International Review, 35, pp.337–359. 
Deans, G. K., Kroeger, F. and Zeisel, S. (2003) Winning the Merger Endgame: A 
Playbook for Profiting from Industry Consolidation, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
DeLong, G. (2001) “Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank 
mergers”, Journal of Financial Economics, 59, pp.221-252. 
DeLong, G. (2003) “Does long-term performance of mergers match market 
expectations? Evidence from the US banking industry”, Financial Management, 
pp.5-25. 
Dension, D. R., Adkins, B. and Guidroz, A. M. (2011) “Managing Cultural 
International in Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions”, Advances in Global 
Leadership, 6, pp.95-115. 
DePamphilis, D. (2010) “Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring Activities: 
An Integrated Approach to Process, Tools, Cases, and Solutions”, Amsterdam, 
London Academic. 
Desai, A. S. and Stover, R. D. (1985) “Bank holding company acquisitions, 
stockholder returns, and regulatory uncertainty”, Journal of Financial Research, 
8(2), pp.145-156. 
Dickerson, A., Gibson, H. and Tsakalotos, E. (1997) “The Impact of Acquisitions on 
Company Performance: Evidence from a Large Panel of UK Firms”, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 49(3), pp.344-361. 
Ding, S., Guariglia, A. and Knight, J. B. (2010) Does China overinvest? Evidence 
from a panel of Chinese firms, Working Paper, University of Oxford, Department 
308 
 
of Economics. 
Dixon Wilcox, H., Chang, K. and Grover, V. (2001) “Valuation of mergers and 
acquisitions in the telecommunications industry: a study on diversification and 
firm size”, Information & Management, 38(7), pp.459-471. 
Dong, Baomin and Guixia, Guo (2013) “A model of China's export strengthening 
outward FDI”, China Economic Review, 27, pp.208-226. 
Dos Santos, M.B., Errunza, V.R. and Miller, D.P. (2008) “Does corporate international 
diversification destroy value? Evidence from cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, pp.2716-2724. 
Doukas, J., Guo, M. and Zhou, B., (2011) “Hot” Debt Markets and Capital Structure”, 
European Financial Management, 17(1), pp.46-99. 
Doukas, J. and Travlos, G. (1988) “The effects of corporate multi-nationalism on 
shareholders‟ wealth: Evidence from international acquisitions”, Journal of 
Finance, 43, pp.1161–1175. 
Draper, P. and Paudyal, K (2006) “Acquisitions: private versus public”, European 
financial management, 12(1), pp.57-80. 
Dutta, Shantanu, Saadi, Samir and Zhu, Pengcheng (2013) “Does payment method 
matter in cross-border acquisitions?”, International Review of Economics and 
Finance, 25, pp.91-107. 
Eastman Jacqueline K., Iyer R. and Wiggenhorn Joan M. (2010) “The Short-Term 
Impact of Super Bowl Advertising on Stock Prices: An Exploratory Event Study”, 
Journal of Applied Business Research, pp.69-84. 
Emery, Gary W. and Switzer, Jeannette A. (1999) “Expected Market Reaction and the 
Choice of Method of Payment for Acquisitions”, Financial Management, 28(4), 
pp.73-86. 
Faccio, Mara, Ronald W. Masulis and John McConnell (2006) “Political connections 
and corporate bailouts”, The Journal of Finance, 61(6), pp.2597-2635. 
Faccio, M., McConnell, J.J. and Stolin, D. (2006) “Returns to acquirers of listed and 
unlisted targets”, Journal Financial Quant Anal, 41(1), pp.97–220. 
309 
 
Fama, Eugene F., Fisher, Lawrence, Jensen, Michael C. and Roll, Richard (1969) 
“The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information”, International Economic 
Review, 10(1), pp.1-21. 
Fama, E. F. (1970) “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work”, The Journal of Finance, 25(2), pp.383-417. 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993) “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks 
and bonds”, Journal of Financial Economics, 33, pp.3-56. 
Fausto, Panunzi and Holger M. Müller (2004) “Tender Offers and Leverage”, 
Quarterly journal of economics, 4, pp.1217-1248. 
Feito-Ruiz, I. and Menéndez-Requejo, S. (2012) “Diversification in M&As: Decision 
and shareholders valuation”, The Spanish Review of Financial Economics, 10(1), 
pp.30-40. 
Feng, G. and Wu, L. (2001) “The empirical study of M&A performance in Chinese 
listed ﬁrms”, Economic Res. Journal, 36(1), pp.54–68. 
Feroz, E. H., Kim, S. and Raab, R. (2005) “Performance Measurement in Corporate 
Governance: Do Mergers Improve Managerial Performance in the Post-Merger 
Period?”, Review of Accounting and Finance, 4, pp.86-101. 
Firth, M. (1980) “Takeovers, shareholder returns, and the theory of the firm”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94(2), pp.235-260. 
Franks, J. and Harris, R. (1989) “Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 23(2), pp.225-249. 
Franks, J., Harris, R. and Titman, S. (1991) “The post-merger share-price performance 
of acquiring firms”, Journal of Financial Economics, 29, pp.81-96. 
Friedman, A. and Gibson, R. (1988) “Philip Morris Co. is bidding $90 a share for Kraft 
Inc. in $11 billion tender offer‟, Wall Street Journal, pp.3. 
Friedrich, T. (1990) “Merger Motives and Merger Prescriptions”, Strategic 
310 
 
Management Journal, 11(4), pp.283-295. 
Fuller, K., Netter, J. and Stegemoller, M. (2002) “What do returns to acquiring firms tell 
us? Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions”, Journal of Finance, 57(4), 
pp.1763-1793. 
Gao, T. (2003) “Ethnic Chinese networks and international investment: Evidence from 
inward FDI in China”, Journal of Asian Economics, 14(4), pp.6211-629. 
Gärtner, D and Halbheer, D (2009) “Are there waves in merger activity after all?”, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(6), pp.708-718. 
Gates, S. and Very, P. (2003) “Measuring Performance During M&A Integration”, 
Long Range Planning, 36(2), pp.167-185. 
Gaughan, P.A. (2011) Mergers, acquisitions, and corporate restructurings, Hoboken, 
N.J. Wiley. 
Gell, J., Kenelbach, J.F. and Roos, A. (2008) The return of strategist: Creating value 
with M&A in Downturns, Boston consulting Group. 
Ghauri, N. and Buckley, J. (2003) “International mergers and acquisitions: Past, 
present and future”, Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2, pp.207–229. 
Ghosh, A. (2001) “Does operating performance really improve following corporate 
acquisitions?”, Journal of corporate finance, 7(2), pp.151-178. 
Ghosh, A. and Jain P.C. (2000) “Financial leverage changes associated with corporate 
mergers”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 6, pp.377-402. 
Global Research (2012) China: Rise, Fall and Re-Emergence as a Global Power, 
[Online] Available at: 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/china-rise-fall-and-re-emergence-as-a-global-po
wer/29644. 
Globerman, Steven and Daniel, Shapiro (2009) “Economic and strategic considerations 
surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States”, Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 26(1), pp.163-183. 
311 
 
Glodberg, W.H. (1983) Mergers: Motives, Modes, Methods, New York: Nichols 
Publishing Company. 
Gort M. (1969) “An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 83, pp.624–642. 
Gorton, G. and Rosen, R. (1995) “Corporate control, portfolio choice, and the decline 
of banking”, Journal of Finance, 50(5), pp.1377-1420. 
Golbe, D. L. and White, L. J. (1988) “A Time Series Analysis of Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the U.S Economy”, in Auerbach, A. J., (eds.), Corporate 
Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Chicago, Illinois, University of Chicago 
Press, pp.265-302. 
Graham, J., Lemmon, M. and Wolf, J. (2001) “Does Corporate Diversification 
Destroy Value?”, SSRN Journal. 
Grave, K., Vardiabasis, D. and Yavas, B. (2012) “The Global Financial Crisis and 
M&A”, International Journal of Business and Management, 07(11), pp.56-66. 
Gregory, A. (1997) “An Examination of the Long Run Performance of U.K. Acquiring 
Firms”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 24, pp.971-1002. 
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1980) “Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and 
the theory of the corporation”, The Bell Journal of Economics, pp.42-64. 
Groff, J.E., Lien, D. and Su, J. (2007) “Measuring efficiency gains from hospital 
mergers”, Research in Healthcare Financial Management, 11(1), pp.77-90. 
Grubb, T. and Lamb, R. (2000) “Capitalize on merger chaos”, New York Free Press, 
pp.5-19. 
Gu, M. Z. P., Wu, P. and Zhong, L. (2010) “China – M&A: Opportunities and 
Challenges”, Online Review, [Online] Available at: 
http://www.zhonglun.com/upfile/File/China%20M&A_Euromoney.pdf. 
Guang Yu and Rong Yang (2000) “The theoretical analysis and empirical study of the 
effect of the stock acquisition”, Contemporary Finance & Economics, 7, 
312 
 
pp.70-74. 
Gugler, K., Mueller, D, Yurtoglu, B. and Zulehner, C. (2003) “The Effects of Merger: 
an International Comparison”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
21, pp.625-653. 
Guo, M. J. and Permezas, D. (2012) “What are the Causes and Effects of M&As? The 
UK Evidence”, Multinational Finance Journal, 16(1/2), pp.21-47. 
Guo, T. (2010) “An anslysis of the impact from NPC and CPPCC on Chinese 
economic and capital market”, International Business Times. 
Gupta, D. and Gerchak, Y. (2000) “Quantifying Operational Synergies in a 
Merger/Acquisition”, University of Minnesota Tel-Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv. 
Haleblian, J. and Finkelstein, S. (1999) “The Influence of Organizational Acquisition 
Experience”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, pp.29-56. 
Hansen, Robert G. (1987) “A theory for the choice of exchange medium in mergers 
and acquisitions”, Journal of Business, .60(1), pp.75-95. 
Harford, J. (2005) “What drives merger waves”, Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 
pp.529-560. 
Harris, R.S. and Rravenseraft (1995) “The role of foreign Acquisitions in foreign direct 
investment: Evidence form the U.S. Stock Market”, Journal of Finance, 46, 
pp.825-844 
Hawawini, G. A. and Swary, I. (1990) “Mergers and acquisitions in the US banking 
industry: Evidence from the capital markets”, North-Holland Amsterdam. 
Haspeslagh, P. and Jemison, D. (1991) “The challenge of renewal through 
acquisitions”, Planning Review, 19(2), pp.27-30. 
Haspeslagh, P. C. and Jemison, D. B. (1991) Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value 
Through Corporate Renewal, New York: The Free Press. 
Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. and Ruback, R. S. (1992) “Does corporate performance 
improve after mergers?”, Journal of financial economics, 31(2), pp.135-175. 
313 
 
Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. and Ruback, R. S. (1997) “Which takeovers are profitable? 
Strategic or financial?”, Sloan Management Review, 38(4), pp.45-57. 
Hennart, Jean-Francois and Park, Young-Ryeol (1993) “Greenfield vs. Acquisition: 
The Strategy of Japanese Investors in the United States”, Management Science, 
39(9), pp.1054-1070. 
Heron, R. and Lie, E. (2002) “Operating Performance and the Method of Payment in 
Takeovers”, Journal of Financial and Quantitive Analysis, pp.137-156. 
Humphery-Jenner, M. and Powell, R. (2014) “Firm size, sovereign governance, and 
value creation: Evidence from the acquirer size effect”, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 26, pp.57-77. 
Homburg, C. and Bucerius, M. (2006) “Is Speed of Integration Really a Success 
Factor of Merger and Acquisition? An Analysis of the Role of Internal and 
External Relatedness”, Strategic Management Journal, 27, pp.347-367. 
Houston, J. F., James, C. M. and Ryngaert, M. D. (2001) “Where do merger gains 
come from? Bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders”, 
Journal of financial economics, 60(2), pp.285-331. 
Houston, J. F. and Ryngaert, M. D. (1994) “The overall gains from large bank 
mergers”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 18(6), pp.1155-1176. 
Hovakimian, A., Opler, T. and Titman, S. (2001) “The Debt-Equity Choice”, Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 36(1), pp.1-24. 
Ismail, T. H., Abdou, A. A. and Annis, R. M. (2011) “Review of Literature Linking 
Corporate Performance to Mergers and Acquisitions”, The Review of Financial 
and Accounting Studies, 1, pp.89-104. 
Ismail, T. H., Abdou, A. A. and Annis, R.M. (2010) “Exploring Improvement of 
Post-Merger Corporate Performance-the Case of Egypt”, The Icfai University, 
Journal of Business Strategy. 
James, C. M. and Wier, P. (1987) “Returns to acquirers and competition in the 
acquisition market: The case of banking”, Journal of Political Economy, 95(2), 
pp.355-70. 
314 
 
Jarrell, G., Brickley, J. and Netter, J. (1988) “The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Empirical Evidence Since 1980”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, pp.49-68. 
Jenson, M.C. (1986) “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and 
takeovers”, American Economic Review, 76(2), pp.323-29. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 
pp.305-360. 
Jensen, M. and Ruback, R. (1983) “The market for corporate control”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 11(1-4), pp.5-50. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986) “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers”, American Economic Review, 76(2), pp.323-329. 
Jiang, F., Stone, G. R., Sun, J. and Zhang, M. (2011) “”Managerial Hubris, Firm 
Expansion and Firm Performance: Evidence from China”, The Social Science 
Journal, 48(3), pp.489-499. 
Jones, S. C. (1982) Successful Management of Acquisitions, Derek Beattle Publishing. 
Jovanovic, B. and Rousseau, P. L. (2002) The Q-theory of mergers, National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Kalinova, B., Palerm, A. and Thomsen, S. (2010) OECD's FDI Restrictiveness Index, 
OECD Working Papers. 
Kim, W. S. and Lyn, E.O. (1986) “Excess Market Value, the Multinational 
Corporation, and Tobin's Q-Ratio”, Journal of International Business Studies, 
17(01), pp.119-125. 
Kling, G. (2006) “The Long-Term Impact of Mergers and the Emergence of a Merger 
Wave in Pre-World-War I Germany”, Explorations in Economic History, 43(3) 
pp.667-688. 
Koyama, Takeshi and Stephen S. Golub (2006) OECD's FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index, OECD Working Papers. 
Kumar, R. (2009) “Post-Merger Corporate Performance: an Indian Perspective”, 
Management Research News, 32(2) pp.145-157. 
315 
 
Lajoux, A. R. and Weston, J. F. (1998) “Do deals deliver on post-merger 
performance?”, Mergers and Acquisitions-Philadelphia, 33, pp.34-37. 
Lambkin, M. and Muzellec, L. (2008) “Rebranding in the banking industry following 
mergers and acquisitions”, International Journal of Bank Marketing, 26(5), 
pp.328-352. 
Lamont, D. and Polk. V. (2001) “Factors Influencing Wealth Creation from Mergers 
and Acquisitions: A Meta-Analysis”, Strategic Management Journal, 13, 
pp.67-86. 
Lane P., Cannella A. and Lubatkin M. (1998) “Agency problems as antecedents to 
unrelated mergers and diversification: Amihud and Lev reconsidered” Strategic 
Management Journal, 19(6), pp.555-578. 
Langford, D. and Male, S. (2001) Strategic Management in Construction Blackwell 
Science, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons. 
Lang, L. and Stulz, R. (1994) “Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm 
Performance”, Journal of Political Economy, 102(6), p.1248. 
Lang, L., Stulz, R. and Walkling, R. (1991) “A test of the free cash flow hypothesis”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 29(2), pp.315-335. 
Lang, L., Rene, H. P., Stulz, M. and Walkling, R. A. (1989) “Managerial Performance, 
Tobin‟s Q, and the Gains from Successful Tender Offers”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 24, pp.137-154. 
Langetieg, T. C. (1978) “An application of a three-factor performance index to 
measure stockholder gains from merger”, Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 
pp.365-383. 
Larsson, R. and Finkelstein, S. (1999) “Integrating Strategic, Organizational, and 
Human Resource Perspectives on Mergers and Acquisitions: A Case Survey of 
Synergy Realization”, Organization Science, 10(1), pp.1-26. 
Li, David K.P. (1995) “Enter the dragon: Hong Kong's growing role in world finance”, 
Columbia Journal of World Business, 30(2), pp.34-40. 
Li, Shanmin and Chen, Yugang (2002) “Study on Wealth Effects of M&A of Listed 
316 
 
Companies”, Economic Research Journal, 11, pp.27-35. 
Li, Xia (2010) “Chinese Cross-Borders M&A now statue and strategies”, Journal of 
International Business and Economics practice, 2. 
Liang L. (2002) “The empirical analysis of Chinese listed company merger and 
acquisition performance”, World Economic Papers, pp.50-61. 
Lipton, Martin (2006) Merger Waves in the 19th, 20th and 21st Centuries, The Davies 
Lecture Osgoode Hall Law School York University. 
Loughran, T. and Vijh, A. M. (1997) “Do long-term shareholders benefit from 
corporate acquisitions?”, The Journal of Finance, 52(5), pp.1765-1790. 
Lu, F., Song, G., Tang, J., Zhao, H. and Liu, L. (2008) “Profitability of China's 
Industrial Firms (1978-2006)”, China Economic Journal, 1(1), pp.1-31. 
Luo, Y. and Tun, R. L. (2007) “International expansion of emerging market 
enterprises: A springboard perspective”, Journal of International Business 
Studies, 38, pp.481-498. 
Lubatkin, M. (1987) “Merger strategies and stockholder value”, Strategic 
Management Journal, 8(1), pp.39-53. 
Lybeck, J.A (2011) A Global History of the Financial Crash of 2007–10, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lyon, J.D., Barber, B.M. and Tsai, C.L. (1999) “Improved methods for tests of long‐
run abnormal stock returns”, The Journal of Finance, 54(1), pp.165-201. 
Mackie‐Mason, Jeffrey K. (1990) “Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?”, 
Journal of Finance, 45(5), pp.1471-1493 
Maloney, M., McCormick, R. and Mitchell, M. (1993) “Managerial Decision Making 
and Capital Structure”, Journal of Business, 66(2), pp.189. 
Malatesta P.H. and Thompson R. (1985) “Partially anticipated events a model of stock 
price reactions with an application to corporate acquisitions”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 14(2), pp.237-250. 
Mandelker, G. (1974) “Risk and return: The case of merging firms”, Journal of 
317 
 
Financial Economics, 1(4), pp.303-335. 
Mantravadi, P. and Reddy, A. (2008) Relative Size in Mergers and Operating 
Performance: Indian Experience, Working Paper Series. 
Manzon, G.B., Sharp, D.J. and Travlos, N.G. (1994) “An Empirical Study of the 
Consequences of U.S. Tax Rules for International Acquisitions by U.S. Firms”, 
Journal of Finance, 49, pp.1893-1904 
Mariana, V. (2011) “Mergers and Acquisitions Waves from the European Union 
Perspective”, Annals of Faculty of Economics, 20(1), pp.306-312. 
Markowitz, H. (1959) Portfolio selection: Efficient diversification of investments, 
John Wiley & Sons, New York. 
Markham, J. W. (1973) Conglomerate Enterprise and Public Policy, Boston: Division 
of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. 
Marris, R. (1964) The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, Free Press, 
Glenncoe. 
Martin, Kenneth J. (1996) “The method of payment in corporate acquisitions, 
investment opportunities, and management ownership”, The Journal of Finance, 
51(4), pp.1227-1246. 
Martynova, M. and Renneboog, L. (2006) “Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe”, 
SSRN Journal. 
Marsh, P. (1982) “The choice between equity and debt: an empirical study”, Journal of 
Finance, 37, pp.159–85. 
Markides. C. and Oyon. D. (1989) “International acquisitions: Do They Create Value 
for Shareholder?”, European Management Journal, 2, pp.125-135. 
Masulis, R.W., Wang, C. and Xie, F. (2007) “Corporate Governance and Acquirer 
Returns”, The Journal of Finance, 62(4), pp.1851-1889. 
Masulis, R.W. (1980) “The effects of capital structure change on security prices: A 
study of exchange offers”, Journal of Financial Economics, 8, pp.139-178. 
318 
 
Meeks, G. (1977) “Disappointing marriage: A study of the gains from merger”, CUP 
Archive, 51. 
Megginson, W., Morgan, A. and Nail, L. (2004) “The Determinate of Positive 
Long-Term Performance in Strategic Merger: Corporate Focus and Cash”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, pp.523-552. 
Meyer, David R. (2015) “The world cities of Hong Kong and Singapore: Network hubs 
of global finance”, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 56(3-4), 
pp.198-231. 
Mirvis, Philip H. and Marks, Mitchell L. (1992) Managing the Merger: Making It Work, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Mirvis, P. and Marks, M. (2001) “Making mergers and acquisitions work: Strategic and 
psychological preparation, Academy of Management Executive”, 15(2), 
pp.80-94. 
Mitchell, M. and Mulherin, J. (1996) “The impact of industry shocks on takeover and 
restructuring activity”, Journal of Financial Economics, 41, pp.193–229. 
Morck, R. and Yeung, B. (1991) “Why investors value multi-nationality”, Journal of 
Business, 64(2), pp.165-187. 
Moeller, S., Schlingemann, F. and Stulz, R. (2004) “Firm size and the gains from 
acquisitions”, Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), pp.201-228. 
Moeller, S. and Brady, C. (2007) Intelligent M&A: navigating the mergers and 
acquisitions minefield, Chichester, West Sussex, England; Hoboken, N.J.: J. 
Wiley & Sons. 
Morellec, Erwan and Zhdanov Alexei (2008) “Financing and takeovers”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87(3), pp.556-581. 
Moeller, Sara B. and Schlingemann, Frederik P. (2005) “Global diversification and 
bidder gains: A comparison between cross-border and domestic acquisitions”, 
319 
 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(3), pp.533-564. 
Moeller Sara B., Frederik P. Schlingemann, and Rene M. Stulz (2007) “How do 
diversity of opinion and information asymmetry affect acquirer returns”, Review 
of Financial Studies, 20, pp.2047-2078. 
Mueller, D. (1979) Testimony before U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary; 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights, 96th Congress, 1st 
Session; Serial No. 96-26, 302-312. 
Mueller, D. (1980) The Determinants and Effects of Mergers, Cambridge: 
Oelgeschlager. 
Mueller, D., (1985) Mergers and Market Share, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 67(2), pp. 259-267. 
Mueller, D. (1989) “Mergers: Causes, Effects, and Policies”, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 7, pp.1-10. 
Müller-Stewens, G., Kunisch, S. and Binder, A. (2010) Mergers and Acquisitions, 
Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag. 
Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas S. Majluf (1984) “Corporate financing and 
investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have”, 
Journal of financial economics, 13(2), pp.187-221. 
Nahavandi, A. and Malekzadeh, R. (1993) “Organizational culture in the management 
of mergers”, Corporate reorganizations, 58, pp.181-253. 
Nardozza, L. (1997) “Resource Redeployment Following Horizontal Acquisitions in 
Europe and North America 1988-1992”, Strategic Management Journal, 19(7), 
pp.631-661. 
Neely, W.P. (1987) “Banking Acquisitions: Acquirer and Target Shareholder Returns”, 
Financial Management, 16(4), pp.66-74. 
Netter, Jeffry, Mike Stegemoller and M. Babajide Wintoki (2011) “Implications of 
data screens on merger and acquisition analysis: A large sample study of mergers 
and acquisitions from 1992 to 2009”, Review of Financial Studies forthcoming. 
Norris, F. (2009) the New York Times, [Online] Available at: 
320 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/business/economy/06norris.html?pagewant
ed=all&_r=1&. 
Oduro, I. M. and Agyei, S. K. (2013) “Mergers & Acquisitions and Firms 
Performance: Evidence from the Ghana Stock Exchange”, Research Journal of 
Finance and Accounting, pp.4-7. 
Officer, Micah S. (2007) “The price of corporate liquidity: Acquisition discounts for 
unlisted targets”, Journal of Financial Economics, 83, pp.571-598. 
Ooghe, H., Laere,E. V. and Langhe, T.D. (2006) “Are Acquisitions Worthwhile? An 
Empirical Study of the Post-Acquisition Performance of Privately Held Belgian 
Companies”, Small Business Economics, 27, pp.223–243. 
Pablo, A.L. (1994) “Determinants of Acquisitions Integration Level: A 
Decision-making Perspective”, Academy of Management Journal, 37, 
pp.803-830. 
Papadakis, Vassilis M. (2005) “The role of broader context and the communication 
program in merger and acquisition implementation success”, Management 
Decision, 43(2), pp.236-255. 
Parrino, James D. and Harris, Robert S. (1999) “Takeovers, management replacement, 
and post‐acquisition operating performance: some evidence from the 1980s”, 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 11(4), pp.88-96. 
Ramaswamy, K. and Waegelein, J. (2003) “Firm Financial Performance Following 
Mergers”, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 20, pp.115-126. 
Report on Foreign Investment in China (2013) [Online] Available at: 
http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/wzs/201312/20131211162942372 (Accessed: 12 
March 2014). 
Rhodes-Kropf, M. and Viswanathan, S. (2004) “Market valuation and merger waves”, 
The Journal of finance, 59(6), pp.2685-2718. 
Rhodes-Kropf, M., Robinson, D. T. and Vishhanathan, S. (2005) “Valuation waves 
and merger activity: The empirical evidence”, Journal of Financial Economics, 
321 
 
77, pp.561-603. 
Rhoades, S. A. (1993) “Efficiency effects of horizontal (in-market) bank mergers”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 17(2), pp.411-422. 
Robert F. Bruner. (2003) Dose M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the 
Decision-Maker, Working Paper, pp.5-15. 
Roll, R. (1986) “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers”, Journal of Business, 
59(8), pp.197-216. 
Ronald W. Masulis and Mara Faccio (2005) “The choice of payment method in 
European mergers and acquisitions”, The Journal of Finance, 30(3), 
pp.1345-1388. 
Ruyi, Dai, Hans, Mörner and Ulf, Grönkvist (2012) Comparative analysis of stock 
performance to announcement of mergers and acquisitions deals in China 
mainland and Hong Kong from 2000-2010, Economics, Sektionen för hälsa och 
samhälle (HOS); Högskolan i Halmstad, Sektionen för hälsa och samhälle 
(HOS). 
Ryu, K. H. and Lee, J. E. (2009) “The Determinant of Performance of Cross-Border 
M&As in China: A comparative study between overseas Sino and Anglo firms”, 
Chinese Business Review, 8(12) pp.44-52. 
Sawyer K.R. and Gygax A. (2001) How eventful are event studies?, Working paper, 
University of Melbourne. 
Schwert, G. William. (1996) “Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions”, 
Financial Economies, 41, pp.153-192. 
Schmidt, S. and Ruhli, E. (2002) “Prior strategy process as a key to understanding 
megamergers: the Novartis Case”, European Management Journal, 20(3) 
pp.223-234. 
Schipper, K. and Thompson, R. (1983) “The impact of merger-related regulations on 
the shareholders of acquiring firms”, Journal of Accounting research, 
pp.184-221. 
Selden, L. and Colvin, G. (2003) “M&A needn't be a loser's game”, Harvard Business 
322 
 
Review, 81(06), pp.70-79. 
Servaes, H. (1996) “The role of investment banks in acquisitions”, Review of 
Financial Studies, 9(3), pp.787-815. 
Seth, A., Song, K.P. and Pettit, R. (2000) “Synergy, managerialism or hubris? An 
empirical examination of motives for foreign acquisitions of US firms”, Journal 
of International Business Studies, 31(3), pp.387-405. 
Shimizu, K., Hitt, M., Vaidyanath, D. and Pisano, V. (2004) “Theoretical foundations 
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions: A review of current research and 
recommendations for the future”, Journal of International Management, 10, 
pp.307–353. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1989) “Management entrenchment: The case of 
manager-specific investments”, Journal of financial economics, 25(1), 
pp.123-139. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert, W. (2003) “Stock market driven acquisitions”, 
Journal of financial Economics, 70(3), pp.295-311. 
Si, YueFang (2014) “The development of outward FDI regulation and the 
internationalization of Chinese firms”, Journal of Contemporary China, 23(89) , 
pp.804-821. 
Silveri, Sabatino (2009) The trading and impact of institutional investors in target 
firms around merger bids, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. 
Sokol, D. (2013) “Merger Control under China‟s Anti-Monopoly Law”, Minnesota 
Legal Studies Research, 13(5). 
Soenke Sievers, Christopher Frederik Mokwa and Georg Keienburg (2014) “The 
Relevance of Financial versus Non-Financial Information for the Valuation of 
Venture Capital-Backed Firms”, European Accounting Review Forthcoming. 
Steiner, P. O. (1975) Mergers: Motives, effects, policies, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Stigler, G. J. (1987) The Theory of Price, London: Collier Macmillan, 4th ed. 
Sun, J., Ding, L., Guo, M. and Li, Y. (2015) Ownership, Capital Structure and 
323 
 
Financing Decision: Evidence from the UK”, The British Accounting Review 
Forthcoming. 
Tang, Yinuo Madhavan (2015) The value of productivity in emerging market firms' 
cross-border acquisitions of developed market firms, ProQuest Dissertations and 
Theses. 
Tao, Fang, Liu, Xiaohui, Gao, Lan and Xia, Enjun, (2017) “Do cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions increase short-term market performance? The case of Chinese 
firms”, International Business Review, 26(1), pp.189-202. 
Temporal, P. (2002) Advanced Brand Management: from Vision to Valuation, 
Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd. 
Titman, S. and Roberto, W. (1988) “The determinants of capital structure choice”, 
Journal of Finance, 43, pp.1–19. 
Tian, Lihui and Saul, Estrin (2008) “Retained state shareholding in Chinese PLCs: 
does government ownership always reduce corporate value?”, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 36(1), pp.74-89. 
Travlos, N. (1987) “Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding 
Firms' Stock Returns”, The Journal of Finance, 42(4), pp.943. 
Trautwein, F. (1990) “Merger motives and prescriptions”, Strategic Management 
Journal, 11, pp.283–295. 
Trautwein, F. (1990) “Merger motives and prescriptions”, Strategic Management 
Journal, 11(4), pp.283-95. 
Uddin, M. and Boateng, A. (2011) “Explaining the trends in the UK cross-border 
mergers & acquisitions: An analysis of macro-economic factors”, International 
Business Review, 20(5), pp.547-556. 
United Nations Conference (2006) World investment report 2010: FDI from 
developing and transition economies, New York, NY: UNCTAD. 
UNCTAD (2000) World Investment Report 2000: Cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions and Development, United Nations, New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2010) World 
324 
 
Investments Prospects Survey 2010-2012, New York and Geneva. 
Villalonga, B. (2004) “Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence from the 
Business Information Tracking Series”, Journal of Finance, 59(2), pp.479-506. 
Vijgen, D. (2007) Shareholders wealth effects on mergers and acquisitions in the 
Western part of Continental Europe, University of Maastricht. 
Wang, T. (2004) M&A analysis and value creation of Chinese enterprises, Beijing 
Economic Science Press. 
Wang, X. (2007) Searching for the motives and effectiveness of Chinese mergers and 
Acquisitions, University of Hong Kong. 
Wang, C., Chu, C. and Li, X. (2001) “The empirical study on the restructuring 
performance in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets”, China Securities Daily. 
Wansley, J.W., Lane, W.R. and Yang, H.C. (1983) “Shareholder returns to USA 
acquired ﬁrms in foreign and domestic acquisitions”, Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, 10(4), pp.647-56. 
Weston, J. F. (1953) The role of mergers in the growth of large firms, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Weston, J. F. (2004) Takeovers, restructuring, and corporate governance, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ : Pearson Education International. 
Wei, Zuobao, Feixue Xie and Shaorong Zhang (2005) “Ownership structure and firm 
value in China's privatized firms: 1991–2001”, Journal of financial and 
quantitative analysis, 40(1), pp.87-108. 
Weidenbaum, M. and Vogt, S. (1987) “Takeovers and Stockholders: Winners and 
Losers”, California Management Review, 29(4), pp.157-168. 
Weinberg and Blank (1979) Takeovers and mergers, London: Sweet&Maxwell. 
Whitaker, S.C. and Hoboken, N.J. (2012) Mergers & acquisitions integration 
handbook: helping companies realize the full value of acquisitions, N.J.: Wiley. 
Wu S. (1996) Efficiency analysis of Chinese securities market, Beijing: Economic 
Research Press, pp.13-19. 
Wu, Wenfeng, Chongfeng Wu and Oliver, M., Rui. (2012) “Ownership and the value 
325 
 
of political connections: Evidence from China”, European Financial 
Management, 18(4), pp.695-729. 
Yao, Ziping and Shi, Kan (2010) Study on the Organizational Culture Integration in 
the Post-M&A, 2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government, 
pp.1246-1248. 
Yao, Shujie, Dylan, Sutherland and Chen, Jian (2010) “China's Outward FDI and 
Resource-Seeking Strategy: A Case Study on Chinalco and Rio Tinto”, 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 17(3), pp.313-325. 
Yeh, Tsung-Ming and Hoshino, Yasuo (2002) “Productivity and operating 
performance of Japanese merging firms: Keiretsu-related and independent 
mergers”, Japan & The World Economy, 14(3), pp.347-366. 
Yeh, Tsung‐Ming (2012) “Do Private Equity Funds Increase Firm Value? Evidence 
from Japanese Leveraged Buyouts”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
24(4), pp.112-128. 
Yook, K. (2003) “Larger Return to Cash Acquisitions: Signaling Effect or Leverage 
Effect”, Journal of Business, 76(3), pp.477-498. 
Yu G. and Yang R. (2000) “The theoretical analysis and empirical analysis on the 
M&A enterprise price effect”, Contemporary Finance & Economics, pp.70-74. 
Zhang, Haiyan and Daniel Van Den Bulcke (2014) “China‟s direct investment in the 
European Union: a new regulatory challenge?”, Asia Europe Journal, 12(1-2), 
pp.159-177. 
Zhang, J., He, X. and van Gorp, D. M. (2017) “Economic freedom and cross-border 
acquisitions from emerging markets into developed economies”, Thunderbird 
international business review, 59(3), pp.313-331. 
Zhang, X. and Zhang, V. Y. (2010) “Chinese Merger Control: Pattern and 
Implications”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 6(2), pp.477-496. 
Zhang, X. (2003) Whether mergers and acquisitions create value, Beijing: Economic 
Research Press, pp. 20-29. 
326 
 
Zhang, X. (2003) Whether Acquisition and Mergers and Reorganizations can create 
value, Economic Research, 6, Jiangsu: Nanking University. 
Zhang. Z.X. (2003) Did M&A Create Value? , Economic Research. 
Zhao, Sxb (2003) “Spatial restructuring of financial centers i mainland China and 
Hong Kong: a geography of finance perspective”, Urban Affairs Review, 38(4), 
pp.535-571. 
Zhou, B., Guo, M. J., Hua, J. and Doukas, A. J. (2012) “Does State Ownership Drive 
M&A Performance? Evidence from China”, European Financial Management. 
Zhou, X. and Zhang, X. (2010) “Strategic Analysis of Synergistic Effect on M&A of 
Volvo Car Corporation by Geely Automobile”, iBusiness, 3, pp.5-15. 
Zollo, M. and Meter, D. (2008) “What is M & A Performance?”, Academy of 
Management Perspectives, 22, pp.55-77. 
